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Abstract
Small Firms, Globa! Economies:
The Economic Sociology of the Northwest Atlantic Sea Urchin Industry
by
Sean R. Lauer 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1999
Ltkf. a  field  on  fir e . So w en t  th e  sea  u r c h in  in d u str y  a c c o r d in g  t o  one
participant Over the course of the industry’s history, more than one observer has
described its development in a similar fashion: a gold rush, a boom.
When the draggers, and then the divers that started getting into i t  it was 
like a field fire. You light a match, and then the sm alle r it starts...
Everybody who had any kind of fondness to the water, some that didn’t 
even, wasn’t fond of the water, couldn’t even swim. It was, like I say, like 
a field on fire around here for a while.
In 1985 the green sea urchin was little more than a nuisance to local fishermen. They 
clogged the traps of lobstermen creating extra work. Perhaps more important, sea urchins 
threatened the coastal ecology by damaging kelp beds that provide food and shelter for 
other fish essential to local economies. This changed when the “trash” fish became a 
commodity with dramatically rising value in international markets. The vast majority of 
East Coast sea urchins supply a Japanese market where the roe is a delicacy popular 
during holidays.
This dissertation examines the organ isational dynamics of firms operating in the 
East Coast sea urchin industry. First, I examine the confluence of economic and political
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
conditions under which the industry evolved. As a part of the export driven growth of the 
past decade in the US the East Coast sea urchin industry benefited from political 
conditions, which encouraged development of global markets for US products. Along 
with this, the Japanese have displayed a seemingly insatiable demand for sea urchin roe 
through the 1990s. In 1971 the governance of the international monetary system changed 
from a fixed to floating exchange rate. The yen’s value began to increase compared to 
other currencies making export of products to Japan financially viable. These economic 
and political conditions set the stage for the East Coast sea urchin industry.
To explain how the industry developed I draw on theory and research from 
Institutional Economics and Economic Sociology to address entrepreneurial processes, 
labor market processes, and exchange processes. A supply of sea urchins existed on the 
East Coast as the Japanese demand grew, but the link between supply and demand 
remained unfilled. Entrepreneurs in the industry established firms to link supply and 
demand. With a link between supply and demand established, firms were faced with 
mobilizing a labor force for the new industry. Labor market processes include the 
recruitment of workers by entrepreneurs and the development o f skills and technologies 
for completing essential activities within the productive system. With the recruitment of 
labor it becomes necessary to coordinate the essential activities of the productive system. 
Participants coordinate exchange within a productive system through hierarchies, 
networks or markets.
As the East Coast sea urchin industry was established and evolved these three 
processes (entrepreneurial, labor market, and exchange) combined to facilitate
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
establishment and growth o f the new industry. The entrepreneurs that moved into the 
new industry attempted to increase the size of their firm s and the amount of production. 
Existing production arrangements on the working waterfront provided access to the 
natural resource, flexible technologies, an existing knowledge base, and unique social 
arrangements that allowed the easy movement of a labor force into the new industry. 
Finally, a market form of organizing exchange developed with an institutionalized 
distrust between participants.
The case of the East Coast sea urchin industry provides an opportunity to examine 
the sociology of economic life. Its position within a global economy, and its economic 
boom characteristics provide a valuable empirical case study in the growing field of 
economic sociology.
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In t r o d u c t io n
A REVOLUTION IN INSHORE COASTAL FISHERIES HAS OCCURRED OVER THE LAST TWO 
decades. A growing number of small-scale fishermen in coastal communities around the 
country are harvesting unusual species such as elvers, sea cucumbers, slime eels and sea 
urchins for markets on the other side of the globe. Small-scale inshore fisheries are not 
new to these coasts. However, the process and product of these new fisheries signal a 
fundamental break with previous practices. The most obvious difference lies in the 
products these fisheries provide—species of marine life that were previously little valued 
by local harvesters working in predominantly Western and often local markets. The fish 
and shellfish themselves do not appear appetizing to the Western palate, and the 
Westerners working in these fisheries rarely have eaten the product themselves.
Perhaps more striking to the social observer are the market characteristics o f these 
fisheries. They serve predominantly Asian customers who do not consider these species 
unusual. Looking more closely at sea urchins, the Japanese have long considered sea 
urchin roe a delicacy serving it over rice for holidays and other special occasions (Wilen 
and Wessells, 1997). Until the 1970s, the Japanese ate sea urchin roe harvested from 
local waters; a fixed international exchange rate made sea urchin fisheries outside o f 
Japan uneconomical, hi 1971, the governance o f the international monetary system 
changed from a fixed to floating exchange rate (McMichael, 1996,1994), and the value 
of the yen began to increase compared to other currencies. This made foreign goods
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2cheaper for Japanese consumers and non-Japanese sea urchin fisheries supplying 
Japanese consumers became economically viable (Muraoka, 1990). The result was 


















Figure 1.1 Changes in World Sea Urchin Landings (MT) Compared with the Changing Value of 
the Dollar versus the Yen.
The analysis to follow examines the development and organizational dynamics of 
one of these “New Fisheries,” the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry. The dynamics 
of supply and demand discussed above are essential to this industry’s development. 
However, the analysis here focuses on the productive processes between supply and 
demand that contributed to the industry’s development —  how supply and demand 
become linked to form an industry. I approach this problem with a concern for the 
evolutionary path of organizational development.
■ Do the revolutionary changes taking place in inshore fisheries include new 
organizational arrangements or strategies for survival?
■ How do these new industries develop? Who takes advantage o f the opportunities that 
develop?
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3■ Do fiims within this new fishery develop long-term reciprocal relationships similar to 
other small-scale inshore fisheries?
■ Do market based or bureaucratic organizational strategies arise under the new 
institutional circumstances?
These questions address the central problems addressed by this research: the 
problem of organizing production. More than practical necessity, there is a variety of 
ways to organize production, and the process o f organizing production can have varying 
consequences for the evolution of the industry, hi particular, the analysis to come 
considers the organizational dynamics o f small-firms.
Small-Firms in Global Economies
One paradox of the late twentieth century is the persistence and growth o f small firms 
(Granovetter, 1984; Sabel and Zeitlin, 1985). The paradox lies in the growth o f these 
small-firms, often firmly rooted in particular regions, as the range o f markets and 
production has begun to span the globe (Saxenian, 1994). Social observers have turned 
their attention to small firms in global economies.
Of particular interest to economic sociology, these small-firms have developed 
unique organizational dynamics that have lead to an exciting area of research on 
economic institutions (Lazerson, 1988). This research agenda has begun to document 
the variety of exchange relationships between small firms that exist in the productive 
process. Institutional economists with an interest in the development o f large 
bureaucratic firms originally found this research within their purview. Large firms 
maintain control o f a wide range of productive activities through vertical integration. 
Rather than use market transactions to obtain goods, goods flow through long-term, 
hierarchical exchange relations. In an effort to understand the decision to use markets or
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
hierarchies in production, institutional economists began to examine productive 
arrangements to uncover the use of markets and hierarchies.1 In a surprising turn, 
researchers uncovered a set of productive exchange arrangements that were neither 
markets nor hierarchies.2
Economists initially termed these arrangements a hybrid between market and 
hierarchy. However, economic sociologists began to take interest and identified the new 
set of exchange arrangements networks of production or small-firm networks. In the 
network form o f productive arrangements resources and transactions flow through small- 
firms linked by reciprocal mutually supportive actions. The relations are non- 
hierarchical, but they are not the anonymous one-time exchanges associated with 
markets. Powell (1990a) finds the relationships in networks provide advantages in 
productive environments with uncertain resource supplies or demand. These 
environments require regular innovation and adaptation. Information is essential to this 
process, and the strong reciprocal ties provide flows of reliable information.
These networks of production encompass a variety of organizational 
arrangements. In some cases, they are tight-knit relations between independent 
businesses, what Eccles (1981) calls a quasi-firm. Customers and suppliers who work 
together regularly develop strong long-term ties o f mutual satisfaction (Eccles, 1981; 
Wilson, 1980). A number of researchers have found network relations to concentrate in 
certain regions; Silicon Valley in California, the Emilia-Romagna Region of Northern 
Italy, and Southwestern Germany (Saxenian, 1994; Brusco, 1982; Herrigel, 1990). In 
these industrial districts, networks of small-firms collaborate to produce a variety of
1 The theoretic work o f Oliver Williamson (1975,1985) is most important in this research agenda.
2 See Powell (1990) for a discussion of this development. The insights found there inform this review.
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5products. Small firms collaborate on a project by project basis based on the skills and 
technology o f the collaborators. Consequently, the diversity o f skills and technology 
along with the dense reciprocal ties o f the firms allow the district to adapt easily to 
market changes. The Japanese and Korean business groups cross both industry and 
regional boundaries. These networks o f  independent firms cooperate exclusively, 
develop a shared group identity, and have an authoritative structure (Granovetter, 1994; 
Yoshino and Lifson, 1986).
The growing evidence for the proliferation and variety o f networks of production 
has provided an exciting empirical and theoretical environment for economic sociology 
as researchers attempt to uncover the products and processes of these forms. The 
theoretical questions raised by cooperative relations in economic life - an area typically 
considered the realm of self-seeking actions -  are particularly interesting.
■ Do social forces influence the initiation and development o f these unique 
organizational forms?
■ Do the cooperation and trust found in these relations result from rational pursuit o f  
self-interest? Do they rely on the influence o f existing social relations in economic 
life?
■ Much is made o f the advantages o f networks. Do limits to the adaptability o f these 
organizational forms exist? Do social forces constrain the adaptability of production 
networks?
Chapter 1 develops the theoretical aspects o f these questions. Below I look more 
closely at the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry considering why it serves as a 
unique opportunity to examine these questions.
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6The Northwest Atlantic Sea Urchin Industry
Following the emergence and development of the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry 
provides insight into the organizational dynamics of small firms in global economies. 
First, the history of the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin fishery takes place within the 
context o f a larger international market for sea urchin Uni in Japan. Stongylocentrotus 
droebachiensis (the green sea urchin from now on) is a member o f the Enchinoderm 
phylum along with starfish, sand dollars, and sea cucumbers. There are over 800 species 
o f urch ins around the world including the red and purple urchins found along the West 
Coast o f North America. The green sea urchin is about the size o f a tennis ball slightly 
flattened at the poles. It is a shellfish with short green spines extending through its shell, 
and found in shallow inter-tidal pools or in ocean depths as great as 80 to 90 feet. They 
are most common in the shallow subtidal zone under 30’ on rocky, gravely or shelly 
ocean floors.
The sea urchin’s reproductive organs, their roe, are a delicacy in Japan called Uni. 
If  you were to crack open a sea urchin from its bottom center, you would notice the 
urchin’s reproductive organs. The roe is orange, triangular and resembles a tangerine 
wedge. There are five pieces o f roe, which make up 10 to 25 percent of the urchin weight 
They are arranged like a star inside the urchin. The roe is essentially a storage organ for 
nutrients not immediately needed for regular body metabolism. When the urchin eats 
well, the gonad development reaches its ideal orange-yellow color and increases in size. 
When food levels are low or not ideal, the sea urchin uses nutrients from the gonads for 
regular metabolism and the roe takes on a gray color.
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7Uni has traditionally come from the waters surrounding Japan where two types o f 
urchins are found resembling the green and red sea urchins. The Japanese consumer 
prefers the Japanese urchin above all others, and prefers other varieties of urchin that 
approach this urchin in size, color, and texture. Prices for the sea urchin are set in the 
Tsukiji Auction, the large Tokyo seafood auction, and vary according to demand, and 
competition from other sources. The demand for Uni is highest during the holidays from 
mid December through early January, although spurts o f demand occur during other 
holidays such as the Japanese equivalent of thanksg iv in g  in mid-August.
A Global Industry
The sea urchin industry was traditionally domestic to Japan. However, within the 
last three decades the industry has become an international productive system. This 
change from domestic to international productive system developed from changes of 
international monetary agreements. In 1944, the Bretton-Woods agreement set a fixed 
exchange rate for currency exchange. In 1971, President Nixon instituted a floating 
exchange rate to replace the fixed exchange rates. For the Yen to Dollar exchange, these 
changes resulted in a decline in value of the Dollar vs. the Yen resulting in favorable 
export conditions from the US to Japan. For instance, in 1970, 360 Yen could buy one 
Dollar worth of US goods. In 1993, 360 Yen could buy over three Dollars worth of US 
goods. The dropping value of the Dollar compared to the Yen has continued with the 
Japanese Yen able to purchase more US goods for the same price as the value o f  the 
Dollar dropped.3 These changes meant increased profits for importing US sea urchin. 
Importing lower quality sea urchin sold for a lower price became profitable, also.
3 See Figure 1.1 p. 2.



















Figure 1.2 Following the West Coast Sea Urchin Industry, the East Coast Sea Urchin Industry 
Peaked in 1993.
Seafood has always been an important part o f the Japanese diet, and with the 
strengthening of the Yen there began a steady increase o f seafood imports to Japan (see 
Figure 1.2). In many cases, the unique tastes of the Japanese led to harvesting o f species 
underutilized outside o f Japan. In the US, federal initiatives to increase exports to Japan 
accompanied these favorable economic conditions.4 In the mid to late 1970s the United 
States negotiated a number o f multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, known as “Fish 
and Chips” policy, to reduce US seafood import barriers to foreign countries. In Japan, 
these agreements included reduced tariffs on underutilized species such as squid and eels. 
The combined economic and political conditions resulted in increased US exports to 
Japan beginning in the 1970s. The sea urchin industry fits within these global economic 
and political changes. Non-Japanese landings of sea urchins were first recorded in 1975,
4 Hayes, Robert 1982. Speech given at University of Maine Marine Law Institute Conference on East 
Coast Fisheries Law.
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9in 1983 non-Japanese landings surpassed Japanese landings, and today non-Japanese 
landings more than double landings domestic to Japan (see Figure 1.4). The dramatic 
increase of world landings and the slight decline in Japanese landings are both a result of
the increased demand for Uni among Japanese.
SB
19851975
Figure 13 Japanese Imports of Seafood have. Increased Steadily Since 1971.
1995
The first sea urchin fishery in the North America developed in the mid 1970s on 
the US West Coast where fishermen began harvesting, and processors began exporting, 
the large red sea urchin. West Coast landings peaked in 1988 and have dropped off as 
landings increased in other regions (see Figure 1.3). On the East Coast o f North 
America, sea urchin populations are concentrated in the Gulf o f Maine because their 
reproductive processes require cold waters. This has concentrated the industry on the 
North Eastern Coast, particularly the US state o f Maine. Urchin populations in the Gulf 
o f Maine began to grow in the early 1980s. A group of University biologists watched as 
one of their study areas changed from a  diverse ecological community to an “urchin
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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barren,” or a homogenous carpet of green sea urchins. Similar processes were taking 
place around the Gulf of Maine as sea urchin populations increased in their density and 
geographic expansion. This increase in urchin populations provided the raw product 









Figure L4 Non-Japanese Landings of Sea Urchins Surpassed Japanese Landings in 1983, and
have Continued to Grow
1985
The Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry really got started in the years from 
1985 to 1988 when a set of firms in Maine began buying and exporting sea urchins for 
the Japanese consumer. Before this, some fishermen harvested sea urchins, and a few 
dealers along the coast bought sea urchins for a small domestic market. There had long 
been a domestic demand for sea urchin roe in sushi restaurants and among some 
European immigrant populations. These urchins were sold in large cities such as New 
York and Chicago where ethnic restaurants and consumers desired the sea urchin roe. 
However, in the mid-1980s three companies in particular, The Urchin Merchant, ISF
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Trading, and Seafood Atlantic, began buying, processing and exporting sea urchins from 
Maine. For the next 7 years, these three exporters handled a majority of the sea urchins 
bought and exported from Maine. The industry developed quickly, and in 1993 sea 
urchin was Maine’s second largest fishery behind lobsters, selling nearly 20 thousand 
metric tons worth S30 million (see Figure 13). During these boom years competition 
among buyers increased. The three large exporters always competed among themselves, 
but at this time, a number of small upstart buyers entered the industry. The new 
competition sent prices soaring, and at times, buyers would be at the wharves bidding 
against each other for a harvester’s catch.
Small Firm Production
The Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry appears to rely on the productive 
activities o f small firms located along the East Coast of the US. To produce sea urchin 
Uni for the Japanese consumer involves harvesting sea urchins, landing and transporting 
the catch to a processor, separating the eggs from the urchin, and bringing the Uni to the 
Japanese market. A large number o f formally independent small-firms carry out these 
separate activities.
Harvesting Sea Urchins
There are currently 1,385 independently licensed harvesters using two different 
methods of harvesting, scuba diving, and dragging. Harvesters actually take the urchin 
from the ocean using the different forms o f technology. Table 1.1 contains some basic 
quantitative information on sea urchin harvesters.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
12
Diving. SCUBA diving is the dominant form o f sea urchin harvesting around the 
world. Divers spend from 4 to 6 hours a day in winter waters filling totes with urchins 
collected from the ocean floor with a small hand held tool. The divers choose a site to 
harvest, and search the bottom filling the totes with their catch. They dump their totes in 
large trays holding approximately 60 to 100 pounds o f live sea urchins. At times, a diver 
could harvest over 30 trays a day. Because they can closely monitor their catch, the 
divers are able to collect a high quality urchin.
When the fishery first began many divers went out alone on a small skiff to dive 
for urchins. Diving alone can be very dangerous; a number o f accidents occurred and 
some lives were lost. Currently all divers are mandated by the State of Maine to bring a 
licensed tender on board to man the boats while divers work the ocean floor. Tending 
primarily involves diver safety, but includes some harvesting duties that take place out of 
the water such as moving urchins from totes to trays, and culling the catch for undersized 
and low quality urchins. Both divers and tenders are independent contractors. They 
work together in a few different ways. Some divers own their own boat, hire a tender, 
and pay him a proportion o f the catch value that day (the lay system5). Some tenders own 
boats, and contract them out as a diving platform. These tenders receive a fee to take out 
divers and provide tending duties. Other divers combine these options. They own their 
own boat, hire a tender using the lay system, and contract out their boat for other divers 
to use as a platform. Still other divers work out unique arrangements, including diving 
and tending partnerships. These divers switch diving and tending duties every other day 
and split earnings each day.
5 For a discussion of die lay system of pay see Doeringer et al. (1986).
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Of the 1,385 current licensed harvesters 72% (997) are divers. Since 1994, when 
DMR started collecting licensing information, 1,135 divers have chosen not to renew 
their licenses. Most likely, this means they have stopped diving, but perhaps some of 
these divers continue to harvest illegally. All current divers are residents o f Maine, and 
they live in any number o f  communities along the coast.
Table 1.1 1996-97 Season Licensing Data 
for Sea Urchin Dealers,
Processors, Exporters, and 
_________ Harvesters6._______________________
■ 80 sea urchin dealers
■ 19 sea urchin processors.
■ 10 sea urchin transporters.
■ 23 1994-95 firms remaining in industry.
■ 997 Sea urchin divers.
■ 388 sea urchin draggers.___________________
6 Data compiled from licensing information collected by DMR.
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Stew is a diver who grew up on the coast o f Maine in a suburb just east o f  
Portland. He started in fisheries digging clams and later learned to scuba dive for 
scallops. He began diving for urchins in the mid 1980s and worked along the south 
shore. For the last four years, he has been working out of a small port town in downeast 
Maine. During the season he pays for a room by the night and takes occasional trips back 
down to Portland. He does not mind migrating, and has made some friends in the town. 
Also, many say the urchins are better downeast Stew dives alone from his small boat, or 
skiff. He has constructed a shelter for it to keep warm in the winter. He has always had 
trouble finding a tender and recently convinced his younger brother Riley to migrate with 
him. They work together when they can. If  Riley cannot tend, Stew has found one local 
man that can often fill in.
Dragging. The East Coast is the only sea urchin fishery that uses the dragging 
technology to harvest sea urchins. A dragger’s boat includes a large tow that scrapes the 
ocean floor and catches the urchins disrupted by the scrape. Fishermen use this 
technology in the groundfish or scallop fisheries and switch to the urchin fishery during 
its season. In the early years, before the Japanese demand, dealers in the domestic 
markets encouraged local draggers to try harvesting sea urchins. Diving was not a 
common fishing technology, and the draggers were successful. They knew where the 
urchins were from emptying their drags while fishing for scallops. Draggers can not 
collect as high quality urchin as the divers because o f the less selective method.
Dragging also can damage the urchins, cracking shells and breaking spines, which 
decreases the value o f  the catch. Many draggers use a “Green drag,” which is lighter than
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
15
a scallop drag. The lighter drag is good for urchin fishing because it does less damage to 
the urchin. John Green, a dragger fishing for sea urchins in the early days of the fishery, 
invented the “Green drag.” He knew he could increase the value o f his catch by 
decreasing the damage done while dragging, so he designed a drag to protect the urchin. 
When the industry grew John Green marketed his “Green Drag” to other draggers getting 
into the new fishery.
A dragger’s boat and gear require a more substantial capital investment than a 
diver's does. They must pay a larger crew to operate the larger boat, and some own more 
than one boat with a hired crew and captain. Typically, draggers in the sea urchin fishery 
used their boat and gear in another fishery before trying sea urchins. They got into the 
sea urchin fishery for supplemental income during the closed period of the scallop or 
shrimp fisheries. O f the 1,385 currently licensed harvesters 388 (28%) are draggers.
Crusty owns two boats that drag for sea urchins in Downeast Maine. He fishes 
from a port 20 minutes drive from his home. He and the crew spend a few nights a week 
living on the boat while fishing. Crusty captains one boat, and his long-time friend Tim 
captains the other. Each boat’s crew includes two laborers that clean the drag and cull 
the urchins. Although Crusty handles the recruitment o f labor and the payroll for the 
boats, he allows Tim the freedom to pursue his captain work independently. Tim chooses 
when and where to fish without having to consult Crusty. Crusty’s boats use a “Green 
drag” which is lighter than his scallop drag. After the urchin season, Crusty switches 
back to the heavy drag for the scallop season.
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Buying, Transporting, Processing and Exporting
Harvesters collect urchins from the ocean floor and bring them to a local dock or 
wharf. A day’s harvest of sea urchins passes through several actors’ hands before 
reaching its final destination in Japan. These include coast-side dealers, processors, and 
exporters. For most harvesters the coast-side dealer is the person they meet at the wharf. 
The coast-side dealer then transports the product from the draggers and divers at the 
wharf to larger dealers or processors. These are small firms, sometimes a single 
individual working independently, and sometimes not a formally recognized business. 
Most coast-side dealers do not actually buy the urchins, but transport them to a wholesale 
exporter or processor for a percentage o f the payment made to the harvester. The coast- 
side dealer make anywhere from five to 20 cents on the pound, paid by a wholesaler or 
processor. Coast-side dealers can be formally independent firms recognized as a small 
business legally and recognized by the Department of Marine Resources as a sea urchin 
buyer. These firms often sell all their sea urchins to a regular customer, although some 
divide their sales among a few customers.
Other coast-side dealers are recognized legally as independent firms, but are not 
recognized as sea urchin buyers by the Department of Marine Resources. These firm s 
obtain permission to buy sea urchins by working under a wholesaler or processor. These 
dealers may work under more than one customer’s license, although they often sell 
exclusively to one customer. Still other coast-side dealers are not recognized 
independent businesses or recognized buyers. It is difficult to estimate the number of 
coast-side dealers in the sea urchin fishery7. There are at least 60 coast-side dealers
7 OMR uses a blanket dealers license for any firm that buys or transports sea urchins in the sate. This 
includes many processors and wholesalers along with independent coast-side dealers. There are also
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independently recognized by the DMR as sea urchin buyers. However, it is hard to say 
how many o f these recognized buyers are active and there could be any number o f  non­
recognized coast-side dealers operating in the many small East Coast ports.
Processors actually separate the roe from the urchin and package it for sale in the 
Japanese market. A processor requires a facility to process the urchins, equipment for 
processing, and finances to buy a large amount of the resource and hire a labor force. 
Many o f the sea urchin processors labor force comes from the Cambodian and 
Vietnamese refugee community. This community was attracted to the job because it 
includes flexible hours and no language or western cultural expertise. Many processors 
believe the Southeast Asians have a special talent for the work. Processing requires a 
certain skilled delicacy with the product. The processors believe this group has a talent 
for combining this delicate handling with speed.
some Canadian firms that solely transport sea urchins to Maine processors. Non-recognized dealers 
further complicate the estimation. DMR recognizes 80 dealers, 19 of which are processors. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that each area includes at least one or two buyers, which might lead to estimates 
of over 100 coast-side dealers.
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Mati Ohsono originally woriced for a Japanese trading company. At one time he 
had nothing to do with sea urchins; he bought and sold large machinery. However, in 
1989 his company was looking for someone to come to Maine and work in the sea urchin 
industry. Ohsono volunteered to move his family to this country. When he first came to 
the US he was buying whole sea urchins from middlemen and would then ship them to 
Japan where his trading company would take over the distribution o f the product. He did 
this until 1992 when he won a lottery for a green card, and realized he could start his own 
business here in the US. His former employer encouraged him to do this.
Today Oshono runs his own processing plant in Portland. He hired a staff of 
Cambodian and Vietnamese processors who work piece rate. He receives his supply 
from three separate coast-side dealers, one each in the south-shore, mid-coast, and 
downeast regions. Oshono no longer sells exclusively to his trading company. Instead, 
he sells 70% of his product at a fixed price to a retail distributor, and 30% he sends to the 
Tsukiji Auction in Tokyo through a broker.
Table 1.1 shows that during the 1996-97 sea urchin season 47 firms held a license 
to buy or transport sea urchins in the state o f Maine8. Ten of these dealers were also 
processors, and five other firms held only processing licenses. Though five of these firms 
only work in the sea urchin fishery, most hold licenses in at least one other fishery. 
Dealers and processors hold licenses to buy or process an average of 9 other species and 
25% hold 16 or more other seafood industry licenses. There were 20 firms with license 
to export to Japan in 1994-95. These firms typically held a license in buying or
8 All quantitative data on dealers, processors and exporters compiled from DMR records on license holders.
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processing urchins also. Ten of these fhms held licenses to export other species, while 
ten only export urchins. A few firms export to other Asian countries as well.
The data on the 1996-97 season is not as complete as the 1994-95 season. 
However, there are some interesting changes from the limited data. There are 90 firms 
currently licensed to buy or transport sea urch ins in the state of Maine. New to the 1996- 
97 season, a few firms were based outside the state o f Maine. Four firms buy sea urchins 
in Canada and buy a permit to transport their urchins to buyers and processors in the state 
of Maine. Six others buy sea urchins in Maine, but then transport them to processing 
plants in Massachusetts and New York. Of the remaining 80 firm s 19 (24%) are 
processors located in Maine. In contrast to 1994-95, processors have begun to 
concentrate in Portland where 13 of the 19 current processors are located. A number o f 
firms have dropped out o f the industry in the two seasons since 1994-95. Only 23 (43%) 
of the firms involved in any of the three sectors (dealer, processor, exporter) o f the 
industry in 1994-95 are currently licensed to buy sea urchins.
The Analysis to Come
The remainder o f this dissertation addresses the evolutionary path o f organizational 
development of the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry. It follows the emergence and 
development of exchange structures between firms within this changing international 
circumstance. The analysis addresses two primary questions: What kind o f  economic 
organization has come to fill this niche? Why did this form of economic organization 
develop, and not some other? Following the discussion above, the research addresses the 
organizational dynamics of small-firms in particular. The research will addresses several 
questions concerning these dynamics:
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■ How do social forces influence the initiation and development o f these unique 
organizational forms?
■ Do the cooperation and trust found in these relations result from rational pursuit of 
self-interest? Do they rely on the influence of existing social relations in economic 
life?
■ Much is made of the advantages o f networks. Do limits to the adaptability o f these 
organizational forms exist? How might social forces constrain the adaptability of 
production networks?
In the chapters to come, I address these questions through an analysis of three economic 
processes: entrepreneurial processes, labor market processes, and exchange processes.
Entreprenenrial Processes
A supply of sea urchins existed on the East Coast as the Japanese demand grew. 
However, the link between supply and demand remained unfilled. Entrepreneurs in the 
industry established firms to link supply and demand.
Labor Processes
With a link between supply and demand established, firms were faced with 
mobilizing a labor force for the new industry. Labor market processes include the 
recruitment o f workers by entrepreneurs and the development o f  skills and technologies 
for completing essential activities within the productive system.
Exchange Processes
With the recruitment of labor, it becomes necessary to coordinate the essential 
activities of the productive system. Participants coordinate exchange within a productive 
system through markets, hierarchies, or networks.
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Before turning to these three processes, the following chapter returns to the 
questions posed above further developing them with discussions o f  relevant research, 
methodology, and the perspective of economic sociology that I apply to this case.
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Ch a pter  1
Th e  E c o n o m ic  S o c io l o g y  o f  th e  
N o r th w e st  A tla n tic  Sea  Ur c h in  In d u st r y
S o c io lo g is ts  h a v e  b e e n  i n t e r e s t e d  in  th e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  eco n o m y  a n d  
society since the discipline’s inception. However, the last ten years have seen a 
rejuvenation of economic sociology as a sub-discipline within sociology, sometimes even 
referred to as the “new” economic sociology9. One way to understand the new economic 
sociology is to consider it a reaction to the imperialistic actions o f economists. Neo­
classical economists such as Gary Becker began to examine traditionally sociological 
phenomena and apply economic explanations to them. In his well known Treatise on the 
Family (1981), for instance, Becker argues that decisions to marry, have children, or 
divorce are the result of cost-benefit economizing by individuals attempting to raise 
personal welfare. Taking these cost-benefit analyses towards sociological subjects such 
as racial discrimination and the family was typically met with praise in economics and in 
the general public.10 While some sociologists adopted these economic approaches, others 
reacted against them by providing sociological explanations for what were traditionally 
considered economic phenomena. Many contemporary sociological classics have come 
from this interaction. For instance, there is Coleman’s (1988) concept of social capital, and 
Granovetter’s (1985) discussion of embedded economic action, among others.
9 See Swedberg (1997) for a recent review and evaluation of this new field.
10 hi 1992 Gary Becker was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics.
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Economic sociology remains fundamentally different from the economic 
approach because it considers economy and economic actors an integral part of society. 
Table 1.1 contrasts the economic and economic sociology approaches to the economy. 
Economic analysis follows the assumptions o f methodological individualism, and reduces 
all economic phenomena to the purposeful actions o f autonomous individuals. The 
analysis begins with the individual actor unconnected to other actors or institutions.
These actors hold a stable set o f preferences and pursue those preferences with a formal 
economic rationality; they attempt to maximize utility or profit The only limits on these 
actions come from the actor’s tastes and the scarcity o f resources (including technology).
Economic sociology starts from a dramatically different set o f assumptions. We 
consider actors socially constructed through interpersonal interactions or through their 
place in society. The links to other actors and institutions form a fundamental part of this 
conception. Rationality is only one of many types o f action. Sociologists take seriously 
the importance of historically constructed meanings, and actions that are not purposeful 
or reflective. Complexity and uncertainty can limit rationality, and existing social, 
political and cultural circumstances can limit desired actions.
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Table 1.1 Comparison o f Econom ics and Economic Sociology
Economics Economic Sociology




The autonomous actor is 
uninfluenced by other 
actors.
Actor is embedded within social 
world.
The actor is influenced by other 
actors and is part o f groups and 
society.
Economic Action Assumed rationality.
All economic actions are 
rational actions.
Variable rationality.
Many different types o f  actions are 
used, including rational ones.
Constraints on the 
Actor
Economic actions are 
constrained by individual 
tastes and the scarcity o f 
resources.
Economic actions are constrained 
by social structures, structures of 
meaning, and scarcity o f 
resources.
The Relation of 
Economy to Society
All attention is given to 
the market and the 
economy.
The economy is an integral part of 










Multiple methods used including 
historical and comparative ones. 





The classics are not an 
important part o f the 
field.
Marx, Weber, Durkheim, 
Schumpter, Polanyi, 
Parsons/Smelser. Classics are an 
important part of the field.
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Economics attempts to focus attention on the economy, the market and exchange 
while putting social variables to the side, assuming their stability. In contrast, the 
sociology of economic life proposes that these same economic institutions are socially 
created, and that economic processes are in fact social processes developing within 
institutional constraints. The social constraints on economic phenomena include the 
ecological environment (Hannen and Freeman, 1984), relations with other organizations 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983,1991), and networks o f personal relations (Granovetter, 
1985). These differing social conditions both limit and create possibilities for economic 
action.
If the new economic sociology emerged from the polemical contrast described 
above, the polemics have died down to what we might consider a healthy cross­
fertilization. Economists and sociologists by training watch the work o f each other while 
walking a line between both disciplines." The dynamic area of research on small-firms 
and networks o f production typifies this kind o f dialogue across disciplines. As seen in 
the Introduction, these new arrangements prove interesting to the research agendas of 
both institutional economists and economic sociologists.12
Industries and Organizational Dynamics
As stated previously, this analysis examines the organizational arrangements of small 
firms in the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry, and the dynamic process that lead to 
these arrangements. The first step is to define the unit o f analysis, an industry, and the 
variables that affect the dynamics o f an industry. Industries are a particular type of
11 See Swedberg (1990) for an interesting discussion with a number of sociologists and economists who 
walk that line.
12 See Powell and Smith-Doer (1994:385-391) for a review of the variety of networks of production.
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economic institution (McGuire e t  al., 1993). They are made up o f  a set o f firms that 1) 
are a part of the same productive system, and 2) compete with firms that provide similar 
services or products. A productive system refers to the flow o f goods, services, and 
resources among technically separable units that transform raw materials into finished 
products (Yoshino and Lifson, 1986; Friedland e t  al., 1981; Peterson, 1978; Hirsch, 
1972;Katz and Kahn, 1966). These technologically separable units are interposed 
between a resource and final consumers. Productive systems can vary in their division of 
labor. The division o f labor varies in the extent to which the activities a part of a  
productive system are carried out by the same or different actors (Stinchcombe, 1983). A 
productive system can vary in the number o f  independent firms and the extent of 
competition between firms. It is this set o f firms, those carrying out essential activities 
within a particular productive system and competing with firms providing similar 
services, that make up an industry. The organizationalfield refers to a broader set of 
organizations that constitute a recognized area o f institutional life. An organizational 
field includes “key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and 
other organizations that produce similar services and products” (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983).13
My primary interest in this research is the formation of the Northwest Atlantic sea 
urchin industry and the organizational dynamics of small firms in this industry. Who 
initiated this new industry? How were initial relations established? How is the 
productive process organized? How has it changed? Answering these questions will
13 Hannon and Carroll (1995) use the term organizational community to capture a similar idea. The 
organizational field follows closely to McGuire et al.’s (1993) conception o f social structures influencing 
the social construction of industry also. I choose to use die organizational field concept because it 
includes the structural components included in Hannon and Carroll and McGuire et al, and adds a
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document the organizational arrangements in the industry, and demonstrate the 
importance o f sociological forces driving the institutional formation and change in this 
industry. Below I look more closely at the social forces that influence institutionalization 
and change in an industry by reviewing three o f the primary sociological perspectives on 
economic organization: organizational ecology, network, and new institutional 
approaches. With each approach, I consider the role of organizational structure including 
the cooperative or trusting relations between firms, and the important social forces that 
influence organizational dynamics in the approach. Although clear differences exist 
between these approaches, they each consider economic actions and institutions 
embedded within larger social structures. This contrasts with the primary economic 
approach to analyzing economic institutions, Transaction Cost Economics.
Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction cost economics (TCE from here) stems primarily from the work o f 
Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975,1985,1995). It is centered on the question o f  why 
firms organize productive activity one way, through markets, rather than another, through 
hierarchies (Coase, 1937:386). Markets and hierarchies are the primary organizational 
concepts within the TCE approach. Both market and hierarchical transactions are a 
means for goods to flow through a division o f labor within a productive system. Through 
market transactions a large number of technically separate units carry out one-time 
exchanges guided by self-interest. In the pure market form, partners to the transaction are 
anonymous; the price mechanism attracts actors to the exchange and requires no previous 
or future knowledge of exchange partners. The immediacy o f the exchange and its
cognitive dynamic to the structure. The organizational field conception is more inclusive of potential
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coordination by price requires no system wide governance or control. The pursuit o f self-
interest and the price mechanism allow for short term relations of mutual satisfaction.
The market ideal requires no lasting or integrated relationships.
Hierarchies provide a sharp contrast to market forms o f organization. Hierarchies
integrate a division of labor through formal bureaucratic organization. Exchange flows
through long-term relations governed by an authoritative power structure. Large firms
create hierarchies by maintaining control of the production flow from manufacturing to
distribution - called vertical integration. Blau (1993) succinctly captures production in
the vertically integrated firm:
Large firms sometimes buy their suppliers (instead o f buying their 
suppliers’ products or their raw materials) and buy their distributors and 
retailers (that is, buy the means of transportation and purchase outlets and 
franchises). Firms also hire permanent workers and buy land. Finally, 
coordination and adm inistration are largely centralized even when 
production is carried out elsewhere (129).
One productive enterprise may purchase resources from other productive enterprises 
through market exchange. Distribution of the product could flow through market 
transactions also. However, a hierarchical, vertically integrated firm organizes these 
transactions under a system of authority and centralized control rather than market 
exchange.
The market-hierarchy distinction, and the decision to integrate, forms the base for 
TCE analysis and its research agenda. Theoretically the distinction is a continuum which 
includes hybrid forms o f organization that lie between market and hierarchy known 
sometimes as networks (Thorelli, 1986), quasi-firms (Eccles, 1981), or clans (Ouchi,
1980). The hybrid form o f organizing economic activity includes aspects o f both markets
embedded activity as a result Also see March and Simon (1958).
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and hierarchies. They involve long-term relations, but without the formal governance
structures o f hierarchies.
The decision o f  a firm to organize productive activity through markets or
hierarchies lies in the amount of transaction costs associated with the exchange. The
transaction, transferring goods and services across technically separable units, is the unit
of analysis in the TCE approach to economic organization. Williamson (1981:552)
equates transaction costs to friction in mechanical systems:
Do the gears mesh, is there needless slippage or loss of energy? The 
economic counterpart to friction is transaction cost: Do the parties to an 
exchange operate harmoniously, are there frequent misunderstandings and 
conflicts that lead to delays, breakdowns and other malfunctions?
Friction, or transaction cost, is low when transactions are straightforward and non- 
repetitive, as in the market. However, transactions with uncertain outcomes, that recur 
frequently, and that include transaction specific investments (money, time, and energy) 
incur high transaction costs. Under these circum stances, hierarchical organization is 
more likely.
Trust between parties to a transaction, or the lack o f trust, forms an important part 
of the TCE perspective. A lack of trust in transactions is included in TCE as 
opportunism. Under market conditions with a large number of anonymous participants, 
trust does not play an important role in action. Price coordinates the exchange instead. 
However, when the number of participants is small, transactions recur frequently, and 
knowledge o f exchange partners is high, the possibility for opportunism arises. Similar 
to neo-classical economics, TCE makes the behavioral assumption that economic actors 
pursue their own self-interest. Acknowledging opportunism is to acknowledge the 
occurrence of self-interest seeking with guile. When the possibility for opportunistic
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behavior increases the costs of monitoring a transaction increases. In this way, 
opportunism often makes it cost effective to integrate activities in a hierarchical form 
rather than attempt to monitor the transaction in uncertain market conditions.14
In the TCE framework, the focus is on individual firms and their relationships 
with other firms. Specifically, the focus is on transactions and the decision to integrate 
transactions through different organizational forms: markets or hierarchies. Uncertainty, 
recurrent transactions, and transaction specific investments as a result o f opportunism 
(potential and actual) increase the costs o f a transaction leading to the decision to 
integrate an activity rather than rely on market mechanisms in a productive system. The 
micro economic focus o f TCE on transaction decisions contrasts with the macro focus of 
the first sociological approach to economic organization I examine, organization 
population ecology.
Organizational Ecology
Rather than examine the micro phenomena of an individual transaction, or even 
the adaptations and transformations of an individual firm, the Organizational Population 
Ecology (OPE from here) approach examines economic organization from an extreme 
macro position. The primary unit o f analysis in the OPE approach is the set of firms, or 
the population of firms, that make up an industry.15 While OPE is concerned with intra­
firm characteristics such as stated goals, forms of authority, core technology, and 
marketing strategy, the approach examines these characteristics at the population level
14 Bradich and Eccles (1988) provide a valuable overview of the governing mechanisms that overcome 
opportunism: price, authority and trust
15 Those following this perspective more often use the term organizational populations to describe the set of 
firms filling a niche, rather than an industry, bn order to m aintain a consistency throughout the 
dissertation I have decided to use the term industry to represent the organizational population. Hannon
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(Hannon and Freeman, 1984,1989). Population level thinking changes the focus of
analysis to the mix of firms operating in an industry, and variables such as population
density, founding rates, and mortality rates.
To better understand the dynamics o f a population o f firms OPE further specifies
the relationship between a population and its environment. Large social structural forces,
or environmental conditions, provide the resources necessary to build and sustain a
population o f firms forming an industry. These resources include capital, knowledge,
personnel, equipment, and customers among others (Carroll and Hannon, 1995:33). OPE
calls the relationship between these resources and the set o f firms in an industry a
fundamental niche:
[T]he fundamental niche o f  an organizational form consists o f the social, 
economic, and political conditions that can sustain the functioning of 
organizations that embody a particular form (Carroll and 
Hannon, 1995:34).
Under certain resource abundance or constraints firms can arise and persist. When a set 
of firms share a common dependence on certain environmental conditions, the same 
environmental niche, OPE considers those firms a population; a set o f firms making up 
the same industry. If  the environmental conditions o f a certain resource niche allow an 
industry to form, to grow, and to sustain its numbers, it follows that changes in 
environmental conditions may lead to changes in the industry. OPE proposes that the 
strong relationship between an industry and environmental conditions, and changes in the 
industry, are due to selection mechanisms.
Hawley (1968) first proposed the selective mechanisms created by environmental 
conditions. When the units of a population, firms in an industry for instance, face the
and Carroll (1995) follow the same convention, specifying that an industry is one type of organizational
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same environmental conditions competitive forces cause them to resemble each other. 
Hawley called this constraining process competitive isomorphism. Hannon and Freeman 
(1989) distinguish this selective process from adaptation mechanisms, which propose that 
changes in strategy and structure o f individual firms reflect responses to environmental 
changes, threats, or opportunities (150). Instead, the firms that already hold the strategy 
and structure are selected by the environmental conditions that exist In fact Hannon and 
Freeman (1989) find it is difficult for firms to adapt to changing environmental 
conditions. More often as conditions change a new cohort o f  firms are selected by the 
new combination of social, economic and political conditions.
The OPE approach asks why there are so many different forms of economic 
organization. The focus is on population level forms, examining the mix of firms that 
make up industries and population level variables. The fundamental niche, created by 
environmental conditions, form the primary organizational concept from this approach. 
The environmental conditions select the set of firms that make up an industry, thus 
defining the organizational form. Noticeably absent from OPE is any concern with action 
or adaptation o f firms and the relationships between firms. Without discounting their 
importance, the OPE approach considers embeddednes o f  industries within larger 
environmental conditions to take precedence in the analysis o f population level changes. 
This differs from the Network approach, which considers those relationships primary to 
understanding economic activities.
population an ecologist might study.
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N etw ork O rganization
Perhaps it isn’t surprising that the network, the set o f nodes (persons, firms) 
linked by a set o f social relationships of a specified type (Laumann et al., 1978:458), 
forms the primary organizational concept in the Network approach to economic 
organization. From this approach, the structure o f economic organization in an industry 
is the pattern o f formal and informal relations recurring within a productive system. All 
industries can be reduced to the set of recurring relations that make up an industry. 
Recurring relations can occur within a hierarchical firm, but many, perhaps most, 
important relations occur between firms within the same organizational field. The formal 
relations within a hierarchical firm or between firms in a productive system form a web 
of relations within an industry, but the Network analyst does not limit analysis to these 
relations. Rather, informal relations, including hidden networks of friendship, advice, 
and conversation, are an equally important structure o f ties.
At the center of the Network approach, we find individuals and firms with actions 
and attitudes influenced by the position of an individual or firm within a network.
Position within a network varies along five key variables: cohesion, equivalence, 
prominence, range, and brokerage (see Burt and Minor, 1983). Cohesive individuals and 
firms share strong common relations with one another. Equivalent nodes do not share a 
common tie with each other, but share a common position within the productive system. 
Both cohesion and equivalence are positions that predict similarities between the actions 
of individuals and firms. Prominence, range, and brokerage are positions that provide an 
advantage relative to others in the network. Rather than point out similarities, these 
positions highlight differences and positions of power and influence in a network.
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Prominence refers to the relative demand o f an individual or firm within a network.
Range is simply the size of an individuals or firms network, which translates to access to 
resources. Brokerage positions provide a contact between disorganized individuals or 
firms, allowing them to pursue their own interests freely.
Existing networks o f personal relations are primary in the network approach. All 
economic actors are embedded within existing and ongoing networks of personal 
relations. Trust in economic relations, and these existing social ties are closely linked.
The trust that exists between individuals or firms within their social networks is the 
lubricant that allows for smooth economic performance. Economic action flows through 
existing social ties already imbued with trustworthiness, and long standing economic 
relations become overlaid with social content that carries expectations of trust 
(Granovetter, 1985:61). Existing network ties provide personal knowledge about the 
trustworthiness of a potential economic relation, and the future of a long-term relation 
provides the incentive for maintaining a trustworthy relation. As Granovetter (1985) has 
pointed out, trust is not a necessary characteristic of an existing tie. These ties often 
include a certain amount of distrust, and opportunistic behavior. However, existing 
social relations are often a necessary if  not sufficient condition for trust to develop in 
economic relations.
The Network approach to economic organization emphasizes the web of 
relationships that surround an individual or firm within a productive system. The actual 
ties, and the position of an individual or firm within the web of ties, is the primary 
organizational concept. Structural position within a network can create similarities in 
action or attitude, as well as provide opportunities for advantage. Existing ties also
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provide the means for establishing and m aintain ing trustworthy economic relations. 
Although consequences o f network ties such as the development o f trusting relations are 
an important part o f the Network approach, the emphasis o f the perspective remains on 
the structure of the network ties. This differs from the New Institutional Analysis, which 
considers these aspects of consciousness primary to the analysis.
New Institutional Analysis
Economic sociologists taking an institutional approach propose an alternative to 
selection mechanisms to explain changes o f organizational populations. From this 
approach, firms develop organizational strategies in order to gain legitimacy, adjust to 
uncertainty, or control market competition (Fligstein, 1996). These strategies develop 
from the broader institutional context of the actors including the social and cultural 
milieu (Meyer et. al., 1981). The broader social and cultural milieu shape both the goals 
and means of actors, often putting pressures on a firm to act according to certain beliefs 
and expectations. Expectations can be the taken for granted understandings that make up 
everyday life, or they may be the constituted expectations that define certain contexts or 
situations (Zucker, 1988:57-9). Using these expectations, and other aspects of the 
cultural and social context, actors develop strategies to solve organizational problems.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest these strategies take isomorphic directions 
through coercive, normative, or mimetic processes. Coercive isomorphism result from 
the formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon 
which they are dependent, and by the cultural expectations o f  the society within which 
organizations operate. The pressures may resemble a force, persuasion, or invitations to 
collusion. The strongest coercive forces come from the state, which forms a common
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legal environment to which all organizations must adhere. Large organizations that 
centralize capital can impose standard operating procedures and legitimated rules and 
structures also. A supporting organization may compel subsidiaries to adopt many 
practices in order to working with them, for instance. Mimetic processes occur under 
conditions o f uncertainty. Firms in ambiguous situations may model themselves on other 
firms deemed legitimate or successful.
Normative pressures come from the collective struggle o f members of an 
occupation to “define the conditions and methods of their work, to control “the 
production of producers” (Larson, 1977:49-52), and to establish a cognitive base and 
legitimation for their occupational autonomy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:70).” 
Homogeneity o f a profession can occur through filtering of personnel through 
requirements o f university training, and hiring employees from within the same industry 
for example. Entrants that escape filtering processes are often subject to on-the-job 
socialization, either informally or through professional and trade associations. Normative 
expectations can also restrict the adaptability of some firms through inertial pressures. In 
many cases, the inability to take alternative courses o f action comes from the individual’s 
inability to even conceive o f actions alternative to existing conventions. In this way, 
institutions do not just constrain options, but define the available preferences (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1989:11). Individuals and firms are often slow to change given their interest 
on adhering to expectations, or their inability to conceive of alternative actions.
From this approach, trust is an institution that stems directly from the adherence 
to shared expectations. Actors trust each other when they believe they share a world in 
common, which they believe leads each to share the same background expectations.
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Constitutive expectations are trusting when participants adhere to shared rules in certain 
contexts over time. Here, expectations of future behavior come from the knowledge o f 
past behaviors under those circumstances. These two types o f trust operate in concert. 
Each is present, but the degree o f each diminishes in relation to the other. When 
background assumptions are strong, the development o f constitutive trust is less 
important. As shared expectations rely more on a record o f past actions the importance 
of background expectations diminishes.
Economic Sociology o f Economic Organization
These theoretical approaches provide a conceptual framework to focus the 
analysis and examine the context of economic action in organizations. TCE focuses 
attention on the transaction and the institutions that facilitate transactions. OPE focuses 
attention on the resource niche o f an industry, and distinguishes different niches. The 
network approach focuses attention on networks of relations rather than individual actors.
With this focus, these theoretical approaches provide concepts for examining the 
social influences of economic processes, and the context o f economic action. In 
particular, these approaches draw attention to the importance o f four sociological conepts 
for examining the development o f economic institutions: 1) embedded economic action 
including social capital and inertial pressures, 2) imitation in economic action, 3) blocked 
exchanges including open and closed relationships, and 4) expectations and economic 
activities.
■ What influence does embedded economic action play in the development of the 
Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry? In particular, what role do social capital and 
inertial pressures play in the industry’s development?
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■ What influence does imitation, or mimetic processes, play in the development of the 
Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry?
■ What influence does the existence o f blocked exchanges play in the development of 
the sea urchin industry? In particular, how do the existence o f open and closed 
relationships influence the development o f  the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin 
industry?
■ What influence do existing expectations about economic activities and economic 
exchange play in the development o f the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry?
The remainder of this dissertation examines these questions directly as it uncovers the 
origin and organizational dynamics of the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry.
The Remainder o f the Dissertation
The examination of an industry, its origins, and its organizational dynamics, from the 
perspective of economic sociology provides a number o f interesting questions for the 
analyst to pursue. First, I ask what kind o f organizational arrangements evolved in this 
industry. Here I am interested in the extent to which firms use the market, form 
hierarchies, or use relations o f trust in networks to organize productive activities.
Second, I am interested in why these organizational forms developed, rather than some 
others. Here the theories above raise a number o f interesting questions. What role do 
existing relations play in the organizational strategies o f actors in the industry? Do these 
existing relations provide resource advantages, or lead to inertia? How do actors adapt to 
uncertainty in economic relations? Do imitation and trust play an important role in this 
adjustment? What influence might demographic shifts in the industry have on 
organizational dynamics? Are there limitations or advantages for demographic changes 
in the industry?
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In the chapters to follow, I will elaborate on particular developments in the 
Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry looking closely at the organizational dynamics of 
small firms in a “new” fishery. The concepts taken from Institutional Economics and 
Economic Sociology will help understand the evolutionary path o f organizational 
development looking particularly at entrepreneurial processes, labor market processes 
and exchange processes. As the East Coast sea urchin industry was established and 
evolved these three processes (entrepreneurial, labor market, and exchange) combined to 
facilitate establishment and growth of the new industry.
Entrepreneurial and Labor Processes
Chapters 2 and 3 examine the entrepreneurial and labor processes in the 
Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry respectively. Each chapter has two purposes. 
First, each demonstrates the advantages of embedded economic action in the 
entrepreneurial and labor processes. Chapter 2 examines the influence o f existing social 
ties on the entrepreneurial process. Chapter 3 examines the unique social arrangements 
on the working waterfront that influence the labor process. Second, along with the 
importance of existing social relations on the entrepreneurial and labor process, these 
chapters examine the influence of inertial pressures on these processes. As this industry 
evolved, actors previously established on the waterfront took less interest in the industry. 
A demographic shift took place and entrepreneurs and harvesters without existing 
economic relations on the waterfront came to dominate the industry.
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Entrepreneurial Processes
Chapter 2 looks at the entrepreneurs, those individuals and firms that provide a 
link between the supply of sea urchins on the East Coast and the consumers in Japan. 
Research in economic sociology finds that social relationships have a paradoxical role in 
the entrepreneurial process. In many cases, existing social relations provide essential 
resources for the entrepreneur, and differences in social ties can provide some 
entrepreneurs with an advantage. In these instances the actual social ties provide the 
entrepreneur with a resource known as social capital (Coleman, 1988). Capital most 
commonly refers to some form of physical or financial capital. Economists use the concept 
human capital to refer to an individual's skills and education that provide an economic 
resource (Becker, 1964). This extends the concept of physical capital embodied in tools, 
machines, and other productive equipment to individual persons. Similarly, social capital 
extends the idea of capital to find economic resources in the social relations individuals 
hold.
The advantage garnered by the entrepreneur comes from their position in a 
network of social relations, and in the qualities of the social network, they are part of. 
Entrepreneurs fill brokerage positions, connecting previously unconnected networks 
(Burt, 1993). The advantages of these brokerage positions has been shown in the 
employment process (Granovetter, 1981), in advancement within internal labor markets 
(Burt, 1997), as well as in the entrepreneurial process (Bonacich, 1973).
For entrepreneurs attempting to fill brokerage positions the quality o f their 
relations can have an influence on their success as entrepreneurs. Cohesive ties to 
existing networks o f social relations can increase their ability to mobilize resources in the
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entrepreneurial process (Granovetter, 1985). These resources, found in existing social 
relations, are particularly important during periods of uncertainty associated with 
economic change or transition that require trust. Information about opportunities and 
access to certain resources (financial capital, labor force) are available to those with 
important ties, and unavailable to those without.
A supply o f sea urchins existed on the East Coast as the Japanese demand grew. 
However, the link between supply and demand remained unfilled. Entrepreneurs came to 
make these links by establishing relations with Japanese customers. However, the 
entrepreneurs came from different social contexts: some embedded within existing 
institutional arrangements on the working waterfront, others autonomous from these 
institutional arrangements. Traditional entrepreneurs were already established as buyers 
on the waterfront and brought their existing social relationships to the new fishery. These 
existing relations included long-term ties with harvesters that allowed the easy 
mobilization of labor in the new sea urchin fishery. The second set of entrepreneurs 
came from outside the context o f the working waterfront Initially, these new 
entrepreneurs had difficulty mobilizing labor in the harvesting sector and they soon 
turned to buyers established in other fisheries and with ties to harvesters to secure a 
supply o f sea urchins for their Japanese customers.
The new entrepreneurs approached the sea urchin industry motivated by growth, 
and without any past ties to limit their endeavors. They developed the business group 
and transient styles o f organization and a fierce competition that contradicted many of the 
excepted business practices o f the traditional entrepreneurs. The density of new 
entrepreneurs in the industry increased and soon pushed the traditional entrepreneurs
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from the industry. Rather than adopt new organizational strategies, these entrepreneurs 
chose to maintain their existing social relations on the waterfront and leave the sea urchin 
industry to the newcomers.
Labor Processes
Examining entrepreneurs encourages a focus on actors in networks, and how 
social ties influence economic action. In chapter 3 I begin by taking a step away from the 
individual actor or firm, and examine the characteristics o f the productive structure that 
make up the locality of which the actor is a part. In the inshore commercial fishing 
industry this is a unique set o f institutional arrangements I call the working waterfront. 
Similar arrangements have been documented in Southwest Germany (Herrigel, 1990) 
Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994) and Northcentral Italy known as industrial districts 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel and Zeitlin, 1985; Sabel, 1991). Perhaps the most well 
documented industrial districts come from the Emilia-Romagna district o f northern Italy 
where a number of products are produced including textiles, ceramics, motorcycles and 
shoes (Brusco, 1982; Piore and Sabel, 1984). Though popularly well known for its 
economic success, economists and sociologists find the unique productive arrangements 
that have developed among firms most interesting.
Brusco (1986) has examined the characteristics o f industrial districts that 
distinguish them from other forms of economic organization. In contrast to traditional 
artisans that produce for small local markets, small firms in industrial districts produce 
for national and international markets. The level o f worker skill and the capacity to 
innovate when confronted with specific productive problems is high in industrial districts 
and often leads to new markets for products. Production takes place through the
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collaboration o f thousands of small firms rather than large hierarchical firms. Exchange 
relations develop between firms for the many stages of production, and firms are not 
dependent on single buyers for their work. A final indicator of industrial districts is the 
presence of firms that produce the machinery necessary for the production o f particular 
commodities.
In the industrial district, resource allocation and transactions flow through
networks o f small-firms linked by reciprocal mutually supportive actions (Powell,
1990b:317). Perrow (1993) captures the small-firm network form of organization:
Imagine breaking up the Integrated Firm into units whose average number 
of employees is ten each. Instead o f2,000 employees in one firm, for 
example, there would be 200 firms o f  ten employees each.. .The firms 
interact with each other, sharing information, equipment, personnel, and 
orders, even as they compete with one another (385-6).
The independent firms are held together in productive relationships based on cooperation 
and trust, and at the same time relations can be easily ended and reestablished while 
adapting to environmental changes (Thorelli, 1986). Powell (1990a) describes networks 
as “lighter on their feet” than hierarchies, and more easily adapting to uncertain supply 
and demand environments. In his study of the textile industry in Northern Italy, Lazerson 
(1993) found this adaptability a result o f the organizational diversity o f the region. One 
firm individually might not adapt easily to a particular market change, but with a variety 
of firms present, at least some can accommodate most opportunities that arise. Lazerson 
also finds support for the open labor markets described by Sabel (1991); laborers are 
attached to firms through informal ties, while simultaneously anticipating changes in their 
existing economic ties. This anticipation requires a deep enmeshment in local 
community, friendships and family networks in order to forecast the contraction and 
expansion o f future opportunities.
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In Chapter 3 ,1 examine a similar set of productive relations in the inshore 
fisheries along the East Coast. The unique productive relations a part of the working 
waterfront rely upon State managed ocean resources, technical flexibility in production, a 
knowledge base developed through long-term experience working on the waterfront, and 
cooperative relations that encourage a social flexibility of production. These unique 
productive arrangements have an important influence on the labor process of the 
waterfront, allowing established and non-established harvesters to take advantage of 
opportunities like the new sea urchin fishery easily. Both established and non-established 
harvesters moved into the new fishery, but they did not share the same interests in the sea 
urchin. Similar to the traditional entrepreneurs in Chapter 2, inertial pressures kept 
harvesters already established in other fisheries from dropping existing relations in favor 
of the sea urchin fishery. These harvesters saw the sea urchin fishery as a supplement to 
their primary fishery, and remained in this fishery as long as it did not conflict with that 
work. Non-established harvesters did not have the inertial pressures associated with 
existing relations and therefore approached the industry differently. For young fishermen 
coming from coastal communities the sea urchin fishery was a chance to establish 
themselves in commercial fishing with the sea urchin as their primary fishery. A third 
group of harvesters came from outside the waterfront context, and was attracted to the 
industry by the opportunities provided, and the little barrier to entry.
Imitation
Chapters 2 and 3 each contain examples of imitation or mimetic pressures in the 
economic processes. Imitation is a type o f embedded action that helps deal with the 
problems o f uncertainty. In uncertain situations, economic actors often follow the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
45
decisions and strategies o f Mends, neighbors, business associates, and competitors whom 
they deem successful. I found this type of action in the entrepreneurial process as new 
entrepreneurs entered the inshore commercial fisheries. Without previous experience, 
they had to imitate and innovate organizing strategies in the industry. Their models were 
often other new entrepreneurs with whom they competed. Similar imitative behavior 
occurred in the labor process as new harvesters mimic established harvesters as they 
develop inshore, commercial fishing career strategies. In many cases, these models were 
family members, or close Mends and neighbors.
Exchange Processes
Chapter 4 looks at the exchange processes between harvesters and dealers in this 
new fishery, looking particularly at the role of trust—the mutual confidence that no party 
to an exchange will exploit the other’s vulnerability. In any industry, it becomes 
necessary to coordinate exchange between the essential activities of the productive 
system. Individuals and firms coordinate exchange within a productive system through 
markets and price, authority and hierarchies, or networks and trust. Previous research on 
the inshore fishing industries of Maine and New England finds network organization 
playing a prominent role.
In New England’s fresh fish market, Wilson (1980) found exchange between 
harvesters and coast-side dealers based on trust and reciprocity. Reciprocitive relations 
benefit both dealers and sellers by decreasing the amount o f uncertainty in their business 
operations. The dealers business requires a constant supply o f reasonable quality fresh 
fish in order to fill his client’s requests. The fishermen’s business interest lies in securing 
a fair price for his catch. Buyers commonly have better information about the current
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market value o f a fisherman’s catch, and could use this to take advantage o f  the harvester. 
However, the fisherman can always withhold future supply from a buyer who cheats on a 
deal. The threat holds weight given the buyers need for a constant supply.
A long-term relationship between buyer and harvester helps solve some o f  these 
exchange problems. For the buyer, a long-term relationship helps assure a constant 
supply o f groundfish. These arrangements allow the buyer some certainty in the quality 
of fish he will receive, and a source to which he can always turn. The long-term relation 
lasts given the harvesters assurance o f a fair market price for his catch.
Wilson finds that other trust dependent relations develop from these long-term 
relations. Fishermen get better access to market information, can base equipment 
upgrades on assured future sales, and can expect fair evaluation o f quality and price for 
the catch. A buyer may pay slightly above market price for fish in order to assure a 
positive return on the vessel’s trip. These steps assure future supply, and perhaps gain 
the buyer’s influence on timing of future effort and species.
Acheson’s (1988) research on Maine Lobstermen finds long-term reciprocal ties 
in the lobster industry as he follows the marketing chain from harvesting to the consumer 
Lobsters reach the consumer through a complicated set of exchanges between harvesters, 
dealers, pounds, wholesale distributors, shippers, and retailers. The primary production 
problem in the lobster fishery is an uncertain supply and demand. For instance, a dealer 
must balance a supply o f lobsters from fishermen on one side and demand from 
consumers including restaurants, hotels, and wholesalers on the other. The fisherman 
harvests an uncertain supply of lobsters each day, but demands payment for their catch on 
the spot. Consumers make a steady demand for lobsters from the dealer, preferably at a
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steady price. A dealer may have to buy a fisherman’s lobsters for which he does not have 
a demand. In addition, he may have a larger demand than the fishermen are catching on a 
particular day.
To balance supply and demand firms develop long-term reciprocal relations 
(Acheson, 1988:119). Wholesalers know that their dealers will attempt to fill demands 
during times of scarcity, and the dealer knows the wholesaler will buy as many lobsters 
as possible dining times of overabundance. Finns in the industry know that the other 
operations they work with will go out of their way to fulfill the informal arrangements to 
balance supply and demand in a way that is best for both parties. Similarly, harvesters 
and dealers establish long-term relations that have mutual benefits. The dealer attempts 
to attach fishermen to his firm to assure a steady supply o f  lobsters for his customers. In 
return, the fishermen gets an assured buyer o f his catch, and often times supplies such as 
fuel and bait with little or no mark up.
In the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry some exchange relations resemble 
those found in the groundfish and lobster fisheries, long-term reciprocitive exchange 
relations. However, for most exchanges between harvesters and cost-side dealers 
expectations o f distrust have developed. These expectations contribute to the non­
exclusive, market like exchange relations between harvesters and coast-side dealers. The 
exchanges have indeterminate outcomes, and opportunistic behavior is rife—conditions 
that might lead to cooperative, trust based exchange relations following the TCE 
approach. However, these inefficient exchanges persist because the participants to the 
exchange expect opportunistic actions by participants to the exchange, and are unable to 
overcome these expectations.
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Chapters 2 through 4 look in more detail at each o f  these economic processes and 
the social pressures that influence these processes. Following these processes I will 
document the organizational arrangements present in this unique resource niche, and 
provide an explanation for why these arrangements developed rather than some other. 
Below, I discuss the empirical sources and methods used in the chapters to come.
Empirical Sources and M ethods1*
At a point in every project a researcher must make decisions about the techniques for 
collecting data, and consider the ways these techniques relate to the questions driving 
their research. The research for this analysis is ethnographic in nature, with the empirical 
material accumulated from multiple sources collected during the period from July 1996 to 
April 1998. I chose the set of techniques associated with the ethnographic approach to 
social phenomena for the flexibility it provides the researcher.
Along with ethnographic techniques, I chose to conduct a case study, or what 
Tilly (1984) calls an individualizing comparison. Choosing an individualizing 
comparison limits my ability to test theories, but the choice provides a unique way to 
illustrate the value of theoretical concepts while illuminating  the particularities o f this 
case. As I delve into separate characteristics of the case in each chapter, the analysis 
becomes comparative—not at the level of the industry, but in terms o f categories of the 
relevant phenomena (entrepreneurs, harvesters, and exchange relations). This analysis 
resembles what Tilly (1984:154) calls variation finding, “establishing a principle of 
variation in the character or intensity o f a phenomena having more than one form.” So,
16 This discussion of empirical sources and methods can be read with equal value at this point, or after 
reading the remainder of this dissertation. I would encourage continual reference to i t  As die reader will
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rather than examine the entrepreneurial process in the industry I examined three different 
forms of entrepreneurial activity in the industry and characterized the differences and 
consequences of the forms.
Below I provide more detail about the specific data sources used in the analysis. 
Following this I provide an example o f how I combined these multiple sources to 
examine one research question. Finally, I give some further justification for choosing 




The data used in the analysis are not solely qualitative. There are a number of 
quantitative sources o f data throughout the analysis. Using data collected from the Food 
and Agricultural Organization o f the United Nations Annual Yearbook o f Fisheries 
Statistics I constructed a time-series data set that covers the years before the emergence 
of the sea urchin industry to the present. The data set includes variables such as Maine 
landings, Japanese landings, world landings, and the yen dollar ratio used to create many 
of the graphs and tables found in the Introduction.
The Maine Department o f Marine Resources (DMR) provided other sources of 
quantitative data. First, from the DMR licensing procedures I have constructed data sets 
on the harvesters, dealers, processors, and exporters in the industry. I have described 
many of these data sources in the Introduction. There are some limitations. For example,
see, some of this current discussion will reference analyses to come. The insigh t of die current discussion 
may increase after fam iliarity  with some of the analyses in chapters to come.
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the data gave only limited information on the diversity o f dealers in.the industry. DMR 
uses a blanket dealers’ license for any firm that buys or transports sea urchins in the state. 
This includes many processors and wholesalers along with independent coast-side 
dealers. In addition, some Canadian firms solely transport sea urchins to Maine 
processors. Non-recognized dealers further complicate the estimation. In 1997, DMR 
recognized 80 dealers, 19 o f  which are processors. It is not unreasonable to assume that 
each area includes at least one or two unrecognized dealers, which might lead to 
estimates of over 100 coast-side dealers.
Other quantitative data includes Dealer Logbooks collected by the Maine 
Department of Marine Resources (DMR). During the 1996-97 season, the DMR required 
that dealers record every transaction between sea urchin harvester and buyer in logbooks. 
The logbooks include: purchaser name, location of transaction, the date o f transaction, 
the harvester’s identification number, amount in pounds purchased, a product quality 
measure, and price per pound. This data source provides a unique resource to analyze the 
organization of the industry, especially the extent o f long term relations, and exclusive 
relations.
Using the logbooks completed by coast-side dealers provides some insight into 
the nature of transactions in the industry found in Chapter 5. Each month every licensed 
dealer is required to turn in a logbook to the DMR. Having a record o f all transactions 
has obvious advantages in this type of research. There are some flaws with using there 
data, however. Dealers have been compelled to fill out these logbooks by the DMR. 
Although landings and costs should accurately reflect their tax records, there is no way to 
check that dealers accurately represent a harvester’s catch. In fact, it seems likely that a
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dealer would misrepresent individual harvester information. Similarly, harvesters are 
likely to misrepresent the information provided for dealers. More than one harvester will 
often sell their catch under one license number, and harvesters can provide inaccurate 
license information easily. In the busy atmosphere o f the market, exact records are often 
lost. However, for the questions that I ask these measurement problems favor the 
conclusions reached using the data. If  records that are more accurate existed, we would 
expect the number o f buyers used by a harvester to increase, and the percentage o f  catch 
going to a primary buyer to decrease. These changes would further highlight the frequent 
switching that occurs in the industry.
Archival Research
There are a number of secondary sources on the sea urchin industry including 
NMFS, NOAA, and DMR reports on the industry, newspaper stories, and scholarly 
research on world fisheries and the Japanese economy. These sources gave me important 
background to the ecology, management, and development of markets for Maine’s green 
sea urchin. Although I cite many of these reports within the dissertation, I have included 
them in a separate appendix.
Since the early 1990s, the Maine State legislature has taken notice o f the sea 
urchin fishery. This has resulted in proposed legislation and some public hearings. The 
legislature asks for written submission of all testimony at public hearings. I spent a 
number of days at the Maine State Legislative Library taking notes on the past testimony 
and following the political processes in local newspapers.
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D irect Field Work
I have become intimately involved with the industry through a number o f  field 
experiences. Perhaps most significant has been my attendance at Sea Urchin Zone 
Advisory Council (SUZAC) meetings. These meetings take place once a month and I 
attended them regularly from June 1996 to April 199817. The meetings addressed a 
variety of management issues in the sea urchin fishery. The council included 
approximately 15 regular participants, including members of DMR, marine biologists 
from the University o f Maine, sea urchin draggers, divers, dealers, and processors. The 
council members represent many regions o f the state and stakeholders in the industry. 
Often non-council members attend the meetings as well.
Through my attendance, I became familiar to the regular participants. The 
meetings provide intimate knowledge o f  the concerns of participants in this fishery and 
the problems encountered in attempts at management. I engaged in many informal 
conversations with participants before and after these meetings as well. Similar to the 
experience at these SUZAC meetings, I attended all public hearings on the sea urchin 
fishery legislation that took place during the period of my fieldwork. These meetings 
also attracted participants from a variety o f sectors o f the industry and the discussion and 
debate at these meetings gave insight into the industry. During the period o f my 
fieldwork, I also attended two meetings o f  the Maine Urchin Harvesters Association, and 
I attended two meetings of the annual Maine Fisherman’s Forum.
Throughout my research I spent time in particular communities and learned about 
the sea urchin fishery in that area. This included spending time at the public piers as 
boats come in, talking with participants in the industry working in the area, and visiting
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processing plants. By spending time in a community, I did not mean to undertake 
research in the tradition of a sociological community study. Instead, this time allowed 
me to examine the economic activities o f participants in relation to other participants. 
With my examination of exchange processes, for instance, I was able to interview both 
buyers and sellers in an area, and observe their regular economic activities day to day. 
This added understanding o f the process that might have been lost by interviewing only 
one side o f the exchange and not witnessing the actual activities o f the industry.
These fieldwork experiences in particular communities did not follow formal 
methods. In choosing communities, I was trying to take account o f the diversity of 
activities that occurred in the industry. I chose areas with sea urchin activity, including 
harvesters, dealers and processors working in the industry. Two o f the areas included 
public piers with spot-market exchange-relations taking place regularly. In each area, I 
spent from one to three weeks. I would return regularly to some areas during the period 
of my fieldwork. In each area I would secure interviews with participants in the industry, 
and spend each day at a pier, in a processing facility or engaged in other activities 
associated with the industry.
Through contacts made in the field experiences discussed above, I conducted 
informal interviews with marine biologists, DMR officials, divers, draggers, dealers, and 
processors. These interviews were not formally structured. At times, I directed the 
conversations towards subjects o f interest to the research and often they took the 
direction respondents chose to discuss.
17 Approximately 20 meetings total.
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Sem i-Structured In-depth Interviews
To supplement the quantitative and qualitative analysis discussed above I 
conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with participants from a variety o f 
industry sectors. I began selecting respondents on a theoretical basis, attempting to 
capture the variety o f experiences by including participants in the different sectors o f the 
industry. Here I wanted to include harvesters, coast-side dealers, and processors in my 
sample, as well as participants from different regions o f the coast To contact particular 
respondents I typically used snowball-sampling techniques. However, I often selected 
respondents purposefully when personal reference did not suit the theoretical sample 
goals. Here I used more formal means (letters, telephone calls) to secure interviews. As 
my research developed, I also selected respondents analytically. As certain patterns and 
themes developed during the research, I attempted to sample respondents that might bring 
contradictions in these patterns to light18. This was not an abandonment of the theoretical 
goals stated above, but rather a supplement to them. Table 1.2 provides some further 
detail about the variety of respondents interviewed.
Table 1.2 Semi-Structured In-depth Interviews
■ 41 sem i-structured in-depth interviews
■ 5 women ■ 17 Harvesters
■ 36 men ■ 11 Divers
■ 6 Draggers
■ 26 Dealers or Processors ■ 14 South Shore respondents
■ 10 Dealers involved in some processing ■ 8 Mid Coast respondents
■ 6 Dealers supplying North American ■ 19 Down East respondents
processors
18 See Linking Research Questions and Empirical Data below.
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These interviews typically lasted from one to two hours. Each interview was 
taped and transcribed for future use. The Appendix includes example interview guides I 
used while conducting these interviews. I did not follow these guides rigidly during the 
interviews. Instead, they were to remind me of subjects I meant to cover at some point 
during the interview, and to help me prepare for interviews. Any one interview might 
follow a number o f directions, covering issues in different sequence, and covering issues 
not set out in the interview guide. At the end o f the interview guide I include a set of 
actual questions I might ask during the interview in order to obtain the information 
included in the guide. These questions helped establish a conversation. I obtained most 
information through probing with follow-up questions.
These interviews provided important information about the relationships created 
in these early years that linked the Japanese demand with the Maine coast Analysis of 
these data also helped determine how exchange relationships develop in the sea urchin 
industry, how exchange partners negotiate issues of trust and how these relations vary in 
exchange between different sectors of the industry. The semi-structured aspect o f the 
interview allowed me to pursue particular subjects of interest to the research. The in- 
person and open aspects o f the interview allowed me to probe respondents about their 
goals and frames o f reference when they took particular actions related to the industry19.
Linking Research Questions and Empirical Data
I did not organize this research design around a formal test of research 
hypotheses, but this does not mean research questions are not subject to empirical 
scrutiny. Perhaps I can best demonstrate this with an example from the research.
19 See Appendix A for examples of interview guides used in these interviews.
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Consider the question, Where did the East Coast sea urchin industry begin? The 
question is part o f the particular narrative of the industry, but not one derived from 
theory. When starting my research I was interested in the industry’s origins and its quick 
growth, but I was not concerned with pinpointing who started it or where it started. 
However, an initial look at newspaper articles about the industry, and informal 
discussions with some participants, put the beginning o f the industry in Portland. There, 
Nicholas Cummings was the first to export urchins to Japan, and soon after Jack Chan 
was the first to process urchins.
My research soon led to evidence contradicting this conclusion. I first began 
questioning this origin at the Maine State Legislative Library where I was looking 
through old newspapers from the many communities along the coast. Here I found a few 
short articles about the new sea urchin fishery starting in smaller communities along 
Maine’s coast where entrepreneurs were exporting and processing sea urchins. These 
stories came at the same time the industry was starting in Portland. Motivated by this 
new information, I adapted my interview sampling design to include some of these early 
entrepreneurs and their early involvement in the industry as well as the Portland area 
entrepreneurs.
I began to develop a different picture o f the industry’s origins, a more diffuse 
origin than I initially found. Later in the research process, while analyzing my data from 
interviews and other sources, I returned to the questions o f industry origins. I now had a 
diffuse image of the origins of the industry, but I reconsidered the prominence of 
Cummings, Chan, and other entrepreneurs from the Portland area. While not the sole 
initiators of the industry, their approach to organizing production did play an important
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part in the evolution o f the industry. While it was still not theoretically essential to know 
who started the industry, these entrepreneurial processes did have relevance to questions 
in economic sociology. Eventually the research directions and analyses that I  have just 
described develop into the analysis in Chapter 2.
This brief description o f one line o f research shows the flexibility o f the 
ethnographic methods, how the research can triangulate multiple data sources to answer 
research questions, and the way questions are subject to empirical review. Before 
following the lead provided by the newspaper articles, I was not aware o f the different 
kinds of entrepreneurship in the industry. Tracking down this lead, I became aware of 
the inertial pressures on traditional entrepreneurs that did not affect the business group 
entrepreneurs from Portland. The flexibility of the ethnographic techniques allowed me 
to pursue this research direction, and uncover one o f the more interesting findings of the 
research. The triangulation o f data encourages flexibility as well. Perhaps my theoretical 
sample of interview respondents would have turned up this finding. However, the 
flexible use of triangulation helped to assure this finding did not go unnoticed.
The triangulation o f  data in this example highlights, also, the iterative testing of 
hypotheses in this approach. In order to bring some coherence to the empirical data I 
collected, I would attempt to apply some conceptual schema to the findings. In this case 
something as simple as where the industry started. From here evidence either lends 
credence to the schema, or contradicts the schema, hi some cases, the evidence comes 
through the immersion in the empirical material, such as finding the newspaper articles.
In other cases, I purposefully collected data looking for contradictory evidence, such as 
interviewing entrepreneurs from outside of Portland. I would resolve the contradictions
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
58
by re-conceiving the schema. As more evidence accumulates, and I modified the schema, 
fewer contradictions from evidence arise. This is not formal testing o f a hypothesis 
found in standard techniques. However, in a similar fashion, interpretations are posed, 
and contradictions with empirical evidence are resolved through observation and 
reasoning.
Justification o f Research Design
More traditional research designs in economic sociology share the strengths o f the 
traditional approach to social research: reliability, statistical inference, and the clear link 
of theory and research through formal hypothesis testing. There are examples of more 
formal methods used in economic sociology. For example, Fligstein (1991) uses 
quantitative analysis in the formal sense o f testing a model in his research on the spread 
of diversification as a firm strategy. He uses the top 100 businesses in the US at different 
times throughout the last century as the population. He uses logistic regression with 
control variables to predict the adoption of the diversification strategy.
Network analysts have also refined formal methods including block models (Burt, 
1983; DiMaggio, 1986). Mapping clique networks is a descriptive type o f network 
analysis. Cliques describe actual ties based on the exchange of resources, information, or 
face-to-face interaction. They map the set of social ties that form an actual network.
When the number o f ties and actors in the analysis increase mapping all ties can become 
quite difficult and offer little simplification of analysis. DiMaggio (1986) encourages the 
use of block models, or structural-equivalence models to analyze organizational fields 
that include a large number of firms. Structural-equivalence models group actors that 
share equivalent network positions whether or not they actually share network ties.
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DiMaggio (1986) shows how to use the block model approach to determine influence 
within an organizational field.
These research designs have certain strengths, but they also restrict the researcher 
by requiring them to define specific testable research questions, specific data sources and 
potential answers before the research begins. While these requirements are the strength 
of the approach, I hoped to accomplish different goals in this research. I found the 
ethnographic approach uniquely suited to this case study. It allowed me to examine the 
case holistically, and to use multiple sources o f data as they applied to diverse research 
questions. In addition, ethnography allowed the primary research questions to emerge 
from the particular phenomena o f the case. In this way, theoretical questions and 
empirical research interacted continuously throughout the project
Taking the ethnographic approach is not unique among social scientists that 
examine similar social phenomena. Acheson (1988) interviewed over 190 fishermen in 
over ten years of studying the lobster industry of Maine. His work included collecting 
profiles of New England harbors, observation while visiting work cites (including fishing 
trips), and examination of three Maine fishing communities -  one in particular depth. 
Wilson’s (1980) research included 5 years o f intimate contact through fieldwork with the 
fresh fish market. Doeringer, et al. (1986) design a project they consider unique in the 
economic literature by blending “traditional economic data with field interviews, original 
survey data, and analysis o f economic institutions (9).” They conducted interviews with 
participants from a number of sectors o f  the industry, local officials and members o f 
government agencies, and a number o f  other actors working in and around the New 
England groundfish industry. Similar to Acheson’s work, they too examine two
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communities in-depth. Apostle and Barrett (1992) use similar methods working with a 
team of anthropologists and sociologists to analyze the Nova Scotia fishing industry. 
Anthropologists conducted four case studies of communities and institutions. Survey 
research on plant managers, plant workers, and boat captains complemented this 
ethnographic work. They placed this research within a  detailed historical contest o f the 
Nova Scotia fishing industry.
Researchers take similar approaches outside fisheries research as well. Coser et al. 
structure the bulk of their research on the publishing industry around 85 interviews 
conducted at 56 different publishing houses. They chose their sample purposefully to 
include different industry sectors and different structural positions such as size and 
location. They also take advantage o f “snowball” type interviews with respondents who 
they get the chance to interview, or whom others say they just have to talk to. They 
selected ten firms for participant-observation based on the sector and structural variables 
described above The researchers spent time at the publishing house taking part in the 
regular activities of that work, talking with workers, and doing some small scale survey 
research. Friedland et al. use existing statistics to examine economic institutions w ithin 
the lettuce industry. In his research on the knitwear industry in the Emilian-Romagna 
region of Italy Lazerson (1988,1993) conducted semi-structured open-ended interviews 
with representatives from 44 firms: 16 manufacturers and 28 subcontractor-artisans. He 
selected these firms through contacts made with three industry associations in the region. 
Lazerson conducted his interview work in tandem with participant-observation at two 
firms where he spent several days shadowing work in the firm. The final analysis found
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in this dissertation is limited by my choice not to follow a traditional research design, but 
I feel equally strengthened by that choice.
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Ch a pte r  2  
E n tr e pr e n e u r ia l  P r o c e sse s
In  1985, THE GREEN SEA URCHIN WAS LITTLE MORE THAN A NUISANCE TO LOCAL 
fishermen. They clogged the traps of lobstermen creating extra work. Perhaps more 
important, sea urchins threatened the coastal ecology by damaging kelp beds that provide 
food and shelter for other fish essential to local economies. This changed when the 
“trash” fish became a commodity rivaled only by the lobster fishery in value. This 
chapter addresses the social construction of a sea urchin industry that changed this trash 
fish to a treasure and the organizational dynamics that occur as inshore fisheries become 
part of a global productive system. In particular I look at the initiation o f  entrepreneurial 
relations to link supply and demand. I examine who took these entrepreneurial steps, 
from what contexts they emerged, and how the actual steps took place.
The linking o f  supply and demand is a social problem. Actors confront and 
develop solutions to the problem based on their social context, bringing advantages and 
disadvantages to the problem. This analysis of the entrepreneurial process begins by 
introducing three distinct types of entrepreneurs: traditional entrepreneurs, business group 
entrepreneurs, and transient entrepreneurs. Each type o f entrepreneurs differs in the way 
they confronted the problem o f linking supply and demand.
Following this introduction, the remainder o f  the chapter shows how these forms 
came to participate in  the new industry, and the dynamic relations between these 
entrepreneurial strategies as the industry developed. The analysis highlights three distinct
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social processes that lead to the current mix o f entrepreneurial strategies in the industry. 
First, the analysis compares traditional entrepreneurs already established on the 
waterfront with entrepreneurs new to the inshore commercial fishing industry.
Traditional entrepreneurs held an advantage over these new entrepreneurs in the early 
stages of the industry because of their existing ties on the waterfront. Second, the 
analysis examines the organizational strategies o f new entrepreneurs to the waterfront 
Not already established on the waterfront, these entrepreneurs followed a process of 
innovation and imitation as they developed organizational strategies in the sea urchin 
industry. These strategies led to an expansion o f production and competition in the 
industry. Finally, the analysis returns to the traditional entrepreneurs. As the new 
entrepreneurs transformed the industry competition required a change of organizational 
strategy on the part o f  the traditional entrepreneurs. Unwilling to make that change due 
to inertial pressures, these entrepreneurs chose to drop from the industry and maintain 
their traditional entrepreneurial strategies.
Entrepreneurial Activity and Organizational Strategy
In 1987, a Japanese businessman came to Smallport, a small downeast town on the coast 
of Maine, and walked down to the Avery Lobster wharf. The Avery family began buying 
lobster on their wharf in 1919, and the business had been handed down for three 
generations. On this day, the Japanese businessman came with a  proposition—he 
suggested they start a sea urchin processing plant on the property just off their pier.
Avery Lobster would manage all aspects o f production in the US. The Japanese would 
pick up the product in Boston and ship to Japan. At about this time Robert Thompson 
was exploring the possibilities of his own export business with a trip to Japan. Thompson
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was in the insurance business and he wanted to get out He was considering the viability 
of exporting traditional Maine goods—blueberries, handicrafts, and Christinas trees— 
when an official at the US trade department in Tokyo introduced him to a man interested 
in buying sea urchins. Thompson would buy the live sea urchins in Maine and bring 
them to Boston. There the Japanese would take over, shipping them to a Japanese 
processor. Both the Avery family and Robert Thompson began buying sea urchins for 
Japanese customers that year. The two were very different—one a family firm with a 
long tradition in the seafood industry, the other a newcomer to commercial fishing 
looking for the opportunity to run his own business. Ten years later, Robert Thompson 
remained in the industry while the Avery family dropped out
Entrepreneurs generate profits by mobilizing resources, such as labor and capital. 
In Schumpeter’s ([1926] 1934) definition entrepreneurship involves pulling together 
previously unconnected elements for an economic purpose. Using the network analogy, 
Burt (1993) applies this directly to a position in a network—entrepreneurs generate profit 
from being between others. He calls this position a structural hole. In this definition, the 
entrepreneur is a broker between two or more networks that would not otherwise have 
contact. Entrepreneurs fill a structural hole in a productive system, forging the link 
between supply and demand. Both the Avery family and Robert Thompson took 
advantage o f entrepreneurial opportunities, but clearly they are different kinds of 
entrepreneurs. The economics and organizational ecology literature expects 
entrepreneurial activity to naturally develop under favorable environmental conditions. If  
markets open and barriers are removed entrepreneurs will simply emerge, or in ecological 
terms organizational founding rates will increase. Perhaps this is true within the broad
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sweep o f  the predictions. However, existing resource conditions may make industry 
formation feasible, but the resources must be assembled by entrepreneurial actors 
(Stinchcombe, 1968). The economic and ecological predictions do not help understand 
who the entrepreneurs are, what contexts led to their emergence, or how they organized 
to take advantage o f the opportunities presented to them.
Organizing an Industry
In the analysis that follows, I look at the entrepreneurs who organized the 
Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry. These entrepreneurs share a structurally 
equivalent position in the productive system. Each provides a link to the Japanese market 
for sea urchins through ties with Japanese import companies. Here I am not interested in 
the psychological characteristics o f the individuals, but instead in the social context from 
which they emerged. These social contexts influence entrepreneurs’ organizational 
strategies and consequently the evolution of the industry as a whole. There appear to be 
three distinct types o f entrepreneurs that emerged from the favorable circumstances  of the 
1980s. The first group, resembling the Avery Lobster Company, follows a traditional 
inshore fisheries production strategy. The second type appears to resemble more closely 
the entrepreneur from economic literature. Similar to Robert Thompson, these 
individuals are looking for business opportunities without any previous experience in the 
inshore fisheries. A third type o f entrepreneur resembles the ethnic entrepreneurs 
frequently documented in the sociological research (Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990; Light 
and Karageorgis, 1994). These are Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees attempting to 
establish themselves in a new country through entrepreneurial activity. Before describing
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these three types in more detail, I examine the economic and political contexts o f their 
emergence.
Economic and Political Conditions
Favorable economic and political conditions for the development of an 
international export industry like the sea urchin industry did exist in the 1980s and in 
Maine where the Northwest Atlantic industry started. The weak dollar and strong yen 
made it valuable for Japanese businessmen to import goods from the US. But who were 
these Japanese businessmen? Some of the Japanese represented processing companies 
based in the Hokkaido region o f Japan. The Japanese sea urchin industry is primarily 
concentrated in Hokkaido where a number o f processors operate. These processors buy 
the green sea urchin on the Northwest Atlantic coast and ship it live to Hokkaido to have 
it processed by Japanese workers. Wealthy Japanese consumers prefer uni processed by 
Japanese workers, and pay a higher price for this product20. Another set of Japanese 
buyers acts as broker for the processed sea urchin product. The Japanese brokers handle 
transport of the product to Japan and selling the product on the Tsukiji auction floor for a 
fixed fee based on quantity.
Many of the Japanese came representing Japanese trading companies known as 
sogo shosha. The primary business of the trading company is linking buyers and sellers 
in a productive network. These Japanese production networks, in which larger 
companies contract out production to a complex network o f  suppliers, are known as 
keiretsu (Miwa, 1996;Nishiguchi, 1994;Yoshino andLifson, 1986). Yoshino and Lifson
20 An exporter’s Japanese customer once asked if any American’s hands had touched the sea u rchins before 
they reached Japan. “Do they think we wish them into die boxes!” he asked. This gives some sense of
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(1986) have called the sogo shosha an “Invisible Link” in international productive 
systems because of the way they oversee production by obtaining supplies o f raw 
materials for Japanese producers, and handling distribution of the final products. The 
sogo shosha establish long-term relationships among many small suppliers and producers 
and hold them together to form a large, often international productive system.
Strategies of expansion and competition motivate the sogo shosha (Yoshino and 
Lifson, 1986:26-33). They have practiced an expansion strategy in most productive 
systems in order to limit dependence on one region for raw materials. Initially in the 
steel industry, for instance, the Japanese steel processors were largely dependent on the 
United States for coking coal. In order to broaden their resource base the sogo shosha 
developed new sources in Canada and Australia. Competition between trading 
companies follows the “one finger in every pie” principle (Powell and Smith-Doer,
1994). Rival trading companies compete fiercely, and as one diversifies into a new 
industry, others follow quickly in order to maintain competitive position.
The Japanese were already well established in the North American West Coast 
sea urchin fishery by the 1980s, but little interest had been shown on the East Coast. 
However, in 1979 the state o f Maine, following the moves by the federal government to 
increase exports to Japan, began to initiate ties with Japanese companies interested in 
Maine seafood products. The first sign of this came with a trade mission to Japan 
sponsored by the federal government A part o f the mission was devoted to seafood, and 
two representatives from Maine accompanied the mission. The former Governor 
Kenneth Curtis and James Warren, executive director o f the Maine Sardine Council,
the Japanese taste for seafood. How the product is processed, and its presentation is as important as taste 
in providing value.
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accompanied US Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps on the mission, which primarily 
attempted to reduce tariffs on seafood21.
The work of John Gardener of the DMR marketing and promotion department 
was at the center o f a second attempt at establishing an export industry with Maine 
seafood products. Initial marketing to Japan focused on squid and tuna in particular, with 
sea urchin only a secondary interest. Gardner organized a fisheries trade workshop 
inviting representatives from Japanese firms and local representatives from the 
commercial fishing industry. The Japanese in attendance were ready to invest in relations 
with the local fishing industry. This included sending Japanese fishermen out on boats to 
teach fishing techniques, providing technicians to help train fishermen in skills to handle 
the squid, and they had established airfreight lines to handle the cargo. After the meeting, 
a Japanese representative agreed to ship Maine seafood products to Japan for free on 
Flying Tiger Airlines and display them at the Tsukiji auction. A week after the workshop 
a Japanese expert working in the West Coast sea urchin industry was invited by Gardner 
to tour local processing plants exploring the commercial potential o f the green sea 
urchin22.
These efforts did not spur the development of a sea urchin industry at the time. 
Three years later officials were still calling for a new approach to commercial fisheries 
with a focus on export o f unusual species to Asian markets, particularly Japan23. It was
21 “Maine fish may not hook Japanese.” by Frank Sleeper. Portland Press Herald, Jan. 11,1979
22 “Exotic Tastes: Japan snaps up Maine’s ‘trash fish’” by Mike D’Antonio. Maine State Times, Jam 7, 
1979; “Maine fish may not hook Japanese.” by Frank Sleeper. Portland Press Herald, Jan. 11,1979; 
“Japanese expert to study Maine sea urchin as food.” By Clark T. Irwin Jr. Portland Press Herald, Jan. 17, 
1979
23 “New approach to U.S. seafood industry urged.” by Dieter Bradbury. Portland Press Herald, June 25, 
1983
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not until the mid-to-Iate 1980s that export to Japan really took off and the Northwest 
Atlantic sea urchin fishery started to develop.
Traditional, Business Group, and Transient Entrepreneurs
In many cases, Japanese businessmen approached individuals on the Maine coast 
asking them to cooperate in the production of green sea urchins for the Japanese market 
A common choice for the businessmen was to approach an existing buyer of inshore 
fisheries products along the coast. Inshore fishermen and buyers share unique productive 
relations based on reciprocity and flexibility. Fisheries social scientists have documented 
the prevalence o f  long-term relations between fishermen and buyers in inshore fisheries 
(see Acheson, 1981). Wilson (1980) finds these relations based on a mutual benefit; 
long-term ties can assure a supply for the buyer and a fair price for fishermen. Given the 
uncertain supply o f fish and changing market circumstances, inshore fishermen and 
buyers also share a flexible relationship. They work in a number o f  different fisheries 
and switch species based on season or market (Dewar, 1983,1986). Wilson (1980) found 
that the long-term reciprocitive ties that develop between buyers and harvesters allow the 
flexibility Dewar (1983,1986) describes. It is the trust that holds the partners together 
that allows them to move easily into other markets and species.
These inshore entrepreneurs organize according to regions also. They are 
_ associated with one o f the many ports along the coast, work with the harvesters in that 
region, and do not compete directly for supply with inshore buyers in other regions. In 
some cases, they even cooperate with buyers in other regions nearby. This offers a 
contrast to the second type o f entrepreneur that employs a business group organizational 
strategy (Granovetter, 1994). A  business group is a network o f firms that regularly
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collaborate over a long period of time (Powell and Smith-Doer,1994:388). The 
boundaries o f the group are stronger than other production networks, and the members 
are a recognized group although they are autonomous firms. The business group 
entrepreneurs buy a largo: quantity o f sea urchins, and do not follow the regional 
divisions o f the inshore entrepreneurs. Instead, these entrepreneurs set up a series of 
buying stations along the coast in order to have a presence in as many regions as possible. 
They typically buy directly from harvesters in one region o f  the coast, and then have 
other buyers working with harvesters in other key regions along the coast Each o f  these 
buying stations is formally recognized independent of the large buyer, but sells their 
product exclusively to this larger buyer. The members of a group do not compete among 
each other, and in the region the buying station operates, industry participants know what 
business group the buyer works within.
A third group of entrepreneurs emerged from the Cambodian and Vietnamese 
refugee community in Portland and has adopted a transient organizational strategy. The 
transient buyers do not work in a single community where they have long standing 
relations, nor do they organize independent buyers to work in specific communities. 
Instead, they travel to ports along the coast without developing ties to a specific area. A 
transient entrepreneur may settle in one port for a while, but it is not unusual for them to 
move regularly from port to port.
This typology summarizes three different organizational forms entrepreneurs use 
to secure a supply of sea urchins for their Japanese customers. Below I attempt to show 
how these different organizing strategies developed, and how they interacted to reach the 
industry structure that dominates currently.
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Establishing Ties and M obilizing Networks
The analysis below examines the entrepreneurial processes at the early stages of 
the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry. These entrepreneurs share a structurally 
equivalent position based on their ties to the Japanese. The first obstacle for the 
entrepreneur to overcome was the establishment o f ties with the Japanese. In some cases, 
the Japanese approached the entrepreneurs that came to operate in the industry. In others, 
entrepreneurs sought out the Japanese customers in order to get started in the industry. 
Once ties to Japan were established, entrepreneurs encountered the problem of mobilizing 
labor to secure a supply of sea urchins. It is possible to distinguish two different types of 
entrepreneurs at this stage based on their ties to the inshore commercial fishing industry 
along the coast. The traditional entrepreneurs held ongoing relationships on the 
waterfront. These existing ties gave them a social capital advantage over new 
entrepreneurs without those ties in the mobilization o f labor to secure a supply o f  sea 
urchins.
Establishing Ties to Japan
There is some record o f a small amount of sea urchin landings for many decades 
prior to the middle 1980s. These landings primarily supplied a small domestic market for 
sea urchin roe in ethnic communities of large cities. Always remaining very small, 
inshore buyers sold these urchins in urban fish markets such as the Fulton Fish Market in 
New York City. The market was never more than a small, part-time operation for 
harvesters and buyers, however. Harvey Holtz, for example, did a little work in this 
market He mainly SCUBA dived in the mussel fishery. He harvested, and had his own 
contacts at the Fulton Fish Market where he and his partner shipped their catch. His
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buyer at the Fulton Market once asked if  he ever saw urchins while fishing. Soon he 
would send a bushel o f urchins or so down to New Yoik with his mussels. For Holtz 
they were usually a gift, he threw in the truck along with his mussels to keep up a good 
relationship with his buyer. Occasionally the buyer would order a specific amount of 
urchins for which Holtz was paid. At one point Holtz began selling urchins to an Irish 
broker who would send them to France. However, this too was a small-scale operation, 
and mostly a sideline to his work in mussels.
Interestingly, a lot of this small-scale production occurred through the 1970s and 
early 1980s. This was the time that monetary policy favored exports to Japan, the state 
and federal governments were encouraging development of industries such as sea 
urchins, and the West Coast industry was in full swing. At least some Japanese were 
aware of the potential fishery at this time, also. Downeast Fisheries worked in the 
herring fishery for generations and established a relationship with a Japanese 
businessman who imported goods to Japan, including herring roe. This Japanese 
importer approached them about the green sea urchin back in the 1970s, but at the time 
the Downeast Fisheries was too busy with other fisheries to start something new. They 
agreed to let him know when they were ready for the sea urchin fishery. Therefore, 
despite conditions favorable to an industry and apparent knowledge o f the resource, it 
took several years for the fishery to develop.
The transformation of the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry from small-scale 
and domestic to the global productive system that it is today included the combination of 
entrepreneurial acts, and the mobilization of labor through social capital. There were two 
kinds of entrepreneurs that established links with the Japanese - those who initiated the
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relationship themselves and those that were approached by the Japanese. In addition, the 
entrepreneurs came from two different social contexts, those with ties to the inshore 
commercial fishing industry, often as buyers, and those from outside the industry.
Social Capital Advantages o f  Traditional Entrepreneurs
One group of entrepreneurs was looking for business opportunities, did not come
from commercial fishing backgrounds, and was not necessarily looking into a
commercial fishing business let alone sea urchins. These entrepreneurs were similar to
Robert Thompson whom I mentioned above. Thompson was looking to start his own
business and was in Japan looking for contacts to start exporting Maine products.
I just had a thing about Japan for some reason. They had all the money at 
that point in time, and if  I was gonna be in the international trade business,
I wanted to deal with somebody that I could not have to worry about 
getting my money... So, I actually went to Japan a couple of times back in 
1988 I guess. I tried to sell some traditional Maine products; you know 
Christmas trees, blueberry jam, jelly, furniture... I didn’t have any success 
in selling anything else over there, but I did find some interest in urchins 
while I was over there.
A similar case is Nicholas Cummings. Cum m ings and his son started a
commercial SCUBA diving business in the early 1980s after moving to Portland, Maine
from California. While running the business and diving in Casco Bay, they could not
help noticing the large number o f urchins blanketing the ocean bottom.
So, then in the process of diving all around Casco Bay, I saw billions of 
urchins on the bottom and I knew that there was a market for some 
urchins. I had seen it done in California. So, I did a little bit of searching 
and I found that there was a very, very small market for urchins in the 
USA, but an awfully small market.
Although busy in the domestic market, Cummings knew there was a larger market in 
Japan because in California he had seen urchin boats unload by the truckload. In 1985, 
he decided to take a trip to Japan.
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la  Tokyo, I went to the auction. They got a huge auction there. And they 
have warehouses as wide as a super highway, long, and piled up to the 
ceiling with urchins. And at the auction, they can all be sold within the 
matter o f an hour or two. And from there, I met urchin processors... It 
was rather difficult because nobody, especially the Japanese, nobody 
wanted to be the first one. And they, somebody had to be convinced that 
the Maine sea urchin was a good marketable urchin. Up until then, 
nobody knew. And I knocked on a lot o f  doors until finally I was lucky 
enough to knock on a right door. And I was super lucky because the door 
that I knocked on, this gentleman in Japan, is known as the godfather o f 
the urchin industry.
Thompson and Cummings both went to Japan looking for contacts to get into the sea
urchin industry. Cummings with the specific intent o f working in sea urchins based on
his knowledge of the California industry. Irving Johnson offers a slightly different case.
He was working as a research assistant at a local biological lab in downeast Maine. As
part of his work, he had become curious about the green sea urchin.
I had a friend in California who called me one time. We were research 
buddies. I was mentioning that I was working with sea urchins and he 
says, “The Japanese use them, I’ll give you a number in Japan to call.” Of 
course, I didn’t speak Japanese. The guy in Japan didn’t speak English.
But anyway, we done what we could to talk.
The relationship didn’t take off right away. Instead they talked off and on for a few
months and Johnson sent over a sample of 200 or 300 pounds.
The guy who got them, says, yeah this is exactly what we want And 
could you send me a shipment o f 500 kilograms. Whoa! This is a major 
project I was thinking at the time. My wife and I, the next week, picked 
up 500 kilograms... When he got them, he loved them. He said, well send 
me 5,000 kilograms.
These examples contrast with the group o f  entrepreneurs that resemble Bruce 
Avery, whom I discussed at the beginning of the chapter. While members o f the first 
group were actively looking for the opportunities in this global industry, this second 
group was not. They were uniquely open to the opportunity when presented to them, 
however. These entrepreneurs were established in the inshore fishing industry, often as
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inshore buyers, and often established in the community when Japanese businessmen
approached them. Avery was buying lobsters in Smallport, a business started by his
grandfather in 1919, when a Japanese businessman approached him about buying and
processing sea urchins:
Well, he showed up here because, I think he was more or less scouting the 
coast of Maine to see what there was for opportunities... He had done 
enough research to know what he was looking for, and he’d done enough 
with his speech therapy, that you could understand him fairly well. And 
then, when he came, who he was gonna buy for, who he was gonna deal 
directly through, the airline he was gonna work with, the people in Japan 
he was gonna deal with, it was all laid out... And where he had an 
Oriental background, he’d come from Japan and traveled all over, and he 
knew all the ins and outs about it, he came here and discussed it with us.
The opportunity usually involved some investment, and the risk accompanying that. The
Avery family built a building by the wharf for the processing of sea urchins. However,
they made these investments with their existing business as an inshore buyer in mind.
The Averys had already considered a building such as this to assist with packing of
lobsters and other seafood. The existing operations tempered the investments some,
making the new opportunity look like a safe risk.
Pete Peters, a lobster buyer on the Portland waterfront, held a similar outlook
towards the new industry. Peters had been buying lobsters for about 10 years before
being approached about the sea urchin fishery.
I’m in the lobster business... Lobsters are what we’re about, and we have 
a small boat industry and it’s somewhat seasonal. So, when the Japanese 
came poking around and there was a possibility that it might be a viable 
industry... The market is strong over there from November to maybe 
March when the sea urchins spawn out. And that’s the time o f year when 
most of our boats are not fishing. So, I had a few boats that were 
interested in going and we’ve got location on the pier so it’s kind o f a 
natural for us to keep the boats going and at the same time maybe keep the 
crew busy [and off] unemployment in the winter time... At the time, die 
sea urchin thing was pretty low risk.
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Lobstermen and lobster buyers make up a  large majority o f the inshore fleet along the 
coast of Maine. For buyers like Avery and Peters, being established in the lobster fishery 
tempered some o f the risks of the new endeavor, and perhaps more important 
supplemented the lobster fishery by providing work during the slow winter months.
In some cases, the Japanese approached these entrepreneurs because they had 
done some work in the small domestic market for sea urchins. A Japanese company 
working in Oregon approached Peg Buck, owner o f Buck’s Wharf in the Casco Bay 
region. The Bucks had been working in the domestic market for many years before the 
Japanese market opened. They decided to increase their work in the fishery as a result 
Two different Japanese companies approached Harvey Holtz about the sea urchin fishery. 
Holtz had been supplying a small amount o f urchins to the Fulton Fish Market as a 
supplement to his harvesting work in the mussel fishery. With offers from two Japanese 
buyers Holtz chose one and made sea urchins his primary work.
Although the actual steps differ, these actors hold a similar structural position—an 
entrepreneurial position—in the productive system. Using Burt’s concept, they fill a 
structural hole between the supply and demand o f the industry. Looking from the coast 
of Maine, these entrepreneurs provide a link through which sea urchins can flow to the 
distribution networks o f the Japanese economy. Looking from the east, the entrepreneurs 
provide a link to the network of suppliers along the Northwest Atlantic coast. Given this, 
it is not surprising that the fish buyers established in the inshore fishery were approached 
about this new opportunity. They in fact held the social resources o f value to the 
Japanese businessmen. They held the social capital associated with their embedded
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position in an existing social context along the waterfront For these entrepreneurs it was
not hard to begin buying sea urchins, in fact they considered it somewhat commonplace.
.. .[M]y role was.. .to secure the supply. And it wasn’t very difficult for 
me, cause I was already down here and I could buy product in Maine with 
a phone call. Well, there’s always divers around and people will learn to 
dive quick i f  there’s money to be made. So, in the wintertime there’s not a 
lot to do but if  there’s money to be made. It doesn’t take long for the word 
to get out. These guys were buying dry suits in a week.
For those already embedded in the waterfront context securing a supply of sea urchins
from the network o f harvesters working on the waterfront was not hard, hi fact, Peters
had already felt some push from harvesters he was working with who knew other boats
were harvesting urchins:
Everybody’s kind of looking. If  somebody’s doing sea urchin, they come 
home with a boatload of sea urchins, then [the boats I work with] start 
asking me, and it’s time to look into this.
When already embedded within a social context such as the waterfront it is easy to react
to an opportunity that comes along. Although it seems natural and sometimes hard to
describe for these entrepreneurs, this stands in contrast to the entrepreneurs that did not
come from that context. These other entrepreneurs either struggled to recruit harvesters,
or needed to develop ties with another buyer already embedded in the waterfront context.
Cummings, for instance, already had ties with a potential network of sea urchin
harvesters. When moving back east from the West Coast he began a commercial diving
business with his son. When they got started in the sea urchin fishery the two did some
of the harvesting themselves, but needed to recruit more divers. Cummings turned to his
social networks in the diving community:
I have, and have had, for many years the reputation that most, a large 
percentage o f the divers in Maine know me. From my diving experiences 
and things that I’ve done in diving over the years. When I approached the
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first divers, they were very difficult to try and convince them that they 
were gonna be able to make a living at diving for urchins.
Although Cummings had contacts to a population skilled in the technology of SCUBA
diving, they did not necessarily look at the opportunity from the same perspective as
those already on the waterfront. Cummings had to recruit hard for divers, putting up
signs at dive shops, through stories in papers and the radio, and offering his own boats as
dive platforms. This brought an unusual assortment of harvesters into commercial
fishing that had not worked in this sector before. As demand grew, Cummings would
eventually break into the existing inshore fleet through an established inshore buyer.
Thompson and Johnson went immediately to existing buyers in their area to
secure a supply o f sea urchins for their Japanese customers. Having no experience on the
water or on the waterfront, they really had no choice in order to get started. For
Thompson it was the first thing he did:
So, I came back and met another guy who was in the business, Patrick 
Scullin. We formed a company and he had some family  down there. We 
set up in his brother in law’s garage and started packing urchins in there...
And he had already, you know, was involved in the business... And he 
had a relationship with some of the divers, so we were able to get urchins.
Being able to get urchins was the primary role of the entrepreneurs in this position. The
best way to do this and do it quickly was either to use already existing relations or
establish ties with someone who had a set o f relationships that would be able to mobilize
labor and supply sea urchins. This was Johnson’s approach also. At first, he approached
fishermen in the area:
They thought my wife and I was crazy. They knew that I was a Vietnam 
veteran, o f course, I had longer hair, and nobody else did, so we were 
different in the beginning. And that’s where we hit most o f our problems.
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Not having any o f the social capital necessary to start in the industry, he instead turned to
a group already embedded in those relations. There were a number o f clam shops around
at the time with ties to harvesters and facilities for packing seafood.
I worked with dealers first because the fishermen refused to fish for 
urchins, they thought we were crazy. So, we worked with the dealers 
first... There was enough little clam shops and places like that that you 
could get in. These are small places, probably 10 or 15 people could fit in 
one o f them.
When Johnson says the fishermen refused to fish for urchins, he really means they 
refused to fish for him. However, for the dealers with established relations in the inshore 
fishing industry getting harvesters to fish is not a problem. We have seen that an 
entrepreneur embedded within the network of relations surrounding the inshore fisheries 
can mobilize labor through the social resources within their social context. For the 
entrepreneur without the social resources a part of that context, they must seek them out. 
In their first steps towards mobilizing labor in the sea urchin industry this is what those 
entrepreneurs did. They approached an established dealer in the inshore fisheries and 
began a relationship with them in order to get a supply o f sea urchins for their new 
Japanese contacts. These early strategies of entrepreneurs were the first steps in what 
later became the three sectors o f the sea urchin industry today.
Given the social capital advantages of embeddedness, it is not surprising that 
those entrepreneurs embedded in the inshore communities and fisheries were approached 
by the Japanese to take part in the new opportunity presented by the sea urchin fishery. 
Moreover, it is not surprising that those individuals not embedded in that context turned 
to this group to take advantage o f  the new opportunities. These individuals and firms had 
unique social advantages associated with their embeddedness that enabled them to get the 
industry started and take advantage of the opportunities. The most obvious advantage
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
80
lies in the material infrastructure o f the inshore fisheries: the existing wharves, boats, and
machinery. However, more subtle, but obvious after the previous discussion, is the
social advantages derived from being embedded in a social network o f existing ties.
Powell (1990a) has described the importance of the hard found trust and complementarity
in productive relations that exists in the network forms o f  organization.
In network forms o f  resource allocation, individual units exist not by 
themselves, but in relation to other units. These relationships take 
considerable effort to establish and sustain.... As networks evolve, it 
becomes more economically sensible to exercise voice rather than exit.
Benefits and burdens tend to be shared. Expectations are not frozen, but 
change as circumstances dictate. A mutual orientation - knowledge, which 
the parties assume each, has about the other and upon which they draw in 
communication and problem solving - is established. In short, 
complementarity and accommodation are the cornerstones o f successful 
production networks (Powell, 1990a:303).
According to Powell (1990a), the emphasis on relationships in networks creates 
advantages in production environments. Producing in these environments can and often 
does require regular innovation and adaptation to changing  circumstances. Information is 
essential to this process, and strong reciprocal ties provide flows o f reliable information. 
Taking a risk on something like the sea urchin requires a strong sense of trust, and mutual 
obligation that one will not be left out to dry. Newcomers to the inshore fisheries were 
met with some contempt, even laughed at. However, the same proposition coming from 
a trusted member o f the inshore community holds more credence.
Inertial Pressures
Given the advantages o f the traditional inshore buyers we might ask why they did 
not take advantage o f the opportunity earlier. Put another way, why was it the aggressive 
behavior of outsiders to the waterfront, and not traditional buyers already established on
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the coast that got the industry going? Although the network forms of organization
typified in the inshore fisheries are able to take advantage o f opportunities, there appears
to be some keeping inertia in this network from taking advantage of this opportunity.
Hannon and Freeman (1984; 1989) in particular have attempted to systematically address
the inertia of organizational forms. They find the reliability and accountability o f  a firm
the most important qualities assuring its persistence. However, the factors that create
reliability and accountability often create inertia in firms.
Some o f the factors that generate structural inertia are internal to [firms]: 
these include sunk costs in plant, equipment, and personnel, the dynamics 
of political coalitions, and the tendency for precedents to become 
normative standards. Others are external. There are legal and other 
barriers to entry and exit from realms of activity. Exchange relations with 
other [firms] constitute an investment that is not written off lightly.
Finally, attempting radical structural change often threatens legitimacy; 
the loss o f institutional support may be devastating (1989:149).
Those buyers already established in the inshore fisheries were a part of an already 
existing structure o f roles, authority, and communication that produced reliability and 
accountability in relations with other firms. The already existing relations gave them an 
advantage in moving into a new fishery, but it created inertial forces, also. These 
entrepreneurs were not willing to drop those existing relations for the new fishery and its 
new structure of roles, authority, and com m unication.
The case o f  Downeast Fisheries demonstrates this. The firm was aware o f the 
potential sea urchin  fishery for years before one ever developed. However, Downeast 
Fisheries was already committed to the herring industry. This included physical capital 
investments, as well as commitments to suppliers, employees, and customers. Similarly, 
Pete Peters describes his move to the sea urchin fishery as a move that fit well with his 
lobster business, not one that would replace this business. In his own words, “Lobsters
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are what we are about” For these entrepreneurs, their ousting structure o f relations 
inhibited their movement to the new fishery. However, the new entrepreneurs did not 
have the existing relations to inhibit their interest in the new fishery. Consequently, they 
aggressively pursued production in a way that led to growth o f the industry as well as 
growth of firms operating in the industry.
Carroll and Harmon (1995:152) point out that it is new firms designed to take 
advantage o f some new set of opportunities that offer the largest threat to existing firms. 
When inertial forces keep the existing firms from changing organizing strategies quickly 
enough, they can be crowded out of the niche conditions. This is in fact what happened 
in the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry. New entrepreneurs, without any 
encumbrances, were able to develop strategies o f competition for supply within the 
fishery that confronted the traditional inshore organization. Rather than compete, and 
have to reorganize existing relations, these firms chose exit from the industry. I  will pick 
up this theme again in the third section o f this chapter. Below I look more closely at the 
new entrepreneurs that entered the sea urchin industry, and the development of the 
business group and transient form o f organizing supply networks. The development of 
these entrepreneurial strategies is linked to the development of the processing sector of 
the industry.
Integration. Innovation and Imitation
The development of the processing sector included industry expansion, the integration of 
production, and the development of unique organizational strategies. These decisions 
took place within a competitive organizational field where entrepreneurs were trying to 
solve problems of organization while remaining competitive in the new industry. In
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some cases, entrepreneurs developed innovative organizational strategies that they 
believed increased their competitive position in the industry. In many other cases, the 
entrepreneurs mimicked the strategies used by other entrepreneurs that they believed 
were successful. They meant to assure their own success with the moves.
Processing and the Business Group Entrepreneurs
For the first few years of the industry, shipments o f sea urchin to Japan from the 
Northwest Atlantic coast were whole/live urchins, what is called a “boxed market” on the 
waterfront These urchins were harvested live from the ocean, boxed in cool boxes with 
ice packs, and sent to Japanese processors in Hokkaido. Shipping a box o f live urchins 
can be difficult. The urchins can live outside o f the water for some time, but if  the 
temperature gets too high, the texture o f the urchin roe will soften. Also, if  the 
temperature falls below freezing for too long the texture and color o f the roe is damaged. 
There were some early mistakes made as urchins were packed incorrectly and arrived in 
Japan unsatisfactorily. Using the airlines often was a problem. Most urchin shippers 
have a story o f a large and valuable shipment o f live urchins that sat at an airport 
somewhere until they were worthless.
Although there are these practical problems with shipping live urchins, they are 
not the most common explanation for finding an alternative to the boxed market. The 
more common explanation processors use to explain their decision to process relies on 
cost-benefit reasoning. They usually portray it in the common sense manner Nicholas 
Cummings uses here:
Well, i f  you stop and think about it. I f  you take an average 10% ratio.
What that % means is that if  you weigh up 10 pounds o f live urchins and
you get 1 pound of roe out o f those urchins, that’s a 10% ratio. So, that
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means if  you got 1,000 pounds o f urchins, that you are paying $2.50 a 
pound to ship over, and instead o f  that you got 100 pounds o f roe. The 
difference in the airfreight is huge.
The roe o f the sea urchin is the delicacy in Japan; the rest o f  the urchin is discarded in 
processing. If  you can eliminate 90% o f your airfreight costs that is an economic 
advantage.
However, a closer look shows that the advantage o f processing is not quite this 
clear. Very often, an exporter can negotiate deals when making regular large airfreight 
shipments like live urchins. These deals can defray some o f  the cost advantages o f the 
smaller processed shipment More important, the decision to process is a decision to 
integrate activities previously carried out by other firms in the productive system. This 
includes taking on substantial costs in equipment, facilities, and labor, which 
substantially cut into the savings associated with airfreight. Perhaps most importantly, 
the decision to process was a decision to enter a different market. Uni processed in Japan 
is a high priced product supplying an elite customer. Uni processed outside of Japan 
produces a low priced product for a more modest consumer. Processing outside of Japan 
does not add value.
If not the cost saving measure so often referred to, what factors did lead to the 
move to processing urchins on the Northwest Atlantic coast? The change resulted from 
the move to expand production by firms started by new entrepreneurs. They saw 
expansion as a necessary step in order to survive in the industry. Operating without the 
restrictions o f working in other fisheries, and without normative or experiential guides to 
organizing their business, the new entrepreneurs innovated and imitated each other as 
they developed larger, more integrated firms.
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The opportunities for expansion existed early in the industry, before processing
developed, driven by the Japanese demand for the green sea urchin. For Irving Johnson
the immediate demand was a surprise. His first shipment was 200 to 300 pounds:
And of course, that was like 2 or 3 million pounds to me. I mean, I was 
talcing this 2 or 300 lbs. and shipping it to a different country... The guy 
who got them, says, yeah, this is exactly what we w ant And could you 
send me a shipment o f 500 kilograms. Whoa! This is a major project I 
was thinking at the time... And then he received them, loved them. He 
said, well send me 5,000 kilograms... This is too much! Could we send 
you what we got?
Nicholas Cummings found the same unquenchable demand when he first began. In his
first year his son and he alone dived for the urchins:
It was along towards the end of the Maine urchin season, but that year, just 
my son and I alone, did a quarter of a million dollars worth o f business...
The following year, I hired more divers, more boats, and we did 2 million 
dollars worth o f business. Next year we did 5 million dollars worth of 
business.
A strong demand and favorable exchange rates helped support this expansion. The price
of Uni remained high in Japan, and a strong Yen made trade conditions very favorable.
Cummings started his business in the Portland region o f Maine around Casco Bay.
Trying to fill demand, and given the large supply along the coast, Cummings began
buying urchins east of Portland:
By the middle half of the second year, we needed to expand into other 
areas. So, I went up to Friendship and I had a meeting with a lobster 
business, in other words a lobster dealer, and he had lobstermen come in 
and sell him lobsters. So, I asked him to call a meeting with the 
lobstermen and I went up there and gave a talk.
Cummings’ expansion out o f his region also followed an expansion on his demand side. 
The boxed market for Northwest Atlantic sea urchins is a limited market. Here urchins 
are processed for an elite market that is limited in its growth. Cummings’ desire to 
expand on the supply side led him to establish ties with trading companies who were able
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to reach a lower end market for sea urchin Uni in Japan. Although die value o f die urchin
Uni is lower, the demand for this product was on the increase, as we saw in chapter one.
The trading companies gave an immediate oudet for the vast supply o f  sea urchins along
the Northwest Adantic coast. It was also the trading companies that gave a lot o f the
impetus for processing on the Northwest Adantic coast, which some respondents relay in
their description o f the decision:
The first year, I wasn’t gonna over commit myself to this... So we brought 
a few, I can’t even remember how many, but a few is probably a lot to 
you... And ah, and then we were shipping them over in the shell. Then 
they wanted us to process a few here. So, we tried processing them on a 
small scale.
Shipping the whole urchin. We did that for 1 or 2 months. This was in 
the summertime that we did this. And we was having a little bit o f trouble 
with the quality because the airlines didn’t know how to treat them, so 
they were becoming a little bad. They were still good, but they were 
becoming a little bad. And then he wanted us to process.
It appears the larger trading companies made the decision to process rather than the small 
firms in Maine. The development o f the processing plants came under the supervision of 
the trading companies also. The Northwest Atlantic firms had the advantage of teams of 
experts as they developed their processing facilities. These experts refined the processing 
techniques for the green urchin so that the finished product would satisfy the new market. 
The firms also found financial support as they made the decision to integrate. In some 
cases, the Japanese provided some money to purchase initial supplies, and they assured a 
steady demand in order to cover investments in plant facilities.
The introduction of processing opened a new and larger market for Northwest 
Atlantic sea urchins. Uni processed in Japan sells in expensive restaurants, especially 
during the holidays. The Uni processed on  the Northwest Atlantic coast would go
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directly to supermarket chains, rather than to processors. This created an expansion
similar to those when the boxed market originated.
Then they wanted us to process a few here. So, we tried processing them 
on a small scale... The next year, we made a bigger commitment. I rented 
another building locally here, and we set up a processing shop. Give you 
an idea o f the magnitude, I had 67 Cambodians working for me at one 
time... and I shipped over 2 million pounds of urchins that year, into 
Japan.
The expansion did not stop at this level; large processors were buying as much as 11
million pounds o f sea urchins in 1993.
As much as the trading companies that invested in the industry guided the
decisions to expand and aided that expansion, the willingness o f entrepreneurs is equally
important. The new entrepreneurs were looking for the expansion opportunities. They
believed reaching the larger market was the way to survive, and moving into processing
was the way to reach that market. The experience of International Collaborations
demonstrates this process. Robert Thompson and Patrick Scullin started the firm
shipping live urchins in the boxed market. They did this for a few years before other
firms started to process on the Northwest Atlantic coast.
Then the business started to change and people started processing over 
here and everybody felt like that was the future. You know we had to 
process over here, because we were paying $1.50 a pound for airfreight to 
get the live urchin over to Japan. And we just cut them open here and 
save all that money. Compete with the Japanese processors, and that’s 
what everybody started doing.
Confronted with the changes in the industry, International Collaborations was forced to 
consider their future when the trading company approached them about starting a 
processing plant
There was some interest on Patrick’s part with processing because he felt 
like that was the logical progression for us that we needed to do that to
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survive. I didn’t really agree with that I just didn’t like the idea of having 
a huge overhead o f processors.
International Collaborators had the opportunity to move into processing. They would 
have a market for the product, and were offered financing to invest in a plant. Thompson 
and Scullin decided to take separate paths. Thompson bought Scullin’s share of 
International Collaborations and continued shipping live urchins in the boxed m arket 
Scullin accepted the offer presented to International Collaborations and invested in a 
processing plant, moving into the new market. The division that existed between these 
partners highlights the importance o f the decisions made to move in this new direction. 
Each firm, presented with the opportunity to make the move into the new market and the 
decision to integrate the processing, had to decide if the move made sense. Under these 
circumstances, operating in a new and uncertain, economic environment, these firms 
relied on mimetic processes in order to develop business strategies. In ambiguous 
situations, firms may model themselves on other firms deemed legitimate or successful.
In the words o f Scullin, the move to processing was what he thought they needed to do to 
survive.
The move to processing led to new means for mobilizing  supply networks. The 
new entrepreneurs had already turned to buyers embedded in local inshore production to 
obtain their first supply of urchins to ship to Japan. With the move toward expansion, 
entrepreneurs followed this strategy moving into other regions, establishing relations with 
embedded inshore buyers, and increasing their supply networks. Each of these buying 
stations is a legally recognized business independent o f the large buyer, but sells their 
product exclusively to the processor. In the region the buying station operates, industry 
participants know what business group the buyer works within. The region of a buying
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station is carefully chosen in order to assure separate buying stations within the same 
group can operate without overlap, and in order to assure competition in a region where 
another business group operates. As these large processors began expanding with buying 
stations they followed each other into the new regions setting up stations to compete with 
each other, and with smaller entrepreneurs exporting to Japan.
Transient Entrepreneurs
A third type of entrepreneur entered the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry
after the business group entrepreneurs had begun processing. This group came
predominantly, though not exclusively, from the Cambodian and Vietnamese refugee
communities in New England. When the first sea urchin processing plants opened,
entrepreneurs recruited labor by formal means: employment agencies and classified ads
in newspapers. A surprise to the processors, the majority of the response came from the
refugee community. One processor, who gained some acceptance in the refugee
community, is candid about his surprise:
I didn’t realize there was that many around. But they came from all over 
New England to do this... word of mouth, and they’re really a tight-knit 
community, all through New England... the whole families would show 
up. They’d bring their kids, their kids would come after school, and I had 
whole generations o f people working with me.
This particular processor expresses his surprise, but social scientists have documented 
this type of informal network among immigrants (Portes, 1995; Portes and Manning, 
1986). His seems like a fair assessment o f the situation. Prejudice along with language 
and cultural barriers, has created a tight knit community among refugees, and when work 
appears the word spreads quickly among these dense social networks. Ta Kutchai was in 
Lowell, Massachusetts when his cousin called him from Portland, Maine and told him
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
90
about the new work opportunity. There was a processing plant hiring, paying fair money, 
and no language or cultural barriers to employment existed. Kutchai brought his brother 
with him to Maine and they began working in a processing plant in Portland.
As the processing sector in Portland grew, so did the refugee community 
involvement It is a tightly knit community, living in the same area o f  the city, playing in 
sport leagues together, and participating in community celebrations. Working in the 
processing plants is a part of that closeness as well, giving them an advantage in 
mobilizing processing labor. This was demonstrated to Mati Oshono when he needed to 
mobilize processing labor to start a sea urchin processing plant Oshono had been buying 
sea urchins for a few years until, because o f  some unique business circumstances, he 
needed to begin processing and make shipments in a very short time. Under other 
circumstances, this would mean finding a trained management staff, a processing labor 
force, and a period o f  training for the new staff. In this case, Oshono approached a 
member of the Cambodian refugee community with some experience in the sea urchin 
industry. This individual was able to organize a trained processing labor force, and 
within two weeks International Exporters was making shipments to Japan.
The ability to mobilize the processing labor within the refugee community is 
similar to the ability o f inshore buyers able to mobilize harvesting labor. In this case it 
was the shared membership in a cultural community, or an ethnic enclave (see Leiberson, 
1980, Portes and Manning, 1986) that provide social resources valuable to the enterprise.
It was not long before members o f the community began using this advantage to 
start their own processing plants. Similar to other ethnic groups living on the margins of 
a host country, the Cambodians had a desire to shed their reliance on others to survive.
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They started their own businesses as a way to help the community withstand the
difficulties o f living in a foreign country.
At least we can try to do it; at least we are working for ourselves. It is 
hard for us to find a job in a company, because most o f us don’t really 
speak English, or write English. This helps us get a start, get our part
When the sea urchin processing plants first opened they offered an opportunity to an 
ethnic group with disadvantages in the human capital skills, particularly education and 
language skills, valued in the larger society. Now, using social capital resources, 
Cambodian entrepreneurs attempted to establish their own place in the new industry.
One o f those entrepreneurs was Ta Kutchai.
Kutchai had moved to Portland to start working in the sea urchin processing 
plants, but he soon grew disenchanted with the new work. He left within a few months o f 
arriving, and began pursuing his interest in opening his own processing firm. He looked 
for Japanese businessmen interested in working with him, and after some time he met a 
Japanese man who had previously worked in the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry 
as a representative of a trading company. This Japanese businessman left the trading 
company to start his own business brokering sea urchins for US processors. As the 
environmental conditions supporting the export of urchins became very favorable, 
Japanese brokers emerged. The brokers do not have the technical and financial resources 
o f the trading companies, but they provided a door to Japan for the interested processor 
by handling shipment and distribution.
With the tie to Japan and the ability to mobilize labor for processing, Kutchai still 
needed to secure a supply of sea urchins. He could not mobilize existing ties for 
harvesting, like the embedded inshore buyers, and he did not have the financial capacity 
to set up buying stations along the coast. Instead, Kutchai rented a Ryder truck and drove
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harvesters. The first trips to the coast were not very successful. Eventually, Kutchai 
found that offering high prices and paying in cash increased his success at securing a 
supply of urchins. This strategy keeps the business operating close to its margin, but in 
Tit’s words, “Without sea urchins there is no business.” The relative success o f the first 
transient processors led to imitators. These firms visit areas where they have no strong 
social ties and attempt to buy urchins through competition with the established buyers in 
the area. Sometimes they park on the side o f a central road with a sign announcing 
“Urchins Wanted.” At other times they will drive right down to the pier where harvesters 
are landing their catch from the day.
The competitive style of the transients for securing supply keeps them operating 
at their margin and many times these firms drop out of the industry. This leads to the 
high turnover found in Table 1.1. Most processors in the 1994-95 season had dropped 
out by the 1996-97 season. At the beginning of the 1997-98 season, seven new 
processors had opened in the Portland area - all Cambodian owned. For some, they do 
not expect to make it past this season. This is the case for Hun Sammaki who began a 
processing firm for the 1997-98 season. He had seen his uncles’ processing plant, in 
which he worked as a child, go bankrupt, and he knows first hand the amount of 
competition in the processing sector. Many of the other small processors are his friends, 
people he plays ball with or spends time with on the weekend. Sammaki is hopeful, but 
not confident he will be in the business next season. After next season, he does not 
expect to work in the industry at all.
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The entrepreneurial process for this third group has some similarities with those 
of the inshore buyers and the business group entrepreneurs. Similar to the inshore 
buyers, the transients in the refugee community began with a social capital advantages 
that allowed them to mobilize processing labor easily. However, they did not carry with 
them the commitments and normative pressures found with the embedded inshore buyers. 
Instead, like the business group entrepreneurs, they were able to innovate and imitate 
strategies for securing a supply o f sea urchins for their Japanese customers. As the new 
entrepreneurs entered the inshore fishery density and competition increased.
Competition and Inertia
Organizational ecology uses the fundamental and realized niche to conceptualize the 
competition that can occur between different organizational forms (Hannon and Freeman, 
1989:97-116). A fundamental niche includes the necessary environmental conditions to 
sustain a set o f firms that employ a certain organizational strategy. However, when 
different sets of firms, employing different organizational strategies, rely on the same 
environmental resources their fundamental niches overlap. Overlapping niches restrict 
the space within the niche that can sustain the set o f firms. The realized niche refers to 
that restricted space, reached through the combination o f environmental conditions and 
competition between the different sets of firms for the environmental resource conditions.
This framework provides a way to put boundaries around the competitive process. 
Although the processed and whole sea urchins reach separate markets and the large and 
small processors supply a different type of Japanese customer, the firms operating within 
each rely on the same fishery resource to supply those markets. The firms compete 
within the same niche for supply if  not for demand. However, the ecological conception
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does not provide insight to the process by which competition takes place. Here the 
institutional approach can help. We have seen above how institutional factors have led to 
the variety of organizing strategies found in the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry. 
However, these organizational strategies include competitive strategies that come into 
conflict. This is particularly true with the traditional inshore buyers. These inshore 
buyers bring with them normative pressures, or conceptions of control, from their 
existing relations in the inshore commercial fisheries. When the innovations followed by 
the business group and transient entrepreneurs come into conflict with these conceptions 
these entrepreneurs have tended to drop out of the sea urchin industry.
The traditional inshore buyers follow an organizational strategy that includes 
switching among fisheries based on season, long-term reciprocal relations with 
harvesters, and an association with a particular port or region of the coast. When these 
buyers entered the sea urchin industry, they brought with them this set o f institutionalized 
organizational strategies. For these entrepreneurs the strategies were commonplace, just 
the way you do business. However, the new entrepreneurs, coming from social contexts 
outside of the inshore fisheries, did not carry these institutional strategies for doing 
business. Instead, they developed strategies that conflicted with those o f the inshore 
buyers.
The first conflict came with the traditional strategy of switching between 
fisheries. For the inshore buyers the sea urchin fishery was a supplement to their already 
existing work. Particularly in the case of the lobster buyer, sea urchin production picks 
up during the slow winter months. However, sea urchins can be harvested in the spring 
and fall, and the new entrepreneurs did not see the sea urchin fishery as a seasonal
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supplement Instead, these entrepreneurs organized the fishery without the seasonal
strategy beginning production in late summer and carrying it on until late spring. To Pete
Peters, an early inshore buyer, this conflict was apparent right away.
He was buying and I don’t think in large volumes, but he was not in any 
other business at the time, so he had the time and energy to go after this, 
where other people were already in business, already in business doing 
something else.
This difference in commitment sustained the different organizing strategies o f the inshore
and new entrepreneurs. For Bruce Avery this conflict lead to quick ending of a
relationship with his Japanese customer. Avery Lobster worked in the sea urchin fishery
when the lobster season was closed. After two years, the Japanese customer ended the
relationship, preferring a tie with an entrepreneur willing to work the longer season.
The strategies o f expansion by the business group entrepreneurs and the
transience of the small processors also challenged the regional segregation of the inshore
buyers. The regional segregation was a form o f cooperation among inshore
entrepreneurs. Rather than compete directly with each other, they would stick to their
particular area and sometimes cooperate. If  an inshore buyer ended up with more product
than his market could handle on a particular day he could pass it on to another inshore
buyer. For Downeast Fisheries, it was common to share trucking duties.
Joe’s trucked for me and I’ve trucked for him a lot. Bill Carry has trucked 
for us. Phil McGuire, I’ve trucked for him a lot... It’s those relationships 
that really made the thing work... Everybody here has always worked 
together... Families go back generations, literally 4 or 5 generations. So 
you don’t screw somebody that you know your kids are gonna be working 
with in 4 or 5 generations, or your grandkids. You try to do a good job.
This kind of cooperation helped business on a  day to day basis, but it also helped reduce 
direct competition in the region a buyer operated. When the new entrepreneurs began 
moving into these areas and trying to buy sea urchins, they came into direct conflict with
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these institutional arrangements. In order to move in to the new areas, the entrepreneurs
attempted to take harvesters away from their exiting relations with buyers by
undercutting their prices. This directly challenged a third institutional arrangement of the
inshore buyers, the long-term reciprocal ties with harvesters.
The inshore buyers work with harvesters on a long-term basis, in a relationship
that presumably has mutual benefits. The buyer secures a steady supply of urchins and
the harvester receives a fair price for his catch. Inshore buyers began working under this
assumption in the sea urchin fishery, but as the new entrepreneurs moved into their areas,
they attempted to draw harvesters away by undercutting prices. Their success was
frustrating to the inshore buyers; to Peters it was perplexing:
The lobstermen would have the commitment. It’s understood; it’s part o f 
the culture. The [urchin] divers wouldn’t . .. So, if  this guys paying 2 cents 
more a pound, their mentality is why wouldn’t I sell to him. My mentality 
is why would you sell to him? I’ve been buying from you all along.
With the introduction o f price competition, the inshore buyers began to loose harvesters
to new entrepreneurs trying to get a stake in the area. When new entrepreneurs undercut
their prices, it challenged the inshore buyers’ legitimacy, their fairness in dealing with
harvesters, leaving them to defend their practices:
I tried to be like I say, as fair for the buyer, the dealer, and the guy 
doing.... With me, I took what I had to get out o f it to make mine; my 
buyer had to make a living to be able to buy tomorrow. The diver had to 
make a living... Me, I do the best I can and I say, this is what I’ve got to 
have to operate. I don’t need no more. I make as much as I have to make 
without having to make a killing. All I want is just a little piece of the pie.
And then I can see, knowing, watching throughout the years, it takes this 
much to make a living.
Put in the position of competing with the new entrepreneurs would mean leaving behind 
strong beliefs about how they should run an inshore buying business. The new 
competition would require adjusting work in other fisheries in order to extend their
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season in the sea urchin fishery, dealing with competition in their region that disrupted
long-term ties with harvesters, and dealing with the ideological challenges to their
traditional practices. In most cases, traditional inshore buyers found dropping out o f the
industry a preferable option, often with no regrets.
So, I did not feel comfortable with that part It turns it into what, in my 
opinion, what we call a whore industry, and I’m glad to be out of it...
There isn’t much structure to it and no loyalty, and it’s whoever’s got the 
best yield that day. That’s not necessarily bad, but that’s a reason why I 
wouldn’t want to be involved in it again.
With the new competition from entrepreneurs outside the inshore fisheries the new
fishery had developed practices that existing buyers found distasteful. The first pressures
came from the business group entrepreneurs moving into new regions. However, for
many it was the movement of the transient entrepreneurs into the industry lead to their
exit. These entrepreneurs were working with slightly less overhead costs than the large
processors, allowing them to beat existing prices. In many cases, these transient firms
were willing to reduce profits, even take a loss, in order to establish themselves in the
industry. This led to a price competition the inshore buyers either could not or did not
want to participate in. This change lead Downeast Fisheries to drop from the industry:
I just stepped away from the business, told everybody that’s it. Called 
Sato and said I’m done. Best move I ever made... I watched a guy go 
over one day and get paid $2.00... The same day I was out there trying to 
buy urchins for a buck a pound. And I said this is fucking nuts. Unless 
you want to play this game for a few years to beat these guys at their own 
game, you can’t do it. So, I got out. The best decision I ever made.
Everybody in the business says, God, you made such a good decision.
When these inshore buyers drop out of the sea urchin industry, they do not fail as 
businesses. To the contrary, they remain thriving inshore buyers operating under the 
same or similar circumstances as they were before the new fishery came along. For these 
buyers the decision to move into the new fishery was a diversification move; one that
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seemed reasonable, at its beginning. However, social process that they could not have 
predicted lead them to drop from the industry, leaving a new fishery dominated by new 
entrepreneurs.
Table 2.2 Comparison of three entrepreneurial types.
Traditional Entrepreneurs Business Group Entrepreneurs Transient Entrepreneurs
Established on Waterfront. Outside o f Waterfront Outside o f  W aterfront
Approached by Japanese. Approached Japanese. Both approached by and 
approached Japanese
Recruit harvesters locally. Recruit harvesters in many 
areas.
Recruit harvesters in 
many areas
Local waterfront orientation. Expansion orientation. Survival orientation
Established in other fisheries. 
Dropped from industry.
Worked primarily in industry. 
Become established and 
expand.
Work primarily in 




It is possible to imagine a different outcome for the entrepreneurial processes o f the sea 
urchin industry, one in which established inshore buyers maintained relations with 
Japanese customers and operated the industry in accord with traditional insho re  fishery 
institutions. In fact, we might even expect this type of industry to develop given the 
social capital advantages o f  the inshore buyers for initiating the new industry. The 
organizational strategies o f  inshore fisheries have shown adaptable to changes in supply 
and demand, and they resemble the small-firm networks known for their flexibility to
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move quickly into new opportunities. With the move o f  traditional inshore entrepreneurs 
into the new fishery, institutional theory would expect them to carry the existing 
organizational strategies into the new fishery with an isomorphic affect
An industry quite different than this developed, however. The institutional 
processes o f innovation, imitation, and competition within the industry created a dynamic 
that began with a reliance on the inshore buyers, but later pushed those same buyers out 
o f the industry. In particular it was the introduction o f two new sets of entrepreneurs, 
without previous experience in the inshore fisheries o f  New England, that lead to the new 
organizational strategies that dominated this new fishery. These entrepreneurs operated 
without the institutional constraints of the inshore buyers. Without the normative 
understandings of how to operate as an inshore buyer, they developed new organizational 
strategies and imitated each other in an effort to survive in the new industry. The 
strategies of survival included strategies of competition that contradicted traditional 
organizational practices within the inshore fisheries, and eventually lead to inshore 
buyers dropping out o f  the industry.
Perhaps this second outcome should not be so surprising, however. The 
environmental conditions that might have supported a sea urchin industry in the 
Northwest Atlantic existed long before an industry developed. However, the inshore 
buyers most favorably situated to take advantage o f  the new industry chose not to. An 
unusual species for a market across the globe did not look as inviting a risk to a group 
embedded in established and successful fisheries. It was not until a group o f 
entrepreneurs looking for new opportunities initiated production that the industry took
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
off. These entrepreneurs could not have gotten started without the inshore buyers 
many cases, but the industry might not have started without the outsiders.
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Ch a pte r  3  
La b o r  Pr o c e sse s
“Like a field on fire.” So went the sea urchin industry according to one
participant. Over the course of the industry’s history, more than one observer has
described its development in a similar fashion: a gold rush, a boom24.
When the draggers, and then the divers that started getting into it, it was 
like a field fire. You light a match, and then the smaller it starts...
Everybody who had any kind o f  fondness to the water, some that didn’t 
even, wasn’t fond of the water, couldn’t even swim. It was, like I say, like 
a field on fire around here for a while.
Before 1985, a small number of fishermen harvested an almost unnoticed amount o f sea
urchins destined for an urban im m igran t market. In 1993 harvesters landed over 40
million pounds o f sea urchin worth over $30 million. Growing along with the landings
was the number o f people working in this fishery. Where not one person made a living in
the sea urchin industry, six years later the industry supported thousands in the harvesting,
buying and processing sectors. Most growth took place within the harvesting sector. By
1994, there were over 1700 licensed harvesters, coming from many different walks of
life.
As we have seen, economic conditions favored the establishment and growth of 
new fisheries such as the sea urchin. International monetary conditions favored the 
growth of a sea urchin industry in the Northwest Atlantic with a product destined for 
Japan. In particular, the demand for this product in the late 1980s and early 1990s
24 See Amory (1996) for examples of this characterization.
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increased as quickly as supply could be garnered. In 1985, the Yen-Dollar ratio began a 
period o f  decline ending in 1995 (see Figure LI and Table L2). As the value o f  the 
Dollar decreased versus the Yen, entrepreneurs could purchase more US products at no 
extra costs. At this time, the Japanese consumers’ desire for Uni had not reached a 
saturation level, and the desire for Northwest Atlantic sea urchins was limited only by the 
amount o f product brought to the Japanese market.
The existence o f Japanese demand alone did not provide the economic conditions 
necessary for the harvesting boom. Entrepreneurial links were needed for the industry to 
flourish. Chapter 2 shows how entrepreneurial activity in the Northwest Atlantic sea 
urchin industry began with a few entrepreneurs supplying a small live urchin market.
The industry soon began to expand with the introduction o f Japanese Trading  Companies, 
Northwest Atlantic processing, and the business group strategy of organizing  the coast. 
Entrepreneurs were positioned to buy as many sea urchins as could be harvested. The 
density o f  entrepreneurs increased as the favorable international conditions supported a 
number o f small immigrant entrepreneurs who began buying sea urchins employing the 
transient organizational strategy.
The economic conditions were ripe for the industry to grow, but the 
entrepreneurial desire to buy sea urchins could not guarantee the mobilization o f labor. 
The final piece of the industry growth was the harvesting boom that took place. This 
chapter examines the boom like growth o f the labor market in the sea urchin industry, 
particularly in the harvesting sector. The analysis has two parts. First, I examine a 
unique set o f institutional arrangements a part of inshore fisheries that I have termed the 
working waterfront. The working waterfront includes a set o f flexible productive
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strategies that include both technological flexibility and social flexibility among a large 
set o f  small firms. Similar to other industrial districts, these small firms have developed 
strategies of cooperation and competition that allow flexible adaptation to uncertain 
supply and demand conditions. The working waterfront differs from these other regions 
in its reliance on a State managed common property resource, the ocean. The ocean’s 
resources, and access to them, form an important part o f the flexibility of the region. The 
arrangements on the working waterfront allowed easy access to individuals interested in 
participating in this new industry, and they facilitated the speed of growth in the 
harvesting sector.
The second part of my analysis of the labor process examines the strategies of the 
individuals that chose to take advantage of the opportunities opened by the new fishery. 
Given the advantages provided by the working waterfront for harvesters to move into the 
new industry, who did and did not decide to take advantage of these opportunities? Here 
I introduce three types o f harvesters who approached the industry with different career 
strategies based on their social context. For established harvesters working in other 
fisheries the new industry was a supplement to their primary fishery. Young harvesters, 
from the waterfront context but not yet established in a fishery, considered the sea urchin 
their primary fishery. A third group of harvesters came from outside the waterfront 
context and approached the new fishery without the career strategies present on the 
working waterfront. Each type o f harvester was able to take advantage o f the resources 
provided by the working waterfront. However, similar to the traditional entrepreneurs in 
Chapter 2, inertial pressures on established harvesters limited the extent to which these 
harvesters took advantage of the new industry.
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The W orking Waterfront
Work, or labor, is any hum an effort that adds use value to goods and services 
(Granovetter and Tilly, 1988:177). Labor markets develop when an entrepreneur intends 
to purvey a certain good and chooses to have someone else provide the labor needed to 
produce the good. The capitalist labor market is most commonly discussed in economic 
literature. Here employers and employees are at the center of the market, and employers 
hire employees for stipulated time periods during which employees concede control of 
their labor (Granovetter, 1981; Tilly and Tilly, 1994). Hiring includes a long term 
contract and close supervision of employee labor. Craft labor markets work somewhat 
differently, relying on subcontracting rather than the hiring of labor (Jackson, 1984). In 
craft labor markets entrepreneurs have outside shops or individuals perform labor at a 
stipulated price for quality, and the control and supervision of labor is conceded to the 
outside shop (Tilly and Tilly, 1994). Organizing work through craft labor markets 
peaked in the late 19th century, but as Sabel and his colleagues have found, craft forms of 
production have persisted into the late 20th century along side of the mass production 
form of organization23.
When explaining the distribution o f labor into particular occupations and jobs 
neo-classical economics emphasizes the characteristics of the individuals making these 
moves, particularly the human capital characteristics of the individuals (Becker, 1976). 
This explanation assumes a situation of open competitive hiring in which employers 
attempt to hire labor at the lowest possible cost and employees attempt to obtain the
25 See Chandler (1992) for a discussion of the craft labor markets in the 19th century. See Sabel and Piore 
(1984) and Sabel and Zeitlin (198S) for a discussion of die organizational forms persistence into the late 
20,h century.
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highest paying occupation or job they can given their human capital characteristics. This 
approach offers little in terms of explaining the fast growth or the diversity o f participants 
in productive systems. Along with the organizational ecology approach, economic 
explanations find increased labor activity driven by favorable environmental conditions. 
However, these approaches do not account for the obstacles to growth that might 
discourage participants even under favorable environmental conditions. Social factors 
highlighted in the sociology of labor markets help to understand the process by which 
labor and entrepreneurs form productive relationships. Economic sociology encourages 
examination o f the structure of opportunities, and patterns of cooperation and 
information-sharing when studying labor markets.
Along the working waterfront, there exists a unique set of institutional 
arrangements that govern productive processes o f  the inshore commercial fishing 
industry. The labor processes are similar to that o f craft labor markets. However, the 
working waterfront is unique in that it includes the state management o f  a common 
property resource, strong communal ties among fishermen, and flexible production 
strategies that allow adaptation to uncertain market and occupational conditions.
Industrial regions dominated by a craft form o f organizing production are commonly 
known as industrial districts. Marshall (1919) first used the term industrial districts to 
describe the Sheffield and Lancashire regions in the 19th century. Today, well-known 
examples include the Emilia-Romagna region o f Italy (Brusco, 1982; Piore and Sabel, 
1984), and the region o f southwest Germany (Sabel and Zeitlin, 1985). Networks of 
loosely linked firms specializing in certain products dominate the regions (Brusco, 1982; 
Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel and Zeitlin, 1985). Production within the districts takes
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place among a large set o f  independent producers that both cooperate and compete with 
other firms within the region. The balance o f cooperation and competition allows 
production in the region to adapt easily to the persistent changes in specialty markets 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984:258-77).
The fishing communities along the Northwest Atlantic coast hold many 
similarities in the organization of production to those found in other industrial districts. 
However, before I examine those similarities I first look at the characteristic of the 
working waterfront that most distinguishes it from other industrial districts. That is its 
reliance on a state managed common property resource, the ocean. As we will see, this 
characteristic has important implications for the labor process and understanding the 
quick development of the harvesting labor market in the sea urchin industry.
Formal and Informal Limitations on Open Access
The structure o f social relations within a productive system can be either open or 
closed (Sorrenson and Kalleberg, 1981). Productive relations are open to outsiders to the 
extent that participation is not denied, and closed to outsiders when participation is 
excluded, limited or subject to conditions (Weber, 1968:43). Drawing on Weber, the 
institutional approach to labor processes emphasizes two mechanisms that work to keep 
productive systems closed: access to property (Parkin, 1979) and the filtering of 
personnel (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The importance of property is clear; control 
over property includes control o f the material resources essential to the productive 
process. Filtering o f personnel is an attempt by members o f an occupation to “control the 
production o f the producers (Larson, 1977:49).” This is done through admitting only 
those with certain characteristics (i.e. professional training, required credentials,
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membership in trade associations) to participate, assuring certain similarities among 
participants. Open and closed productive systems are particularly relevant to research on 
fisheries.
In his now classic discussion o f common property, Hardin (1968) assumed that 
the absence o f  private property and open access were synonymous. He concluded that 
under common property/open access circumstances a productive system would inevitably 
head toward overexploitation of the resource, to the detriment o f all producers.
Ironically, the rational actions of individual producers lead to this tragedy. Although 
remarkably influential, Hardin’s “tragedy of the com m ons” thesis has been challenged 
based on the empirical research of fisheries social scientists (see McCay and Acheson, 
1987; McGoodwin, 1990). Examining fisheries from an institutional perspective, these 
social scientists have found that the absence of private property and open access are not 
synonymous (Acheson, 1987; McGoodwin, 1990:89-96). Instead, the openness o f  a 
public resource is variable from case to case, and more often than not “com m on 
property” is not open. Instead, some participants are excluded or limited from 
production. These limits take formal and informal means.
The most significant formal limitation on access to fisheries resources comes 
from the state. The ocean is a common property secured by positive government 
provisions. Fisheries resources are public resources and their management is conducted 
through state administration. The state—that set of adm inistra tive  and policing 
organizations headed by a centralized authority (Skocpol, 1979)—dictates the terms o f 
access and use of this public resource. The state is typically the most powerful 
organization within an organizational field, particularly in fish ing  industries where it has
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ultimate rights over the resources essential to production. Understanding the state’s 
power, Hardin (1968) called for increased state regulation of common property resources 
in order to avert tragedy. Other social scientists have documented the state role in 
limiting access to public resources, or in some cases not limiting access sufficiently 
(Dewar, 1983; Anderson, 1987; Pinkerton, 1987; McGoodwin, 1990; Finlayson, 1992) 
State regulation is the most important formal restraint on access to ocean 
resources, but in the absence o f state regulation, common property resources are not 
necessarily open. In what Dyer and McGoodwin (1994) call the most significant 
development of fisheries social science over the past decade, a number o f researchers 
have uncovered informal limitations on access to common property resources. These 
restraints are informal in the sense that they are not sanctioned by the state (see Portes, 
1994). However, fishermen often assert rights to fishing grounds and implement 
strategies to limit fishing effort (see Acheson, 1981). These informal restraints on access 
typically occur among inshore fisheries (Dyer and McGoodwin, 1994). They take three 
forms: the assertion of property rights over prime fishing spaces, the exclusion o f 
outsiders from fishing areas that communities assert as their own and the manipulation of 
information in order to temporarily claim ownership to certain fish stocks (McCay, 
1981:5-6). Much like professional and craft associations, informal communal relations 
can filter labor in inshore fisheries through the assertion o f  rights to fishing grounds.
While Hardin’s conception of the tragedy of production surrounding an open 
access resource is compelling, the assumption that all common resources are open does 
not appear tenable. Instead, even in the absence o f private property, resources are 
embedded within the social constraints of the state and informal means o f control on
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production. Rather than assume a public resource includes open access, we have to 
approach each fishery asking if  or how open is access. As new participants moved into 
the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin fishery, they met few limitations. Access to the new 
fishery was very open, perhaps surprisingly so. hi the next section, I examine the 
development o f open access to this new fishery, asking why access was not limited.
The Social Construction of Open Access
When the first entrepreneurs began to consider shipping sea urchins to Japan, and 
when they approached the first harvesters to invest time in the industry, two potential 
limitations might have stalled the development o f the new industry. First, the state, 
which held ultimate rights over the ocean resources, might have limited participation. In 
addition, existing fishermen may have attempted to limit access to outsiders through 
informal means o f  control. In fact, the state put few limitations on participation, and 
local fishermen often encouraged the entrance o f outsiders to this new fishery. Below I 
look more closely at the role of these formal and informal institutions in creating open 
access to the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin fishery.
State Lim itations
Rights to the world’s oceans have long been a source of international dispute, 
culminating in the United Nations Law of the Sea in 1982 which gave coastal nations 
ultimate rights within 200 miles of their coasts26 (see McGoodwin, 1990:97-106). The 
US first made claim to this area in 1976 with the passage o f the Fisheries Conservation 
and Management Act27. The act secured rights within 200 miles o f all coasts for the
26 This is commonly known as the 200-mile limit-
27 Later renamed the Magnuson-Stevenson Act
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federal government More important to the sea urchin industry, it made individual 
coastal states responsible for the management o f the area within three miles o f their 
coasts (the 3-mile limit). This was particularly important to the new fishery because the 
ecological habitat o f  the growing sea urchin resource kept it close to the shore, making its 
management the responsibility o f the coastal states.
The first seven years o f the industry took place primarily along the coasts of 
Maine where the state legislature holds the ultimate rights over resources within the 
three-mile limit. Important decisions on the management of this resource follow the 
channels of all law making in the state. The Department o f Marine Resources (DMR 
from here on) is the administrative body that controls the resource on a day-to-day basis 
through the edict o f the State. Though ultimate control of the resource lies in the 
legislature, DMR holds considerable control over the resource enforced by the state’s 
edict. DMR controls access and use of the resources in two ways: 1) through limiting 
access to those fishermen holding licenses, 2) by establishing rules that affect when 
fishing is allowed, what techniques can be used, and what types of fish can be harvested. 
Often the DMR enacts control on particular species of fish, with different amounts of 
access and rules for each fishery.
The DMR could have limited entry to the sea urchin fishery when the first sea 
urchins began selling in Japan. Limited entry fisheries existed in other fisheries around 
the country and the world at the time2®. However, before 1993 DMR did not pay 
particular attention to the sea urchin fishery. Anyone could harvest sea urchins by 
obtaining a $35 commercial fishing license. Two factors contributed to the DMR
28 For an interesting case see the Oregon Fisheries Development Council where access to new fisheries is 
limited immediately (Richard Ford, personal communication).
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decision not to limit access to this new fishery. The first stems from the department’s 
history o f managing its coastal resources. No precedent in the DMR management 
strategies limited access to fishery resources. While they have limited how fishermen 
fish, they have not limited access to a fishery.
There is little reason to believe DMR would change their approach to the new sea 
urchin fishery. Acheson (1997) has shown that typically changes o f DMR inshore fishery 
management have come from industry pressures rather than DMR initiative. He finds 
only two exceptions to this pattern, the recent initiatives from the federal government, 
and one case o f initiative coming from charismatic leadership within the department The 
inshore habitat o f the sea urchin kept it from the gaze o f federal managing bodies. From 
within the DMR, the sea urchin fishery was met with disinterest rather than innovations. 
Many considered the relative size o f the fishery unimportant. Even in the early 1990s, 
the Commissioner of the DMR told fishermen the sea urchin industry would never 
amount to anything. The only sign o f concern came in 1987 from the University of 
Maine Sea Urchin Project Committee. The committee included biologists from the 
university and the DMR. Although concerned about the long-term potential o f  the 
fishery, this group chose to conduct research on the biology and ecology o f the green sea 
urchin rather than limit access to the resource29.
Along with the lack of historical precedent for limitation and the unlikely 
initiative for establishing one, the State, from the Governor to the DMR, pushed for 
development o f the fishery resources. Governor Brennen considered development of
29 In personal communications and “New Sea Urehm Harvesting Industry May Boost Washington County 
Economy.” by Mary Anne Clancy. Bangor News Oct 2,1987. In 1982, in contrast, zoologists from the 
University o f New Hampshire were encouraging harvest of sea urchins due to their unusual growth and 
expansion of population (see Chapter 1).
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Maine’s fisheries consistent with the State’s history and way o f life. As we saw in the 
last chapter, underutilized species and foreign markets were important strategies for 
expanding the fishing industry. Although the sea urchin was not a target species for 
development, its establishment helped the state to move in the proposed new direction. 
The push towards development created little interest in establishing limited access to the 
new fishery.
Inform al Lim itations
Informal limitations to working in inshore fisheries do exist along the Maine 
coast. The lobster fishery is both the largest inshore fishery on the coast and the most 
territorial (Acheson, 1987,1988). The informal control o f access includes the assertion 
of property rights over an area related to a local harbor. Acheson (1987:40-45) finds two 
types of territories claimed by gangs. In nucleated territories gangs share a strong sense 
of ownership close to the mouth o f the harbor where they anchor their boats, but that 
sense of ownership weakens with distance from the harbor. In perimeter-defended 
territories gangs share a strong sense of ownership based on outermost areas, which they 
defend closely. The defense o f areas remains informal, and sometimes illegal. It might 
be verbal sanctioning, or the marking of buoys as a warning. This can escalate to the 
destruction of traps, an illegal ac t Acheson (1988) has documented a few cases where 
the conflicts escalate to “lobster wars” between gangs defending territories.
The harbor gangs defend their territory against encroachments by other gangs, but 
they also regulate the entrance o f  new fishermen. In order for a new participant to move 
into the lobster fishery, a harbor gang must accept the new person. The fishing grounds 
for the sea urchin fishery cover areas very sim ilar to the harbor gang territories, but the
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harbor gangs did not limit the entrance o f new fishermen to the sea urchin fishery. Two
factors contributed to this lack of territorial enforcement The species-specific character
o f harbor gang territoriality was one factor discouraging interest in the sea urchin fishery.
The harbor gangs’ territoriality operates solely within the lobster fishery and their control
of production does not extend to other fisheries. As one lobsterman says, it just doesn’t
work the same way with other fisheries:
Scalloping, for example, traditionally there’s been a lot o f boat movement 
It’s not unusual for there to be 4 or 5 scallopers tied up in the harbor from 
where I work. Same in Winter Harbor even more so.
The same lobstermen who would strictly defend intrusion o f lobster boats in their harbor
are willing to tolerate a new boat working in another fishery.
A second reason for the disinterest of the harbor gangs lies in the unusual qualities
of the fishery. The sea urchin was long a nuisance to the lobster fishermen. Urchins
move in packs, and cleaning them from lobster traps took up the time of lobstermen every
fishing day. For the lobsterman the sea urchin fit the definition o f a trashfish perfectly,
worthless and trouble. Their distaste for the creatures is reflected in the common name
given to the urchin, “whores eggs.” It is little surprise that a lobsterman did not want to
lay claim to such a species.
The lobster fishermen hate the urchins. We’d like to see every one o f 
them gone, cleaned up. Yeah, come on in; get them the hell out of here!
Along with the nuisance quality of the urchin, the SCUBA technology used in the fishery
also discouraged interest o f  the lobstermen. As one lobsterman told me, “If  God had
meant us to be underwater he would’ve given us gills.” When SCUBA divers started
fishing for urchins, they were often met with derision from the local lobstermen.
They used to look at me and say, ‘oh, you must be crazy to jump out o f a 
perfectly good b o a t’ They used to tell me th a t And they’d tell me,
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“Christ sakes, I wouldn’t go urchining. Whore’s eggs, Christ, I wouldn’t  
do that i f  you paid me.”
The SCUBA technology and the distaste for sea urchins encouraged the lobstermen’s 
disinterest in control over participation in this new fishery.
Rather than being excluded from or allowed only limited access to the new 
fishery, urchin harvesters found the sea urchin fishery an open productive system. 
Limitations on access might have come from the State o f Maine, which held formal rights 
over the ocean resource. However, with no precedence for limiting access, and with the 
push towards developing new global markets Maine chose to leave access to the new 
fishery open to all interested participants. Strong communal ties and territoriality often 
lead to informal controls of production in inshore fisheries. The harbor gangs 
documented by Acheson have these characteristics, but because of the species-specific 
character o f the gangs and the unusual aspects o f  this species, they did not limit entrance 
of outsiders to the fishery. Instead, lobstermen often facilitated this move by providing 
access to the fish stocks by sharing knowledge and their boats. This type of activity, 
switching to new fisheries and cooperation between existing fishermen and the new sea 
urchin divers is a common form of organization found in industrial districts.
Flexible Production Strategies
We saw in Chapter 2 that traditional entrepreneurs held certain relations with 
local harvesters that gave them an advantage for moving into the new sea urchin fishery. 
Those relations, or social capital, provided a flexibility that allowed easy adaptation to 
the developing sea urchin market A similar flexibility exists in the harvesting sector o f 
fisheries that reduces the capital investment participants need to move into a new fishery
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such as the sea urchin. Piore and Sabel (1984:17) define flexibility in production as a 
strategy o f  permanent innovation, o f constant accommodation to ceaseless change rather 
than an effort to control i t  Productive flexibility is commonly associated with industrial 
districts.
hi his research on the putting-out system of textile production in the Emilia- 
Romagna region of north central Italy, Lazerson (1993) distinguishes between 
technological and social flexibility. Technological flexibility refers to the ability to apply 
certain technologies to new tasks and easily meet changing demands. Social flexibility 
refers to the ability to recombine relationships—to initiate and end cooperation 
regularly—allowing adaptation to changing market demands. The working waterfront 
resembles industrial districts in both technological and social flexibility. This is combined 
with an intellectual base that can be adapted to production in other markets30. Of 
particular interest to this analysis, the flexibility of production allowed participants to 
move into the sea urchin fishery with low capital investment costs. High investment 
costs might have discouraged movement into the new fishery, and limited access to some 
interested participants. However, the existing material and intellectual infrastructure o f 
the industrial district, its flexibility in particular, further opened access by allowing 
harvesters to move into the sea urchin fishery with little capital investment.
Technological Flexibility
The inshore fishing vessel and the fishing gear used on these vessels provide a 
flexible workstation for the inshore fisherman. Hundreds o f inshore fishing vessels line
30 Sabel and Zeitlin (1985) find a similar knowledge base in other industrial districts, where “the mysteries 
of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air (Marshal, 1922).” Although knowledge is
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the northeastern coasts working in a number o f fisheries including lobsters, scallops, and
quahogs (Acheson, 1988; Wilson, 1980). Each vessel is unique given the preferences of
the operator, and the gear and fisheries within which they primarily work. The vessels
share two qualities: their size—compared with the offshore vessels the inshore boats are
relatively small (under 60 feet, lobster boats under 42), and their ownership—inshore
boats are predominantly an owner operated fleet (see Acheson, 1988:44-45; Patterson and
Smith, 1981; Acheson e t  al., 1980). The small, owner operated boat is like a floating
workstation giving the fishermen access to the oceans resources.
An inshore fisherman’s boat allows adaptation to the uncertain movement of fish
populations, and the species switching strategy o f inshore fishermen (Acheson et al.,
1980, 1981:291-2). A small inshore boat is limited from the offshore fishing grounds,
but its small size and maneuverability allow it unlimited access to the many nooks and
crannies o f  the northeast coast. Fishing requires following the migration patterns of a
target species as they move within this inshore region. Fish populations change over the
course of a season, and from year to year. For Jimmy Newman, a downeast lobsterman,
following the movements o f a fish population is the challenge of the occupation.
Lobsters are a migratory species and basically, you accumulate knowledge 
and you take that; you shift traps here, you shift traps there, you wait here, 
you wait there. It’s like having 550 chess pieces. I move traps every day, 
trying to get a rhythm going. And then every season’s different. Certain 
aspects they do the same, or you think they do the same. So, a lot of time 
you’re thinking about what’s going on down there. It does you no good to 
be one day behind the lobsters.
not equally distributed between all participants, within die district as a whole knowledge develops 
through adaptation to persistent change that allows easy application to new productive pursuits.
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The persistent change o f the fish populations makes the work interesting, but requires a 
flexible technology to adapt to the change. The fisherman’s boat is uniquely suited to the 
uncertain and necessary adaptation of fishing.
Inshore fishermen often switch effort between species, and the ability to outfit a 
boat with different kinds o f  gear makes this adaptation possible. Jack Benjamin works in 
the lobster fishery in the summer and fall hauling traps. In the winter he can move into 
the offshore lobster fishery or outfit his boat with a dragger and work in the scallop or 
urchin fisheries.
I got lobsters up until after New Year’s. Then take the traps all up is what 
I’d normally do and then we’d put the dragging gear in and drag urchins 
and scallops until the 15th of April. But the urchins usually died out the 
last week o f March.
The inshore lobster season slows in the winter when the lobsters move farther o ff shore. 
Benjamin could follow the lobsters offshore this time of year. However, because of the 
flexible character of his inshore fishing boat he can switch gear and move into other 
fisheries until April when he moves back to hauling lobster traps inshore.
Just as a harvester can outfit a boat with different gear in order to adapt to new 
fisheries, they can adapt specific gear for different species as well. Most fishermen have 
worked with different types o f gear in their careers, and have developed their own style 
of rigging gear to suit their particular tastes. This was the case for Wendell Cunningham. 
Similar to Benjamin, Cunningham was catching lobsters when he first decided to try the 
sea urchin fishery. Before catching lobsters, Cunningham worked in the offshore scallop 
industry for years, and was able to adapt a scallop drag to suit the specific needs o f the 
urchin fishery.
Every fisherman has his own idea on how to rig his fishing gear. I try to 
rig  my drag so that it equally fishes, as well on scallops as it does urch in s .
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Because there will be certain days that I will go to an area, where I might 
not fish on a lot of urchins, but I’m getting a percentage o f scallops to go 
with them. So, therefore, at the end o f the day, I’m looking at a 
combination o f revenue from scallops and revenue from urchins for my 
total days catch.
Cunningham was able to outfit his boat with the dragging gear to switch from lobsters to
the urchin and scallop fisheries. The dragging gear itself is also flexible, and a fisherman
can rig it in his own way based on his current needs. Cunningham developed a drag that
could work in the scallop and urchin fishery rather than one or the other. Benjamin
considered a drag suited only for urchins, but decided to modify a scallop drag instead
because of the uncertainty o f finding urchins on any given day.
It’s just a hit or miss thing. You can spend the whole damned day looking 
around and you may not find anything. But most of the time you get 
enough to make a day’s pay and pay your fuel bill anyway... We were 
getting 20,30 pounds of scallops a day to go with the urchins, and the 
scallops are 6, $7.00 a pound. So, we made another $150, $200 a day just 
on the scallops. The scallop drag wasn’t a real heavy drag. It was a four 
foot chain sweep, but it was light, fairly light So, it worked okay.
Along with the flexibility o f the inshore boat, the ability to adapt a drag made it easy to
move into the sea urchin fishery. Fishermen like Cunningham and Benjamin did not
need to invest in any new technology to try the new fishery. With a little time spent on
adapting the boat and gear, they were ready to harvest.31
Social Flexibility
The technological flexibility allowed many fishermen to move into the new sea 
urchin fishery without significant capital investment Using their boats and adapted
31 John Green’s experience rigging drags in the scallop fishery allowed him to adapt a drag to the sea urchin 
fishery. Green, sensing the potential of the new fishery, began to market his drag to other fishermen 
interested in moving into the new fishery. The “Green Drag,” as it became know, sold along the coast 
from Massachusetts to Nova Scotia. (John Green, personal communication). Green had die initiative to 
market the adapted drag, but the adaptability of the inshore boat allowed for this marketing strategy.
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dragging gear, the sea urchin fishery offered a low risk opportunity for many inshore
fishermen. Along with the technological flexibility, a number o f fishermen moved into
the new fishery using cooperation, or social flexibility, common in industrial districts.
One type o f cooperation exists between the traditional entrepreneurs and the inshore
fishermen. Inshore fishermen and entrepreneurs often cooperate in order to explore the
possibilities o f new fishery products. Take the relationship between Gene Farrell and
Phil McGuire. McGuire has been working on the waterfront all his life. He bought his
own boat first and now he owns Near Coast Lobster with a dealer’s building on the
waterfront. As Farrell says, McGuire is always looking at something new:
He was always the first, he was the first guy in the town to do the sea 
cucumbers, and he was the first guy to do the sea urchins. He was always 
on the cutting edge of anything new, like that
Farrell grew up in Nearcoast also, and runs his own gill net boat. He and McGuire are
often collaborating on new projects.
He was always asking me, even in the summer, he’s asking me for the roe 
and the milk from codfish. He says Japs like i t  He used to have me save 
that. He even wanted us to bring in, one time, sea anemones. We get them 
in the nets, they’re red, and they sting you know. And he wanted us to 
start saving them, but he wanted them a certain color. But we don’t catch 
them the color that he was talking about. Yeah, he’s always got some 
strange thing that he wants to try.
McGuire and Farrell collaborate on new projects like this often. Some work out, and
some do not, but each project requires the market knowledge o f McGuire’s, and Farrell’s
knowledge of fishing. Through cooperation, these types o f relationships between
fishermen and traditional entrepreneurs provide a social flexibility that could not exist
separately.
These social relations are not exclusive partnerships between pairs, but are a part 
of the economic life o f the waterfront McGuire does not collaborate with Farrell alone.
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For instance, when first exploring the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin fishery McGuire and
a Japanese businessman wanted to get a sample o f the Northwest Atlantic green sea
urchin. Collins went down to the local wharf to see who was around and ran into Chuck
Anderson. Anderson had just graduated high school and had his own 30’ lobster boat
that he had also outfitted with a small drag. Anderson caught lobsters in the sum m ers
long enough to know where he could find sea urchins.
I knew where there was plenty o f sea urchins. I didn’t know what they 
wanted, what to look for. The Japanese guy went right aboard the boat 
with me, I took him right out, and he showed me what he wanted. He 
taught me what to look for. We set it up that [Phil] bought the urchins and 
shipped them to him. That’s how I first started. The first couple years I 
went I never even had a boon or nothing. I just hauled it up by hand and 
dumped it on the floor.
Anderson and McGuire shipped the first sea urchins to Japan out o f Nearcoast Harbor,
and they worked together for the next few years. As Anderson says, it is funny how it
happens, but those kinds o f things happen a lot. Collaboration and exploring new
opportunities is part of the waterfront mentality:
You get a strange bug in the trap, you got to look it over and see what it is, 
wonder if you’d make money at it. Always thinking o f  different ideas.
The traditional entrepreneurs often have the knowledge o f the markets that gives them an
advantage in finding new opportunities. However, they could not pursue the ideas
without the fishermen’s cooperation. The initiative does not always come from the
buyer, either. As Pete Peters, an inshore buyer, points out, often times the harvester first
sees the potential for a new market and initiates the cooperative relationship with a buyer.
Everybody’s kind o f looking. If  somebody’s doing sea urchin, they come 
home with a boatload o f sea urchins, then [the boats I work with] start 
asking me, and, it’s time to look into this.
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With buyers watching markets, and harvesters watching other harvesters, collaborations
develop that allow movement into new fisheries with the changing opportunities.
Another kind o f social flexibility among harvesters developed in the sea urchin
fishery that allowed easy movement into the new industry with low investment costs.
This developed through collaborations between boat owners and SCUBA divers. A
fisherman interested in SCUBA diving for sea urchins could obtain the appropriate gear,
and training for under $2000. A  small investment for moving into the new fishery.
However, the SCUBA equipment and training alone could not get the diver access to the
ocean; they needed a boat Some divers secured anything that would float in order to get
access to the ocean, resulting in some precarious boats on the water. However, more
often divers established relationships with existing boat owners. This was how Will
Tucker got access to fishing grounds:
You usually go out on a boat Usually a lobsterman, someone who knows 
the fishing grounds and stuff, and it supplements him pretty good. We 
give a 30% commission to him. We have 2 other divers, 3 divers on the 
boat. So, he does pretty well as a supplemental thing.
The winter is a slow time for many fisheries, and the sea urchin fishery provided the boat
owners with work on the water during these times. For three winters Farrell took divers
out on his gill net boat before he started to dive himself:
The first year I got my boat, and I was wondering what I was gonna do in 
the winter. And some diver called me and wanted to know if  I wanted to 
go out and try it. So, I took him just right the other side of an island here.
We did that for like 3 or 4 days and after that, I got lined up with 3 
different divers.
For the boat owner the collaboration offered work on the water in the slower winter 
months. For the diver the boat owner offered access to the ocean with no investment 
costs. The boat owner also brought an existing knowledge o f the ocean to the
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relationship. This gave the diver access to the ocean through the boat, but also access to
sea urchin populations through the sharing of the boat owner’s knowledge. Farrell just
knew where to find urchins:
Divers would show up here and they didn’t have a clue. They didn’t even 
know where they were going... I just knew a lot of places from lobstering.
Places that have lobsters have urchins.
Through their partnership with the boat owners, the divers secured access to the ocean, 
and they secured a working knowledge o f the ocean, which provided access to sea urchin 
populations.
The collaborations between divers and boat owners take many different forms.
There may be a partnership between one diver and a captain, or there may be multiple
divers working with a boat owner. The partnerships often last one season, but may last
only part o f a season or over a number of seasons. Newman has participated in a number
of different partnerships as a boat owner working in the sea urchin fishery:
Me and Crazy Mike did it. I think we only did it in the springtime that 
year, like February, March, April. I worked with Mike and then I think it 
was with this guy I’m with again now, I think I worked with him the year 
after that... Then there was a couple years with those two high school 
kids. Actually sometimes a couple, 2 or 3 years o f working with somebody 
will do it. I mean, we still get along.
Newman’s collaborations with divers have a fluid character. They could end at any time, 
but they often last a season, or in the case of the high school students, they last a few 
years. Although they often last, participants can end collaborations easily, and renew 
them at another time, as is the case with Newman’s current partnership. Among 
participants, there is an understanding o f the social flexibility taking place that allows it 
to work smoothly. Newman and his current diver stopped working together when 
Newman wanted to switch to the sea urchin fishery in the early fall. The diver was not
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ready to start that early, so Newman set up with the high school students. When these 
two divers decided to get their own boat the partnership ended on good terms32. The 
lobster fishery was doing very well that year, so Newman hauled traps through the fall. 
His boat was open after this so he and the diver he had worked with a few years earlier 
started working together again. In this way, productive relations are recombined in a 
flexible process that allows easy adaptation to changing market circumstances.
The social and technological flexibility of the working waterfront is similar to the 
industrial districts found in other regions of the world. This flexibility allows easy 
adaptation of production to changing market opportunities. As the market for sea urchins 
began to develop, the flexibility allowed participants to move into this new fishery with 
little human or physical capital investments. With few limitations on entry to the sea 
urchin fishery from the state, informal territoriality, or necessary capital investments the 
fishery came to resemble an open access resource as described by Hardin. With the 
growing demand in Japan and among entrepreneurs on the Northwest Atlantic coast, the 
harvesting sector was ripe for rapid growth. Next, I look at who did and did not take 
advantage o f the new opportunities.
Harvester Career Strategies
In the fall o f 1986, Will Tucker’s neighbor, a local lobsterman, told him  about a new 
industry getting started. Some guys on the waterfront were SCUBA diving for sea 
urchins. Tucker had just built a house, and was starting a family. He worked 
construction in the warmer months, and bounced around in the winter m aking a few
32 As we will see below, the decision to buy your own boat makes sense to fishermen as part of die career 
path in inshore commercial fishing. Newman’s partnership with the high school students ended on good 
term s given this understanding.
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dollars where he could. Considering the industry’s prospects good, Tucker took a 
SCUBA course, bought a commercial fishing license, and started harvesting sea urchins. 
At that same time, Adam Rock was attending high school in a small downeast town. 
Coming from a long line of fishermen Rock had already started his career on the water by 
working on local boats and diving for scallops. When some divers from out of town 
came and started harvesting sea urchins he decided to try the new fishery. The next year 
he quit school to become a full time urchin diver. Participants such as Tucker and Rock 
came from diverse backgrounds, and with the institutional arrangements o f the working 
waterfront, they were able to move quickly into the new fishery.
The harvesters in the sea urchin industry appear to come from three separate 
social contexts based on their previous experience in commercial fishing industries.
These differing positions in turn lead to different career strategies employed by the 
harvesters when they approach sea urchin harvesting. The first two groups fall under 
Miller and Van Maanen’s (1982) conception of traditional fishermen. Those in the first 
group were already established in commercial fishing when the sea urchin fishery got 
started. The second group o f urchin harvesters came from commercial fishing 
communities or families but were young and not yet established in a fishery. The third 
group falls under Miller and Van Maanen’s (1982) conception of non-traditional 
fishermen. They came from a diversity o f backgrounds outside of the comm ercial fishing 
industry and started their career in commercial fishing with the sea urchin fishery.
Established. Young, and Non-Traditional Fisherm en
A single fishery operates for a fraction of the year based on seasonal cycles. As a 
result, inshore fishermen often move between fisheries during the ups and downs o f
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specific species cycles (Acheson, 1981; Dewer, 1983,1986). The winter is a notoriously 
slow time for inshore commercial fisheries along the Northwest Atlantic. The sea urchin 
fishery is unusual in that harvesting peaks in the winter. When the inshore buyers were 
looking for harvesters in the new fishery, they often turned to the established fishermen. 
By established I mean that they already owned boats and gear for harvesting in other 
fisheries. These technologies were easily adapted to new fishery opportunities. In 
addition, being established includes having existing social ties and reputation among 
buyers and other harvesters. Being established allowed these fishermen easy movement 
into the new fishery, but they viewed the sea urchin fishery as a supplement to their 
existing fishing.
Commercial fishermen, particularly small-scale fishermen, tend to resist changes 
and innovations in general (Acheson, 1981). Often this resistance results from inertial 
pressures stem m ing from an established career position (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). 
The established fishermen along the coast often approached the sea u rchin fishery with 
this resistance. However, a second group of harvesters did move into this new fishery 
enthusiastically—fishermen at the beginning of their careers, and not yet established in a 
particular fishery. Like Adam Rock, these fishermen were not yet committed to any 
fishery, but becoming established was already a career goal. One can find sim ila r  career 
motivations around the world (Acheson and Reidman, 1982; Middleton, 1977; Wadel, 
1972; Goodlad, 1972). Early in a commercial fisherman’s career, an opportunity like the 
sea urchin fishery is an opportunity to establish a career in commercial fish ing .
The established and young urchin harvesters came from a tradition o f inshore 
fishing. As Miller and Van Maanen say, they are fishermen until they somehow
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demonstrate that they are not (1982:32). They had already become independently 
established in a commercial fishery, or they come from the commercial fishing social 
context through family, friends, and experience working on the water. A final group of 
harvesters did not emerge from the commercial fishing context. Instead, they came from 
the land where they worked in any number o f other occupations. This group follows 
more closely the economic model of labor movement. Many came from the construction 
industry, which was in recession in the late 1980s and early 1990s and has a slow winter 
season. Economic pushes and pulls lead them to the sea urchin fishery, an occupation 
with little human or physical capital requirements at the time of their movement.
Career Strategies o f Established H arvesters
With the lack of barriers to entry in the harvesting sector o f the sea urchin 
industry we are left with the question of why some workers did or did not move into this 
new fishery. Two possible answers follow from the economic sociology literature. First, 
some workers may hold an advantaged position within networks that provides access to 
important information about new opportunities such as the sea urchin industry. In 
addition, some workers may have knowledge o f the new opportunity, but decide not to 
take advantage of it given inertial pressures o f institutional arrangements. Much of the 
recent sociological research on labor markets shows that the flows o f information through 
networks of personal relationships explains the matching of workers with opportunities. 
Granovetter (1973,1981,1985) has found most jobs are filled through a personal 
connection that provides information about an opportunity. Workers rely on personal 
relations to provide an evaluation of the prospective job that can be trusted above all 
others. Tilly and Tilly (1994) describe two separate networks, recruitment, and supply
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
127
networks that become linked in the matching process. Examination o f immigrant labor 
movements has shown that, once linked, these two networks often stay together resulting 
in a sim ila r labor force moving into similar occupations (see Light and Karageorgis, 
1994).
On the working waterfront, the network explanations do not appear as salient,
however. Here existing productive relations already link recruitment and supply
networks, and these networks extend into the local community through kinship and
friendship ties. When a new market comes along and an inshore buyer like McGuire
needs someone to harvest he can turn to a set of existing relations to fill the position. As
we saw in Chapter 1, inshore buyers accomplish recruitment quickly and easily,
seemingly without effort. For the harvesters, the process was similar. Drew Taylor
learned about the new fishery through the regular productive activities on the waterfront:
Well, they just started buying them down at one o f the local wharves,
Seaside. It isn’t open now. And it was just money in the winter as 
compared to nothing.
Farrell first heard about the sea urchin industry when he was still working as a hand on
other fishermen’s boats:
There was a couple draggers. They used to just drag for them around here 
first. And I went with a few guys that needed a hand one-day. We used to 
go up Casteen and all around.
Adam Rock was scallop diving when he first learned about the sea urchin industry:
Yeah, I ’d been scallop diving one winter and some Portland divers came 
up this way, got on the boat that we were scallop diving.
Benjamin had already seen divers at the local wharf when he decided to give dragging a 
try:
Someone I knew had decided to go drag some with a scallop drag. And if  
I remember right, we didn’t need a license at the time to drag urchins. So,
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we went over and tried i t  And when we went in to sell them, the guy 
handed me a check, I thought this isn’t so bad. We went all that winter.
Learning about new opportunities as did the fishermen above is part of the waterfront;
their stories are matter-of-fact These fishermen were not doing anything special, they
were participating in the inshore fishing industry and as a part of that process participants
become aware o f new opportunities like the sea urchin fishery. As Taylor says, when a
new fishery starts fishermen might “be closed mouth, stuff like that But somebody’s
gonna find out eventually. You can’t keep it secret forever.” The dense production
networks that surround the waterfront eliminate the information problem in the matching
process, but fishermen still do not universally take advantage of new opportunities when
they arise. Instead, the decision to take advantage o f a  new opportunity depends much
more on their career strategies.
There are three institutionalized strategies o f an inshore fishing career along the
waterfront, which influence a fisherman’s decision to take advantage of a new
opportunity. The strategies are problem solving routines embedded in the institutional
arrangements o f the waterfront, and that become a part o f the conscious thought of
participants in the productive arrangements (DiMaggio, 1990; Swidler, 1986). First,
there is a strong commitment to working on the water. Fishermen have been found to
have a strong commitment to their work compared with other occupations (Acheson,
1981), and the commitment becomes part of a social identity (Miller and Van Maanen,
1982). The identity is woven into the lives of participants, considered natural:
M y father-in-law’s a fisherman and he told my wife when she complained 
about all the time I spent out on the water. He told her “there’s no sense in 
bitchin’ ‘cause it was in my blood and she wasn't gonna haul me away 
from it.” As long as I can make a living on the water, I will.
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This commitment is key to understanding the tenacious way in which fishermen attempt 
to maintain their careers on the waterfront in the face o f  many obstacles. Rather than 
pursue any opportunity fishermen are committed to making something out of the 
opportunities on the waterfront.
Once an inshore fisherman makes the commitment to commercial fishing, he 
becomes invested in a particular fishery. One aspect o f the commitment includes making 
a capital investment in the core technologies of a vessel and gear (Levine and McCay, 
1987; Wadel, 1972). Wadel’s (1972) examination o f the purse-seine herring fishery in 
Norway remains an excellent example of this process. A career fisherman first works as 
a hand on a boat receiving a share of the value of the catch. At this point in his career, 
the harvester is attempting to save money in order to invest in some core technology in 
the future. In the Norwegian herring fishery, the core technologies are a fishing vessel 
and net gear. With this initial investment, the fishermen then collaborate until they can 
invest in the other core technology of the fishery (Wadel, 1972:108-115). Investment in a 
fishery is more than capital investment, however. It includes social investments in 
productive relations and in building a reputation. Once working in a fishery a harvester 
establishes ongoing relations with buyers and other harvesters in the productive process, 
and reputation can establish a fisherman in the status system of that fishery (Acheson, 
1981). In this way, a fisherman becomes a lobsterman instead of a groundfisherman.
Research on the adoption of technological innovations finds that a commercial 
fisherman’s decision to adopt a new technology depends on their career situation when 
opportunities develop (Levine and McCay, 1987; Acheson and Reidman,1982).
Adopting a new technology often includes estab lish in g  new relations and a reputation in
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a new market. As fishermen become more established in a fishery their productive 
relations become institutionalized in an already existing structure o f roles, authority and 
communication. As Hannan and Freeman (1989) argue, these existing structural relations 
encourage inertia in their economic actions. Goodlad (1972) for instance found that only 
some Shetland Island drift net fishermen were willing to adopt the new purse-seine 
technology in the herring fishery. Adopting the new technology would pay off 
economically, but would mean working in a different market Established fishermen, 
with boats, gear, ongoing ties, and reputation were not willing to give up this investment 
for a new fishery. It was the less invested fishermen, typically younger, who were 
anxious to adopt the new technology in order to establish their fishing  careers.
Inshore fishermen typically invest in a primary fishery when establishing their 
careers. However, most fisheries are seasonal and are prone to unpredictable fluctuations 
in the resource, markets, and government regulation. Therefore a third strategy o f 
working in more than one fishery has developed. In some cases fishermen switch to 
different fisheries over the course of a year based on the reproductive cycles o f the 
species or state enforced seasonal restrictions (Levine and McCay, 1987; Dewar, 1986).
In this way, a fisherman can patch together a living over the year by combining work in 
more than one fishery. In other cases fishery switching takes place over the course of a 
career. As the resource, government regulations and markets change fishermen exit and 
enter fisheries in order to patch together a career over many years o f fishing (Acheson, 
1981).
These three waterfront career strategies influenced workers’ decisions to move 
into the new sea urchin industry as it developed. Some fishermen were already
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established in fisheries that carried them through the year successfully. This group was
not likely to move into the new fishery. Other established fishermen did choose to
supplement their primary fishery by working in the sea urchin industry during the winter.
Due to changes in resources, markets and state regulations these fishermen needed to take
advantage of an opportunity like the sea urchin industry. Still others were working in
primary fisheries that were in decline based on the resource, market, or state regulations.
For this group, the new fishery was an opportunity for a new primary income source.
These three strategies combined to motivate harvesters' decisions to move into the sea
urchin industry. While some fishermen moved into the fishery simply to take advantage
of a potential opportunity, for most the new opportunity came at a time that it suited their
career in commercial fishing to move into the fishery.
Some harvesters were risk takers, harvesting sea urchins to try and make some
money while they could. Benjamin was a successful inshore lobsterman, and could
lobster offshore in the winter if he wanted. Instead, he would move into the scallop and
urchin fisheries to take advantage of the financial opportunities. The first day of the
scallop season can bring in a lot of money, as can the sea urchin fishery in late December.
Alley is unabashed about taking advantage o f those opportunities:
Guys used to get upset with me, they’d say, “he’s a damned hog. He 
wants everything.” Well I lobster and got 1,000 traps in the water and I rig 
up and go scalloping the first day of November. We only drag 2 or 3 days 
and we make pretty good money for those first 2 or 3 days. Take it out 
and go back lobstering. They can do it, just like I can, but they don’t have 
the motivation. That’s why I’m in it, I’m in it to make all I can make.
Benjamin is established in the lobster fishery. He fishes many traps, and holds a federal 
offshore license that allows him to follow the lobsters offshore in the winter. However,
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he takes advantage o f the flexibility o f  his boat and gear to move into other fisheries at
particularly good times in the market
Other established fishermen did not move into the sea urchin fishery at all.
Rather than jump around like Benjamin, they were firmly enmeshed in their primary
fisheries and saw no reason to jump around.
These decisions can be understood as a combination of inertia based on the
commitment o f fishermen to their primary fisheries and the success o f those fisheries at
the time of the opportunity. As the sea urchin fishery grew so did the lobster fishery, and
firmly established lobstermen had little reason to abandon their primary fishery.
Benjamin’s commitment, for instance, has remained with lobsters. Similar to the
traditional inshore buyers in Chapter 1, Benjamin views these other fisheries as
supplemental. His real commitment is to the lobster fishery, and his commitment to
scallops or sea urchins depends on his involvement with the lobster fishery.
Well, I’m primarily lobster. We mostly urchined for 2 or 3 years in the 
wintertime. I went into it with the idea of paying my bills and getting me 
through till spring when lobstering got going again. The last couple years 
have been really, pretty good years. So last year, in 1996, we lobstered 
until the first of February and then we took traps up. And then this year I 
moved traps all winter. It was a very good lobster year.
Benjamin primarily works in the lobster fishery. Come wintertime, when the inshore 
lobster industry fades Benjamin has many options for work. He has the federal permit 
and the gear to move offshore in the lobster fishery, and he also has the dragging gear 
that enables him to work in the inshore scallop and urchin fisheries. However, in the end, 
his primary commitment is too the lobster fishery, and his decision to move into the 
urchin fishery depends on his interests in his primary fishery. For the last couple of 
years, he has decided not to fish for sea urchins.
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Not all fishermen are in the advantaged position o f  Benjamin. Newman has been 
a lobsterman for 15 years, but he is not able to fish offshore in the winter. Lobster fishing 
offshore requires a larger boat, gear, and a federal lobster permit to fish outside o f the 
three-mile limit. Many fisherm en who fish for lobsters in the summer and fall are unable 
to go offshore, and must rely on other fisheries in the winter. As we saw above, Newman 
created partnerships with divers who used his boat for a diving platform, and he has 
worked in the sea urchin fishery since its early years. Similar to Benjamin, Newman’s 
interest in the sea urchin fishery has waned in the last few years due to a seasonal conflict 
with the lobster fishery. The lobster season carries on into the fall, overlapping the sea 
urchin season. When it comes to deciding between fisheries, Newman sides with his 
primary fishery:
I’m not gonna quit lobstering early anymore to go urchining, definitely 
not. I’m gonna fish till November 1st, November 10th, regardless. Whether 
it be sacrificing a diver or not. This is what I do, this is what I’m gonna be 
doing as long as I live and I like to do it. You know, my main thing is 
lobstering. I love to catch lobsters. And that’s what I’m gonna be doing 
for the rest of my life. And this urchin industry was exciting. It was fun.
Not getting started with a diver at the beginning of the sea urchin season can mean not 
working in the sea urchin fishery at all for Newman. In past years Newman has stopped 
lobster fishing a little early in order to get started with a diver. However, the lobster 
fishery is doing well, and Newman is primarily a lobsterman. Sea urchins were always a 
supplement to his work in the lobster fishery.
Many fishermen were dragging in the scallop, quahog, or oyster fisheries before 
the sea urchin industry began. Some were lobstermen who outfitted their boats with 
small draggers in order to work in these fisheries during the winter months. Other 
draggers worked primarily from larger dragging boats that could work farther offshore in
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the scallop and groundfish industry. These fishermen based their decision to move into 
the sea urchin fishery on the relative success of these other fisheries, also. Cunningham 
was primarily lobstering, but without an offshore license, he turned to scallops in the 
winter months. At the time scallops were doing well so Cunningham didn’t move to 
urchins:
So, I didn’t get into it for a couple of years. I was scalloping. At that time 
the scallop industry along the Maine coast was doing real well... Some 
guys that didn’t have the larger boats and equipment were looking for 
something to do in the winter and it was a blessing for them to have 
something to be able to revert to in the winter.
As the scallop fishery held out Cunningham did not see the need to move into a new 
fishery for those winter months. However, as the scallop industry remained stable, the 
prices in the sea urchin fishery began to rise and Cunningham moved to take advantage 
of the opportunities. For Taylor sea urchins provided an opportunity to replace an 
unstable fishery:
I used to drag oysters, and the oyster population was getting low and I just 
figured I’d try som eth ing  different.
Taylor held an offshore lobster license, but did not have a large enough boat to work off
shore. Instead, he worked in the oyster fishery, which had seen a short period o f growth
along the southern coast of Maine in the early 1980s. Similarly, the quahog fishery in
downeast Maine had seen a period o f sharp growth, but catches were not stable and many
draggers moved to sea urchins when the new fishery got started.
Not having to establish a partnership with divers, draggers using the sea urchin
fishery as a supplement could enter the fishery without interrupting their primary fishery.
However, the interest o f some draggers in sea urchins has waned due to their investment
in a primary fishery. For instance, Anderson has been dragging sea urchins since the
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beginning o f the industry, but he is primarily a lobsterman. Sea urchins were always a 
supplement, and he does not have the established relations in the urchin fishery as he 
does with lobsters. This lack of established social relations has lead him to rely less on 
the new fishery:
Another day at the pier. I tell you I never look forward to going in there.
There was not one day where I ever looked forward to going in there. Not 
since this starting bidding for them. I 'd  like to see it straightened ou t Just 
come into one of these Dealers here, drop them off, get paid a fair price.
Don’t have to argue and fight for your money. Don’t have to worry about 
being here at 1 or 2:00. Never have to worry about someone being there 
to buy them.
Anderson would like to have the sea urchin industry look more like the lobster industry 
with which he is familiar. With the growth in buyers and the turnover, he does not have 
the established relations he finds in the lobster industry. As a result, he has turned away 
from sea urchins in the winter, only harvesting a few days in December when the lobster 
fishery is slow.
Career Strategies o f Youny Harvesters
While established fishermen saw the sea urchin industry as a supplement, a 
second group considered it a start. These fishermen worked on the waterfront, often held 
kinship ties to the waterfront community, but had not yet become established in a fishery. 
These fishermen, typically young and at the beginning o f their careers, did not own their 
own boats and had not established a reputation with buyers in any particular fishery. Sea 
urchins were a chance for young harvesters to establish themselves, not as a hand on a 
boat, but as a fisherman.
Dave Bogan’s father was a small inshore buyer in downeast Maine. Bogan 
started working on the water, right out of high school, as a stem man on lobster boats in
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the summer and on shrimp boats in the winter. While working on shrimp boats, Bogan
had seen urchins landed at some of the wharves. Soon after that, an inshore buyer
recruited him to try diving in the new fishery:
I got started in the summer with a wet suit and used equipment I probably 
had $600 $700 invested, couple hundred in licenses. The initial 
investment was minimal... Everything just fell into place. The wharves 
were already there; the boats were there.
Bogan was able to get into the new fishery easily with a minor capital investment, and the
existing infrastructure o f the working waterfront in place. With the sea urchin he was no
longer a hand on someone else’s boat, but he was a fisherman establishing his own
relations in the new fishery. Adam Rock tells a similar story. He had already been
SCUBA diving when the sea urchin industry got started:
The reason why I went diving is because I got out o f high school and 
diving was something to do to make a living. I’ve been fishing my whole 
life. My father was never a big lobster fisherman, so I wasn’t either. I 
decided to try [diving] then.
It was through his diving in the scallop fishery that Rock found out about the new sea
urchin fishery. A few urchin divers from Portland came and worked from the same boat
he was scallop diving from:
You could see that the divers were making $2,000 to $2,500 a day. And 
we were making $150 a day scalloping. And it didn’t take long to switch 
over. The first day of the winter I made 5340 and then just got better from 
there. And then I went 3 or 4 years with other people on a small boat o f 
my own.
For Rock the sea urchin industry was his chance to establish himself in his own fishery
and invest in his own boat:
Yeah. Then I bought my own boat that I have now. It’s a 31 footer, 
diesel. I’ve been doing it ever since.
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Rock went into SCUBA diving as a way to get started in commercial fishing. Getting the 
equipment and certified was a minimal investment, and he could work from another local 
boat as a platform. When the sea urchin industry started, it was an opportunity to follow 
a commercial fishing career path. He began saving money while using other boats as a 
dive platform. Soon he bought his own boat. Young fishermen at the beginning of their 
careers like Bogan and Rock never hesitated to move into the sea urchin fishery. Without 
other com m itm ents., there was no reason not to invest in the fishery and become full time 
sea urchin harvesters.
As the new industry evolved these different approaches to working in the 
harvesting sector developed also. One group o f fishermen, primarily lobstermen, were 
working in a fishery that was stable or growing. They viewed the sea urchin fishery as a 
supplement to their primary fishery, something to hold them over through the winter. 
However, the sea urchin fishery was not their primary fishery, and in some cases, they 
left the industry behind as a result. A second group o f fishermen became more invested 
in the sea urchin fishery, however. Most were at the beginning o f their careers on the 
waterfront and looking for an opportunity to invest in a fishery like sea urchins. Others 
moved to sea urchins from other fisheries, making a career switch by considering sea 
urchins a key part o f their fishing  activity. A  third group of fishermen that Miller and 
Van Maanen (1982) would call non-traditional came from outside of the working 
waterfront context. These were workers with diverse past experiences who moved into 
the sea urchin fishery as they discovered a unique work opportunity.
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Non-Traditional H arvesters
While the fishermen above come from the working waterfront context, another
group of harvesters in the sea urchin industry comes from a variety o f experiences outside
of the waterfront. As Miller and Van Maanen describe them, they “posses personal
biographies that vary widely from one another and from those o f the traditional fishermen
(1982:33).” It is hard to estimate the number of non-traditional fishermen working in the
sea urchin industry, but most participants agree that it is higher than other fisheries33.
Since they were not part o f the working waterfront, how this group learned of the new
opportunities becomes a relevant question. Returning to the questions posed by the
economic sociology literature, we have to ask how this outside group learned about the
new opportunities in the sea urchin industry, and why they decided to take advantage of
the opportunity upon learning of it.
Among non-traditional fishermen, the importance o f personal networks played a
more important role than it had among traditional fishermen. In many cases, the non-
traditional urchin harvesters learned of the new fishery through an acquaintanceship with
someone who was working on the waterfront These workers lived in the relative
proximity of the coast when they heard about the new industry. Nick Sage was working
in a coastal town managing restaurants when he first started fishing:
I fell into i t  I got done at Local Restaurant in June o f ’84, and just for the 
hell o f it, I decided to take scuba diving course at the Y. And a friend of 
mine who was a navy diver had been diving for scallops for a couple 
years. I really didn’t have anything else lined up for that winter. So, I 
figured why not?
Fuller had never really entertained moving into the commercial fishing industry.
However, the restaurant business on the Maine coast is often seasonal, and when an
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opportunity for winter employment came along Sage decided to try i t  Scallop fishing 
was never a career, but the next year the sea urchin industry came along and Sage 
decided to get out of the restaurant business and become a full time commercial 
fisherman.
Similar to the traditional fishermen, non-traditional fishermen took advantage of
the opportunities provided by the sea urchin industry when they had knowledge o f  the
opportunity and were in a position to take advantage. Will Tucker was working in
construction when his neighbor, a lobsterman, told him about the new industry:
My next door neighbor was a lobsterman. At that time, I was having hard 
problems with carpentry. It was after all those big booms of the 80’s.
And then, I would basically die in the wintertime, and then in spring and 
summertime it was just work, work, work, work. So he told me, “you 
ought to look into this, it’s looking pretty good.” I still waited a year or 
so, you know', then I just decided to do it.
Like Tucker, several non-traditional harvesters were working in the construction industry. 
The years before the sea urchin industry began were boom times for these industries, 
employing thousands as carpenters, painters, or roofers among others. As the 
construction boom ended, many workers were looking for some kind of employment to 
make up for the decline in work. Several of these workers decided to get into the 
harvesting sector of the sea urchin fishery. However, information flows impacted this 
labor movement and it was only those who somehow heard about the opportunity that got 
involved. Like Tucker, some had a direct tie to the waterfront For others, the 
information began to difiuse through non-waterfront networks as more non-traditional 
fishermen got involved.
33 It is hard to make this estimate for die reasons discussed in Chapter 1.
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The recruitment strategies o f Nicholas Cummings also had an important impact
on the movement o f non-traditional fishermen into the sea urchin industry. Cummings,
as we saw in the last chapter, was an early business group entrepreneur. He got into the
sea urchin business through his work as a commercial SCUBA diver. When he first
started shipping sea urchins to Japan, he turned to other commercial divers to work in the
harvesting sector. Although this group was sometimes reluctant, many commercial
divers without any fishing experience began SCUBA diving for sea urchins. With his
strong interest in growth, Cummings also turned to other unorthodox approaches to
recruiting labor. He recruited some harvesters from California where the sea urchin
fishery already had a large diving labor force, and he used the local media to promote the
new industry and encourage interested workers to get involved. Cummings used local
newspapers, radio, and television to spread the word about the new industry. John Myers
was working as a commercial diver in New Hampshire when he first heard about the sea
urchin industry beginning in Portland, Maine:
It had been on the radio that the Japanese were considering opening up a 
market in the states, something of that nature. I remember going up to 
Portland and spending a couple days up there going from fish house to fish 
house and ask ing  them if  they knew anything about sea urch in s . Of 
course, nobody knew anything. I finally got a name o f one guy, I went to 
talk with him, and he said oh yeah, we buy sea urchins. The guy’s name 
was [Nicholas Cummings]; he was called [the Urchin K ing].
A number of harvesters came to the industry in this fashion. Some came from the 
commercial diving industry or from the relative proximity of the coast where they heard 
about the new industry through personal networks. Still others moved to the coast, 
hearing about the new industry through the local media. As the industry developed the 
new opportunities drew a large number of non-traditional fishermen and they began 
working on the waterfront for the first time.
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Labor Market Process
Work, or labor, is an essential part o f  any productive system, and an economic sociology 
o f the productive process must account for the mobilization of labor in any productive 
system. In this chapter, we have seen that labor strategies o f workers are more than the 
rational responses to the pushes and pulls of economic life alone. Instead, the decisions 
to take advantage of an opportunity are embedded in institutional arrangements that 
embody economic life. The particular circumstances o f those institutional arrangements 
in turn impacts the development of labor markets and the composition of labor forces as 
industries develop.
Rather than a boom, it is possible to imagine the sea urchin industry falling flat— 
even with the Japanese consumer interest and the entrepreneurial activity. However, the 
unique circumstances of the working waterfront help realize the potential as production 
quickly and easily. The state control o f access to fisheries resources, the flexible 
productive relations of waterfront production and the career strategies of commercial 
fishermen favorably combined in the sea urchin industry to allow the growth in 
harvesting labor markets. Although fishermen came from traditional fishing 
backgrounds, many were at the beginning of their careers on the waterfront becoming 
established in the new fishery. In addition, many non-traditional fishermen came to this 
new industry as other non-fishing industries went into decline. These new harvesters did 
not approach the new job with the sense of tradition that comes from working on the 
waterfront
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Ch a p t e r  4  
E x c h a n g e  P r o c e s s e s
On a n  o v e r c a s t  and  w ind y d ay , th r e e  sea  u rch in  d e a le r s  w a tt a t  a  pubic pier fo r  
sea urchin harvesters to return from a day’s fishing. The wind often keeps harvesters in a 
small boat fishery off the water on days like this. These transient dealers have driven 
from Portland to a downeast public pier in order to buy sea urchins not knowing the local 
harvesters stayed in today. Harvesters sometimes encounter a sim ilar problem. They will 
come in from a day’s fishing and find no dealers to buy their product To sell their catch 
they need to load their urchins in a truck and drive up and down the coast looking for a 
dealer. Sometimes this means driving from a downeast port all the way to Portland, a 
three-hour trip one-way. These cases are extremes, however. On most days, harvesters 
and coast-side dealers meet and exchange sea urchins. Nevertheless, these cases 
demonstrate an important aspect o f the productive system. In each of these situations, 
there is a problem with the coordination o f exchange within the productive system.
This chapter examines the coordination of exchange between harvesters and 
coast-side dealers in the sea urchin industry. I focus on the institutions that can facilitate 
exchange, particularly trust and the obstacles to achieving exchange relations based on 
trust. This analysis begins with an introduction to three distinct forms o f exchange in the 
sea urchin industry: Long-term occlusive exchange relations, nonexclusive exchange 
relations, and plural forms o f  exchange relations.
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Following this introduction, the remainder o f the chapter examines in depth each 
o f these forms of exchange. Along with the qualitative sources o f interviews and field 
work, this analysis includes use o f dealer logbooks that provide a quantitative look at the 
different forms o f exchange that operate in this industry. There are three parts to the 
analysis. First, I examine the existence of long-term exclusive ties in the whole/live 
sector o f the industry. I consider the possibility that these trusting relations evolved from 
the participants’ rational pursuit o f self-interest However, it appears that these 
cooperative relations are non-calculating. Second, I examine a set o f market like 
exchange relations that exist in the sea urchin industry. In contrast to the non-calculating 
relations in the whole/live sector, these relations are decidedly calculating despite 
conditions that might encourage cooperation and the emergence of trusting relations. 
Here I examine the institutional causes of this calculated non-cooperation. Finally, I 
examine the existence o f a set of exchange relations that use both trust and market forms 
of exchange. These relations attempt to balance trust and market relations in a unique 
form that is both calculating and non-calculating.
Trust and the Costs o f Exchange
For the past eight years, Nick Sage and Harvey Holtz have been buying and selling sea 
urchins from each other. Sage is a non-traditional fisherman, coming to the new fishery 
from the restaurant business. Early in his career, he began working with Holtz and they 
have maintained a relationship since then. Holtz has relationships like this with all his 
divers. He asks that his divers work exclusively with him, and in return he provides a 
steady market and other supports like filling air tanks at the end of the day. In contrast, 
Pete Kelly prefers to sell his sea urchins at public fish piers. After eleven years o f
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fishing, he knows many of the dealers that are still in the business, but these relations do 
not influence where he sells his catch. At the end o f the day he takes his catch to the pier 
where a set o f dealers have come looking to buy sea urchins. After shopping his catch 
around, he sells his sea urchins to the highest bidder. In both o f these cases, sea urchins 
are exchanged across technically separate units in the productive system; transactions are 
completed. The transactions are completed in very different ways, however. One 
exchange is coordinated by a form of cooperation and one through the price mechanism 
at a spot market.
Markets are social institutions that facilitate exchange between buyers and sellers 
(Coase, 1988:8). Economic historians often view markets as exchange institutions that 
take place in a specific time and place. However, the neo-classical economist’s market is 
more an abstract arena where a large number o f technically separate units carry out one­
time exchanges guided by self-interest (Swedberg, 1994:257-264). In the neo-classical 
economist’s market, partners to the transaction are anonymous; the price mechanism 
attracts actors to the exchange and require no previous or future knowledge of exchange 
partners. The immediacy of the exchange and its coordination by price requires no 
system wide governance or control. The pursuit of self-interest and the price mechanism 
allow for short term relations of mutual satisfaction; the market ideal requires no lasting 
or integrated relationships34. Economic sociologists emphasize the social structural 
characteristics o f markets, and power relations in the exchange process. In the network 
perspective concrete social relations structure market based exchange (Granovetter,
1985). Weber (1968) emphasized the aspects o f straggle and competition that surround
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
145
market exchange35. He considered the exchange a struggle o f  the participants’ interests, 
and between those potentially interested in the exchange there exists a struggle o f 
competition. Following Weber, Fligstein (1996) considers the market a political and 
cultural construction evolving from the power struggles among actors to control 
competition and insure economic survival (1996:659-60).
Recently, institutional economics and economic sociology have turned their 
attention to another institution that facilitates exchange within a  productive system: trust. 
Trust in economic relations refers to the mutual confidence that no party to an exchange 
will exploit the other’s vulnerability (Sabel, 1993; see Gambetta, 1988). TCE assumes 
that parties to an exchange act self-interestedly, and that they will exploit one another’s 
vulnerability i f  they can. In the ideal market, competition nullifies this potential 
opportunism. When ideal market conditions do not exist, the potential for guile exists 
and opportunistic parties can take advantage of others. Having to monitor exchange 
partners closely to prevent opportunistic actions increases transaction costs. TCE 
proposes that if  the two parties exchange regularly they can eliminate transaction costs 
through the formation of non-market institutions that integrate the exchange.
Establishing relationships based on trust and a mutual self-interest can eliminate the costs 
associated with opportunism.
From the TCE, perspective trust emerges from self-interested action taking place 
over repeated exchanges. In contrast, economic sociologists consider trust an aspect of 
existing social relations. In the network literature, trust is embedded in existing and
34 See Powell (1990), Braddich and Eccles (1989) and Williams (1985) for further discussions of the 
market form of coordinating exchange and for comparison with network and hierarchical forms of 
coordination.
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ongoing networks o f personal relations. The trust found in these existing relations can 
act as the lubricant for smooth economic relations (Granovetter, 1985). Trust becomes 
part of the background expectations o f the exchange, the unconscious but taken for 
granted expectations o f everyday life (Zucker, 1986). Trust can become part of the 
shared rules of exchange actors hold in specific contexts, also (Fligstein, 1996). These 
sociological perspectives consider social variables key to the establishment or disruption 
o f trust
Exchange in the Sea Urchin Fishery
Rather than one, there appear to be three forms o f exchange dominating the sea 
urchin industry. The first form resembles that o f other New England fisheries. Like Nick 
Sage and Harvey Holtz above, harvesters and dealers continue the tradition o f the 
working waterfront and establish long-term exclusive exchange relations based on 
reciprocity and trust.
These long-term exclusive ties stand in sharp contrast to exchange relations 
governed by the price mechanism. Here price alone brings the parties to the exchange 
together: harvesters attempt to obtain the highest price possible for their catch, and 
dealers attempt to buy the catch at the lowest price they can. Rather than trust, 
reciprocity or a mutual self-interest, these exchanges are fraught with distrust and guile. 
Among dealers, the level of competition is very high and it is comm on for dealers to bid 
up the price for a harvester’s catch in an auction like manner. The latter auction type 
competition takes place most often at public fish piers where spot markets have operated
3S For a discussion of Weber’s conception of the market see Swedberg, (1994:265) which also includes 
discussion of writings not yet translated to English.
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for the past 5 years. Here a number of dealers come to the pier each day and harvesters 
shop their catch around, settling on the best offer.
A third form o f exchange resembles what Bradich and Eccles (1989) call the 
plural form. These harvesters and dealers use both trust and price to coordinate 
exchange, choosing the form based on economic strategies. These plural forms do not 
follow one economic strategy. Instead, harvesters and dealers combine trust and price in 
unique ways. Some dealers will hold a number o f long-term exclusive relations with 
harvesters in order to assure a steady supply of product, and they use the market to obtain 
more sea urchins when their supply from long-term ties can not fill orders. Harvesters 
will use long-term ties in order to assure a steady market for their catch, but will opt to go 
to the spot markets when prices are high, or when they are selling a lower quality 
product. These are some examples o f harvesters and dealers using both trust and price in 
order to coordinate their exchange relations.
Long-Term Exclusive Exchange Relations
Table 4.1 provides a look at the type of exchange relations that exist between 
harvesters and coast-side dealers in the sea urchin industry. Using dealer logbooks, the 
data provide a look at all transactions between harvesters and dealers in the 1996-97 
season.36 The table uses descriptive statistics in order to find variation.37 Looking at All
36 Logbook data was obtained from the DMR of Maine. In order to assure the anonymity o f industry 
participants, all identifying characteristics of the dealers and harvesters were removed before the DMR 
supplied this data.
37 Using the logbooks completed by coast-side dealers provides some insight into the nature of transactions 
in the industry. Each month every licensed dealer is required to turn in a logbook to the DMR. The 
logbook should record all transactions in the industry including the date, location, harvester’s license 
number, weight of catch, roe percentage, and price paid per pound. Having a record o f all transactions 
has obvious advantages in this type o f research. This date are not without flaws, however. Dealers have 
been compelled to fill out these logbooks by the DMR. Although landings and costs should accurately 
reflect their tax records, there is no way to check that a harvester’s catch is accurately represented, hi
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Harvesters, Row 1 examines the Number o f Dealers a harvester sold to over the course 
of the season. The first and third quartiles (columns 3 and 4) capture the different types 
o f relations that exist in the industry. The first quartile shows that at least twenty five 
percent of the harvesters sold exclusively to one buyer ova: the course of the season.
This form o f exchange is sim ilar to that found in other inshore fisheries in the 
same region, hi these fisheries researchers find non-market relations coordinating 
exchange between inshore harvesters and coast-side dealers. In New England’s fresh fish 
market, Wilson (1980) found long term exchange relations between harvesters and buyers 
based on norms o f reciprocity. The reciprocitive relations benefited both buyers and 
sellers by decreasing the amount o f uncertainty in their business operations. The dealer’s 
business requires a constant supply o f reasonable quality fresh fish in order to fill his 
clients requests. The fisherman’s business interest lies in securing a fair price for his 
catch. Dealers commonly have better information about the current market value of a 
fisherman’s catch, and could use this to take advantage of the harvester. However, the 
fisherman can always withhold future supply from a buyer who cheats on a deal. The 
threat holds weight given the buyers need for constant supply.
fact, it seems likely that a dealer would misrepresent individual harvester information. Similarly, 
harvesters’ transactions are likely to be misrepresented. More than one harvester will often sell their 
catch under one license number, and harvesters can provide inaccurate license in fo rm ation easily. In the 
busy atmosphere of die maiket exact records are often lost However, for the questions asked here these 
measurement problems favor the conclusions reached using the data. If more accurate records were kept 
we would expect the number of buyers used by a harvester to increase, and the percentage of catch going 
to a primary buyer to decrease. These changes would further highlight the frequent switching that occurs 
in the industry.
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Table 4.1 Logbook Data
Mean Median 1* Quartile 3rt Quartile
All Harvesters
Number o f dealers'1 3 2 1 4
Proportion sold to first dealer* .76 .82 .54 1.0
Number o f days fishec? 20.5 16 4 33
Number o f months fished? 4 4 2 6
Number o f counties3 1.4 1 1 2
Exclusive Harvesters
Number o f dealers1 1 1 1 1
Proportion sold to first dealer* 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Number o f days fished? 10.4 2 1 13
Number o f months fished? 2.24 1 1 3
Number o f counties* 1 1 1 1
Nonexclusive Harvesters
Number o f dealers 4 3 2 5
Proportion sold to first dealer* .63 .63 .48 .81
Number o f days fished* 25.7 24 11 37
Number o f months fished? 4.9 5 4 6
Number o f counties 1.6 2 1 2
2Proportion o f harvesters season landings purchased by the buyer that harvester sold to most often, 
dum ber of days fished during the 8 months season.
^Number of months in which harvester fished at least once, 
dum ber of counties in which harvester sold landings.
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A long-term relationship between buyer and harvester helps solve some o f  these 
exchange problems. For the buyer, a long-term relationship helps assure a constant 
supply. These arrangements allow the buyer some certainty in the quality of fish he will 
receive, and a reliable source to which he can always turn. The long-term relation 
assures the harvester a fair market price for his catch. As predicted by Gouldner (1960), 
Wilson finds that other trust dependent relations develop from these long-term ties. 
Fishermen get better access to market information, can base equipment upgrades on 
assured future sales, and can expect fair evaluation o f quality and price for their catch. A 
dealer may pay slightly above market price for fish in order to assure a positive return on 
the vessel’s trip. These steps assure future supply and perhaps gain the buyer some 
influence on timing of a fisherman’s future effort and the species sought.
Strong social ties, kin, and community in the economic process stand out in 
Acheson’s (1988) research on Maine lobstermen. In most small businesses on the coast 
o f Maine, but especially in the lobster fishery, Acheson finds a firm operated by a core o f 
relatives. Few businesses hire more than four employees without close kinship ties. 
Family employees have a number of benefits, including trust that they will keep business 
secrets and being able to ask for long hours o f work during times o f need. In addition, a 
large number of children and wives perform essential tasks for the operation without pay. 
Kin form apprenticeship relations to leam skilled jobs and important information can be 
shared between the trusted relations. These include references for good employees, 
sources o f credit, and information on new business innovations. Families often lend 
money for new businesses, and it appears that larger numbers o f kin involved in a fishing 
business lead to greater success, also.
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Acheson finds long-term reciprocal exchange relationships in the lobster industry 
as he follows the marketing chain from harvesting to the consumer. Lobsters reach the 
consumer through a string of exchanges between harvesters, dealers, pounds, wholesale 
distributors, shippers, and retailers. The primary production problem in the lobster 
fishery is an uncertain supply and demand. For instance, a dealer must balance a supply 
o f lobsters from fishermen on one side and demand from consumers including 
restaurants, hotels, and wholesalers on the other. The fisherman harvests an uncertain 
supply of lobsters each day, but demands payment for their catch on the spot. Consumers 
make a steady demand for lobsters from the dealer, preferably at a steady price. A dealer 
may have to buy a fisherman’s lobsters for which he does not have a demand. In 
addition, he may have a larger demand than the fishermen are catching at a particular 
time.
To balance supply and demand firms develop long-term reciprocal relations 
(Acheson, 1988:119). Wholesalers know that their dealers will attempt to fill demands 
during times o f scarcity, and the dealer knows the wholesaler will buy as many lobsters 
as possible dining times of overabundance. Firms in the industry know that the other 
operations they work with will go out o f their way to fulfill the informal arrangements to 
balance supply and demand in a way that is best for both parties. Sim ilarly, harvesters 
and dealers establish long-term relations that have mutual benefits. The dealer attempts 
to attach fishermen to his firm to assure a steady supply of lobsters for his customers. In 
return, the fishermen gets an assured buyer o f his catch, and often times supplies such as 
fuel and bait with little or no mark up.
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The long-term exclusive ties found in Table 4.1 resemble the inshore groundfish 
and lobster industries described by Wilson and Acheson. Fieldwork and interviews 
support the interpretation that these exclusive relations resemble the reciprocitive 
relations found by Acheson and Wilson. A number of harvesters work from local ports, 
and sell to local buyers exclusively. Below I explore why a form o f exchange similar to 
exiting fisheries developed in this new fishery.
Forming Exclnsive Exchange Relations
A set o f long-term exclusive relations based on trust, similar to those in other 
local fisheries, appears to have developed in the new sea urchin industry. Below I 
consider possible explanations for the development of trusting exchange relations in three 
parts. First, I consider the possibility that these relations could evolve through the pursuit 
of rational self-interest of the exchange parties. Second, I examine the problem of 
indeterminacy in economic exchange. Finally, I look more closely at the actual long­
term exchange relations that have developed in the whole/live sector of the industry and 
attempt to reach some conclusions for the origins of these relations.
The Evolution o f  Cooperation
Economists have attempted to show that the trust that develops between exchange 
parties, like those described above, evolves from cooperative relations based on the 
rational self-interests of parties to a recurring exchange (Axelrod, 1984; Taylor, 1987). 
Figure 4.1 maps this process using game theoretic techniques. Here we have two parties 
to an exchange, a harvester, and a dealer. Each party has the option of cooperation or 
non-cooperation. A dealer cooperates by offering a consistent market for a harvester’s
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product at a fair price. A harvester cooperates by agreeing to offer a constant supply of 
product The matrix in Figure 4.1 models the payoff o f  a decision. Each participant’s 






Figure 4.1 follows a classical Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Here there are 
advantages to each party if  both cooperate. The payoff increases for a non-cooperator if 
the other party cooperates. I f  both parties choose non-cooperation a balance of payoffs 
occurs, but the payoff is lower for each party than if they had both chosen to cooperate.
In this game, a participant prefers non-cooperation if  the other party chooses to 
cooperate. A participant also prefers non-cooperation if  the other party chooses not to 
cooperate. In a one-time exchange between anonymous parties, the outcome of this game 
is mutual non-cooperation, although cooperation would provide a better payoff to both.
The outcome of mutual non-cooperation results from this game when the 
exchange is one-time and between anonymous parties. A different outcome may develop 
when exchange is recurrent. Participants may adopt a conditionally cooperative strategy 
to the recurrent game38. Sometimes known as ‘T it for Tat”, a party to exchange will











Prisoner’s Dilemma Model of Bargaining Process
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choose to cooperate as long as the other party to the exchange cooperates, hi this way 
participants use previous experience to judge the future strategies o f exchange parties. 
From a strictly rational perspective, the ‘T it for Tat” game provides a possible 
explanation for the evolution of cooperation in inshore fisheries.
There are two problems with this explanation for the development o f trust. First, 
the calculative cooperation described above and trust are not the same thing. In fact, the 
absence of the calculative motives o f the game theory model more accurately 
characterizes trust The difference is important, because the cooperation that results from 
calculative motives is less stable than a cooperation based on norms o f trust. In the 
recurrent game model, participants can disrupt the cooperation easily after one 
questionable transaction, and participants must evaluate each transaction critically. If a 
participant blindly cooperates without calculation, it becomes beneficial for the other 
party to defect regularly. Interestingly, TCE questions the evolution of cooperation 
argument on similar grounds. The constant calculative actions create transaction specific 
investments, and are not the most efficient means o f coordinating exchange. Trust, as a 
non-calculative cooperation, succeeds in overcoming these transaction specific costs.
The second problem lies in the game model's assumption of straightforward 
exchange with full knowledge of outcomes. Harvesters bring a day’s catch to dealers in 
order to exchange it for payment; dealers estimate the value of the harvester’s catch to 
determine a price to pay for the sea urchins. Exchange takes place when a harvester 
agrees to exchange his catch for the price offered by the dealer. This captures the 
exchange process at it simplest, but day to day this exchange is fraught with what 
economists call indeterminacy. Indeterminacy describes a point when insufficient
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evidence makes a rational judgement about the likelihood of various outcomes o f an 
action impossible (Elster, 1989b:30-41). In the game models, the participants can not 
judge the payoff matrix when outcomes are indeterminate. Perhaps an obvious solution 
to the problem o f indeterminacy is to collect more information, but how much 
information to collect is indeterminate also. Introducing competition and the perishable 
quality of products to the exchange process increase the urgency of the decision; there are 
potential costs or advantages to acting too quickly or not quickly enough. These 
problems can be demonstrated very well looking at the sea urchin industry.
Indeterminacy in the Sea Urchin Industry
Attempting to estimate the value o f a sea urchin harvester’s catch resembles the
indeterminacy described by economists. This can first be seen in the entrepreneur’s
attempt to estimate the value of the catch on the Japanese market. Sea urchin roe from
the Northwest Atlantic is sold in a number o f different Japanese markets, but
entrepreneurs primarily follow the activity at the Tokyo Seafood Auction to monitor the
market for their product. Although this already simplifies the market for his product,
there is still considerable uncertainty making this estimate. First, the estimate is a
forecast about the market activity in four to five days. Joe Handy makes this forecast in
consultation with his Japanese broker:
We talk about it on the phone. To try to project what the market’s gonna 
be like. Cause I have to know what the market’s gonna be 4 days from 
now, not what it is now. My product’s not gonna get there for 4 or 5 days.
5 days actually. If  I buy tomorrow, it’s gonna be 5 days before my 
product gets to the market So, I’m not interested in what the market is 
today, I ’m more interested in what it’s gonna be 5 days from now. And 
that’s the hat trick in this business.
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For a processor, they have to buy product one day, process it the next, and then transport
the product to Japan, a process that can take up to five days. As Handy says, he is not
interested in the market today, but in five days. A number of factors go into this forecast.
Entrepreneurs have to estimate the strength of demand, the yen to dollar ratio, the amount
of product coming from the Northwest Atlantic on the market, and the amount o f product
from other regions of the world on the market:
There’s so many influences on the market. There’s weather conditions in 
Japan, production from other places [Korea, Russia, Chile], like I told you, 
does have an influence. It’s not a solid influence, but it’s still an 
influence. Some of the big companies might unload a large amount of 
volume at once. That tends to dry that market up. But these are all things 
I can not foresee, that nobody can foresee. My competitors aren’t gonna 
tell me what they’re shipping. It’s kind of a crapshoot. But that’s pretty 
much a typical day.
These circumstances make an accurate estimate of the product on any one day
impossible. Working in the market day to day increases knowledge, but many factors
remain unknown in assessing value to a harvester’s catch. An entrepreneur must make a
best guess of value. Since it is better to err low, the dealer’s interests lie in securing the
product from the harvester at the lowest possible price. Having more market information
than the harvesters, dealers will attempt to buy sea urchins well below market value if
they can. Harvesters are aware of this:
So one buyer might be at say 60 cents a lb. for that day, but the guy down 
the street went up to 85. You know he was paying 85 but the other guy 
knew about it too, but he, you know. He wouldn’t be to quick to try to 
jump his price and try to get as much as he could before the word got out.
“Oh, oh yeah, I’ll give you 85 cents!” But the mean time you know, 10 
other people or 20 other people went through at 60.
Here the dealer was willing to pay $.85 per pound for the product, but if  he could get 
away with paying $.60 he would. At the fish pier, it is harder for a dealer to restrict 
market information, but the interest remains.
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The value o f the product on the Japanese market is not the only point of 
indeterminacy for the dealer. The value of a harvester’s catch also varies based on the 
quality o f the product. As the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin roe more closely resembles 
the Japanese sea urchin roe, the value increases. In general, the higher quality roe is firm, 
unbroken, and a bright yellow color (Wilen and Wessells, 1997). On the fish piers 
dealers measure quality with a roe count—the percentage o f the whole urchin weight that 
comes from the roe weight.
Roe counts vary from under ten percent to over twenty percent. In order to 
estimate the roe counts of a harvester’s catch buyers perform either a formal roe test or an 
informal crack test. In a formal roe test, the buyer takes a sample o f the harvester’s catch 
and weighs that sample. Recording this weight, the buyer then separates the roe from this 
sample o f urchins, weighs the separated roe, and finds the ratio of roe to whole urchin.
The roe test also gives the buyer a chance to inspect the color and texture of the catch.
The formal roe test can take some time, and when the pier is especially busy, a queue o f 
harvesters can develop waiting for a roe test. Because o f  the queue, many buyers use a 
simple crack test. In the crack test, the buyer simply cracks open a few urchins from the 
catch without removing them from the fisherman’s totes. Looking at the cracked urchins 
the buyer estimates the quality and offers a price.
Both formal and informal methods of estimating quality are flawed measures.
Each estimate is surely off by a few percentage points, and at best, the tests can spot a 
particularly low quality catch. The sample of sea urchins chosen for the test is usually 
quite small and not random in the statistical sense. This decreases the chances that the 
sample reflects the whole catch. Estimating the roe count o f the sample using the crack
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test is obviously prone to errors, but even in the formal roe test, this measure can. be off.
Rarely is the roe perfectly removed from the urchin; sometimes excess material stays
with the roe, and sometimes part o f the roe is left behind. In addition, buyers often take
some roe out o f the second weighing because o f discoloration or poor texture changing
the roe to whole urchin ratio. When working with a  small sample, these m ino r factors can
lead to differences in one or two percentage points in the roe count estimate. Buyers are
aware of these problems:
Every test is at random. You try to take the randomness out of it, by 
taking a sample out o f every tote, through the top, middle, and bottom of 
every tote. But, really, it’s pretty random. So, two tests could come out 
slightly different.39
It is common for buyers to conduct more than one test and find a difference of a few 
percentage points in the estimates. These few percentage points can have a large effect 
on the value of the catch given the base price method o f  setting value.
Prices for sea urchin landings are set on a per pound basis, and base prices are set 
at a ten percent roe count level o f  quality. The price is set for a ten percent roe count and 
then varies by $.10 for each percentage point above or below ten percent For instance, 
with a $1.00 base price an eleven- percent roe count would gamer $1.10 per pound price. 
Similarly, a nine percent roe count would gamer a $.90 per pound price. When catch 
sizes approach 1,000 pounds a $.10 or $.20 difference in per pound price can make close 
to a $200 difference in the value o f the catch. Given this method of placing value on the
39 Here the buyer is clearly not using random in the statistical sense, but in a popular usage meaning
haphazard.
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catch, slight differences in the estimate of quality can have large consequences for the 
overall estimate of catch value40.
40 In this discussion I attempt to analyze the ways in which uncertainty exists it die exchange process. 
However, the following extended quote from an interview provides a telling example o f this difficulty as 
one entrepreneur attempts to factor die many uncertain aspects of die exchange in order to approach the 
exchange rationally. His difficulties alone are very telling, and provide some foreshadowing to later 
arguments:
I’m watching the yen, everyday I watch the yen, and die yen has gone in the past week 
and a half, it’s gone form 120 yen to die US dollar to 126. So, that’s one thing that’s 
going on. It could be independent of die urchin price, but we have our eye on that 
Something’s happen in g , and there’s lots of reasons, but anyway, the price is felling in 
Japan. The trade price, so we’re talking in... So today, it would seem like it was a 
sim ple spreadsheet to calculate that every day, but it’s no t It’s actually very calculated 
because you’re buying from 9% up to 20% yield. And basically you start off with a base 
price of say, 10%. That’s where you base everything, 10% yield. So, say we say today 
the base price is.. .this morning we said it went down to 50 cents a pound at 10% yield 
Which is a very low price. Think of a high price for a pound of sea urchins, they’re 
heavy things. You can say 5 sea urchins. But, anyway, that’s a very low price. That 
would mean that if  they brought in sea urch ins of 11%, it would be 60 cents a pound It 
goes up a dim e, ten cents, every percentage. Or reversibly, it goes down ten cents every 
percentage below. But, we don’t buy below 9% because it’s not big enough to work 
with. Yeah. So, and what you find is that for these yields, when you work it out with 10 
cents going up and 10 cents going down over these yields, you can then calculate how 
much the roe is costing. What’s the true cost of the roe in every day trading? You may 
say every 100 grams costs. What you find take any percent, say we take 10% yield and 
we look at the base price for that o f say 70 cents. There’s a weird reversal happens. 70 
cents is actually the price where no matter what yield you take, if  you took 9, 10, 11, any 
yield you would always have the same cost for the roe. Because the price is rising or 
felling with the yield and die amount of roe that gets extracted compensates for the price.
So, you end up, whether you’re buying 15% or 9%, it’s the same price all the way 
through, 70 cents.
Oh, really?
At 80 cents, the lower yield is more expensive because you’re taking less out, so that the 
roe... so then your motive is for buying, when you get over 70 cents you would like to 
buy higher yields. It’s more economic. Lower cost, too, to take it and put it in the trays.
Below 70 cents, it’s the opposite.
Right, your margins decrease...
You’re motivated to buy lower yield Cause that’s where its... and I just discovered that 
recently on a spread sheet I thought that was a pretty exciting thing to find It was 
w eird I couldn’t believe it. I was looking at the figures, and then boom! But that makes 
everything else very complicated. Because when you take that little picture and you plug 
that into the larger picture o f cost analysis and everything and market price, you’ve got 
this stupid reversal happening, it really blows your mind away some times. And you 
have to be very aware o f that because you drink you made a mistake, and then you 
suddenly realize it’s reversed and these answers are so real. And that’s one thing I’ve 
identified but it still doesn’t pay to buy yield Because, although the cost o f roe is 
cheaper, there’s less units o f product to sell. So, o f course, you make a m argin  on die
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Long-term Exchange in the Whole-Live M arket
Harvesters and dealers working in the whole-live market operate under similar 
circumstances as the lobster and groundfish industries. With indeterminacy, uncertain 
supply and demand for the dealer, and insufficient market information for the harvester 
lead to long-term relations in this sector o f the industry. The whole/live market serves an 
elite customer in Japan; the demand is smaller than that for the processed market, but 
consistent The whole/live entrepreneurs need a  high quality product, but consistently 
pay higher prices also. Under these conditions, long-term exclusive relations based on 
reciprocity have developed between buyers and sellers. These buyers rely on a stable 
supply of high quality sea urchins from harvesters. In order to assure this they have made 
accommodations to their loyal harvesters. Robert Thompson requires a day to evaluate
cost of roe, but you also make a m argin  on every product, item, unit So, even though, 
when it’s below 70 cents, it’s more economic in cost of product in each package to buy 
lower yields, overall, it’s still more economic to buy higher yields, because you get more 
product to sell It overcompensates for the cost So, I think that’s a very interesting thing 
I’ve discovered recently.
So, imagine you’re out on the pier, do you run through those things in your mind when 
you’re buying?
No, it’s much more complex over there, because over there you’ve got a very, very 
competitive market situation, auctions. You have an old boat comes in, you have S, 6, 7 
buyers all climb down at the same time. Then, they do what you call a stomp test, crack 
them open, and then they all start calling out prices. It’s very risky, it’s buyer beware.
Same time as that’s going on the divers, some divers, a few of them, are trying to, what 
they call, “sugar their totes.” Yesterday was w hat they call “peanut butter sandwich” 
which is when die put high yield on the top, high yield on the bottom, and then bad product 
in the middle. Because they know that we stomp die top to look at than. And then we 
knew we were being, they were “sugaring” before they were being good on top and just 
bad on the bottom, so we were turning the totes o v a  a  we were looking at the bottom o f 
the totes. And every year you find 2 or 3 buyers who are knew buyers, quiet often they are 
Cambodians, and for one reason or another, they seem to be higher. Their prices are way 
higher. And that really throws a spin on the works, in to the whole buying situation. The 
whole auction, you have these people up there that don’t have any relation to the market. 
People talk about money laundering and all sorts o f things, but who knows what that’s all 
about It could just be that these people will be out of business at the end of die season, 
because they lose a lot of money. So, there’s that, that complicates, the whole m arket
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the catch of a harvester before making payment, in effect a consignment type
relationship. He feels his quality market requires he does this, but he is willing to
accommodate the harvesters with a steady market and a fair price:
It’s a little bit hard for me buying on an every day basis, but I manage to 
do it, just because you pretty much have to. If you buy from the guys 
every other day, they’re not gonna stay with you... For the most part, 
they’re pretty loyal. Just treat them right I treat them right, believe me. I 
can afford to pay them a little more for that ability to look at them first 
Because they figure, they’re gonna get a fair price and they’re gonna get a 
fair deal.
There is some risk involved for the harvester, but Thompson attempts to compensate the
risk by offering a little more money for the product than most dealers offer. A  trust
develops between the exchange partners and they begin to integrate their activities
closely; buyer and seller coordinate their productive activities:
That’s part o f the communication process and you only have to get a hold 
of the divers that night or early the next morning. Usually they call into 
the plant now. We go into pack at like 2 and 3 in the morning, and when 
they get up, they call in; can we go today, or what price did you get 
yesterday, and can we go today, and that type of thing. It has to be pretty 
under control.
Though technically separate, harvesters and dealers work closely with one another, 
coordinating activities and accommodating each other’s needs in the productive process.
Similar to Wilson’s findings, these long-term relations often develop other 
reciprocitive characteristics. Holtz is a whole/live entrepreneur who insists on loyalty in 
the harvesters from which he buys. Similar to Thompson he has a small, consistent 
market for a quality product. He does not have any hard feelings i f  harvesters would 
rather shop around, but he does not want to deal with that in his business. In return, he 
provides his divers with additional services like filling  their air tanks each night or 
sending a truck to pick up their urchins when they cannot come to his wharf. The
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harvesters appreciate this and agree to be loyal in the relationship. Nick Sage doesn’t see 
any reason not to:
There are people who will try to bounce from him to whoever’s paying the 
most on a particular day. He doesn’t put up with that. All o f his boats are 
full time boats for him. I have to deal with him all the time, so, as far as 
I’m concerned, it’s not worth screwing up that relationship. It’s very 
convenient with Harvey. He fills the tanks; he’s competitive [with price], 
if  not higher than anyone else.
The harvesters and buyers that work in the whole/live market develop long-term relations 
embodied with reciprocity and trust The trust helps to make economic exchange smooth 
and harmonious, reducing transaction costs. However, if  not an evolution from 
calculative cooperation, where do these relations come from? TCE seems to explain their 
existence with their success, but some clues to their origins may exist in sociological 
perspectives.
Perhaps these relationships develop through mimetic imitation of other fisheries. 
Mimetic processes often lead to isomorphic occurrences, and Fligstein proposes that new 
industries adopt guiding conceptions from industries that are close by (1996:665). The 
harvesters and dealers in the whole-live market are aware o f practices in the lobster and 
other fisheries and are sometimes admiring of participants in them, but evidence o f actual 
imitation is hard to find.
There is evidence of normative pressures influencing the establishment o f long­
term exclusive ties. Economic actors carry normative expectations with them when they 
move from one economic context to another. In previous chapters, we have seen these 
pressures create inertia among actors, and their eventual dropping from this new fishery.
In other cases, these participants have remained in the industry and they carry 
conceptions o f the rules o f exchange between buyers and sellers from one industry to
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another. Harvesters and buyers with experience in other fisheries that utilize long term
exclusive relations based on reciprocity and trust maintain these conceptions o f  the rules
of exchange and attempt to establish similar relations in the new sea urchin industry.
This is the case for Chuck Anderson, who came to the sea urchin fishery from lobsters
and would like to maintain similar relations with buyers in the sea urchin industry:
I’ve always been the type o f person; I only sell to one person. I didn’t 
want to spread around very much. I don’t like to. I like to be able to come 
in, unload, and get whatever it’s worth. I’d rather have somebody that 
buys all the time and you can be loyal.
Drew Taylor, also coming from the lobster industry, feels similarly. His interest in 
working with one buyer is rooted in his position as a fisherman in the waterfront 
community:
I like to keep the business going in the local wharves if  I can, because it 
just makes sense to help people around the community. A lot of the time 
these guys will jump back and forth because one buyer will want them 
worse one day and he’ll pay a dime more. I can’t keep track so I stick 
with one and figure it levels ou t Course I try to keep the quality o f my 
urchins right. You’ve got a lot o f guys that try to sneak things through.
Line the bad urchins with good. I try to keep it honest and it usually pays 
off.
Rather than a calculative cooperation, Taylor appears to prefer the long-term relation as a 
way to avoid the calculative action. Taylor chooses to sell exclusively to his dealer out of 
a commitment to the local dealer’s wellbeing. The loyalty appears to come from the 
shared commitment to the community, but there is also a practical aspect to the decision. 
He believes he is saving time and energy with long-term exclusive relations. In TCE 
terms, long-term exclusive ties reduce transaction costs.
It is difficult to differentiate the effects of TCE economizing and institutional 
pressures in the instances o f exchange relations similar to those o f other inshore fisheries. 
Perhaps the more compelling explanation comes from the TCE perspective. These ties
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result, it appears, from the conditions o f exchange within which the parties are working. 
Similar to the lobster and groundfish industries, dealers need a steady supply o f a  quality 
product, and the harvesters need a reliable market and a fair price. The demand for this 
product is stable and there is little competition between these entrepreneurs. The lack of 
competition between buyers and the balance o f interests found between the exchange 
parties result in the reciprocitive, long-term, exclusive relations o f the whole/live sea 
urchin market. However, it is difficult to rule out the role of normative and mimetic 
pressures. Looking more closely at nonexclusive exchange relations in the sea urchin 
industry allows further consideration of these questions.
Nonexclusive Exchange Relations
A look back at Table 4.1 shows that the exclusive relations discussed above do 
not dominate the sea urchin industry. Considering Row 1 again, harvesters sold to a 
mean o f three buyers during the season. The median and third quartile show that over 
50% of harvesters sell to at least two buyers, and over 25% sell to three or more buyers. 
Although these harvesters sell to more than one buyer, there still remains the possibility 
that second and third buyers make up a small amount o f the actual exchanges the 
harvester makes over the season. Stated another way, each harvester may have a primary 
dealer to whom they sell their catch. This primary dealer may buy nearly all o f  the 
harvester’s catch, indicating a strong commitment between exchange partners if  not strict 
exclusivity. Row 2 under All Harvesters examines the proportion o f a harvester’s total 
landings sold to their primary dealer. It shows that harvesters sell a mean o f 76% of their 
catch to a primary dealer, and a median o f 82%. Although this does portray some 
commitment to a primary buyer among harvesters, it does not appear consistent with the
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reciprocitive relations found by Wilson and Acheson. Looking further at Nonexclusive 
Harvesters, Rows 1 through 5 examine those harvesters who sold to at least two dealers 
over the course o f  the season. These harvesters sold to a mean o f 4 different dealers, and 
25% of this group sold to five or more dealers in the season. These harvesters do not 
show much commitment to a primary dealer, selling an average o f 63% of their catch to a 
primary dealer. The first quartile shows that one-quarter sell less than half o f their catch 
to a primary dealer. O f this lower quarter, perhaps we can say they have no primary 
dealer.
Figure 4.2 provides a graphical illustration o f this phenomena. It plots the 
proportion o f a harvester’s catch sold to the primary buyer by the number o f buyers to 
which the harvester sold. In the top left o f  the graph, we see the long-term exclusive 
relations that resemble the reciprocitive relations found by Wilson and Acheson. Here 
harvesters sell 100% of their catch to one buyer. However, as we look down and to the 
right, the graph shows harvesters who are selling only a fraction of their catch to a 
primary dealer. These harvesters divide their remaining catch among a second, third, and 
in some cases over ten other buyers. The cases found in the upper left-hand comer of the 
graph appear consistent with the findings of Acheson and Wilson. However, it is the 
large number o f  cases that are not clustered in that comer, culminating in spot markets 
that develop at public piers that distinguish the sea urchin industry and beg further 
examination.
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Number of buyers sold to
Figure 4.2 The Proportion of Harvester’s Catch Sold to Primary  Buyer by the 
Number of Buyers Used
Rather than an instance of isomorphism, these nonexclusive relations depart from 
the form of exchange found in other inshore fisheries discussed. One explanation may be 
that exchange in this new fishery takes place under different circumstances. We have 
already seen that a considerable amount o f  indeterminacy exists in the exchange. Below 
I further examine the affects of opportunism and competition on exchange in the sea 
urchin industry.
Competition and the Pnhlic Pier
Perhaps the most noticeable difference between these nonexclusive relations in 
the sea urchin industry and the long-term relations discussed above is the extent of 
competition between dealers and the ability o f harvesters to obtain multiple bids on their 
catch. This is most apparent at a set o f spot markets that have developed at public piers
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
167
along the coast. Previously, local buyers held near monopoly status by controlling access 
to the waterfront As Wilson states, the private ownership o f offloading facilities by 
individual first buyers and the time involved with moving from wharf to wharf strongly 
discourages the possibility of harvesters soliciting multiple bids for their product 
(1980:493). At the spot markets fishermen easily obtain multiple bids for their product 
Below I examine the development o f the spot markets in the sea urchin industry at public 
fish piers.
Interestingly, the impetus for the public fish piers in Maine came in 1979 during 
the period of growth in the groundfish industry. As many others have observed, a period 
of growth followed the implementation of the 200-mile limit a part of the Fisheries 
Management Act and both Federal and State governments were optimistic about the 
development possibilities of the commercial fishing industries41. In Maine, Governor 
Joseph Brennan considered the fishing industries the cornerstone o f  the Maine’s 
economy. Primary among Brennan’s goals was maximizing the value added to fish 
products in Maine42. To reach the goals Brennan wanted to increase instate processing 
and establishing groundfish auctions in Maine. Establishing modem fish piers along the 
coast was a key part o f this initiative.
Funding for the piers came from a variety of sources. Brennan negotiated with 
representatives o f the Commerce Department, receiving $10 million for improvements to 
the commercial fishing industries. The Commerce Department allocated the money 
contingent on the passage of a $11.8 million bond issue accepted by Maine residents in a 
popular vote that year. The majority o f the funds went to the Portland Fish Pier, and the
41 See Dewar (1983) Dorienger, et aL (1986).
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State divided remaining funds between piers located in Kennebunkport, Rockland, Saco, 
Vinylhaven, Stonnington, and Eastport. The funding for the piers came from state and 
federal funds; the piers are built on public property owned by the local communities; and 
the management o f the piers varies from port to port with the local community taking 
primary responsibility for day to day operation.
The Portland Fish Pier went on to establish the Fish Exchange, a successful 
auction for groundfish. For other piers success did not come so easy, and their linking 
with the sea urchin industry developed through die coincidence of their mutual 
developments. When Brennan and the local communities planned the development o f the 
fish piers, they had the groundfish industry in mind; no one foresaw a sea urchin fishery. 
Surprisingly, the groundfish industry in Maine did not grow as some predicted, and the 
sea urchin industry became key to the pier’s success. Today the sea urchin industry is the 
primary activity at the Rockland and Stonnington piers from early fall through the winter, 
providing half of the pier’s revenues.
The paths crossed partly because o f the competitive strategies employed by 
entrepreneurs working in the processing sector of the sea urchin industry. First, the 
business group entrepreneurs’ competitive strategy included setting up buying stations in 
a variety o f areas along the coast. They often chose areas in order to be competitive in 
with other expansion-oriented entrepreneurs, resulting in a  concentration o f buyers in a 
local area. Often the business group entrepreneurs would establish relationships with 
established inshore buyers in these areas. However, as we saw in Chapter 1, the 
institutional pressures on these established inshore buyers often lead them to drop out of
42 Gov. Brennan outlined his goals for the future of Maine’s com m erc ia l fisheries in a speech given at die 
March, 1979 Maine Fishermen’s Forum.
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the sea urchin industry. This lead to turnover in the buying sector and raised the problem
of waterfront access for the business group entrepreneurs. At this time, the public fish
piers were struggling to stay above water. When Bret Storm took over management of a
mid-coast Fish Pier, it was all but closed:
The guy that had it before me, he paid the city $4,300 out of the 5 years he 
had i t  Basically, he closed the pier down. The month of October [1997], I 
paid the city five grand.
Storm was now paying the city as much in a month as the previous pier manager did in 
five years. He was able to turn the pier around in large part due to the revenue from the 
sea urchin industry.
Storm runs the pier as a business independent o f the city, paying the city a 
proportion of his total revenue each month as a lease. Revenue is collected on all 
products that cross over the pier. Lobsters gamer $.03 per pound, urchins $.05 per pound 
for instance. There were no sea urchins crossing the pier when Storm started to manage 
the pier. However, in 1992 he started a relationship with Jack Chan, a business group 
entrepreneur from Portland. Chan was looking for a buying station location in the mid­
coast region, and Storm saw some potential in the relationship. Preparing the pier for the 
sea urchin buyer took some investment in the infrastructure from Strom:
I started i t  I mean, I shouldn't take the credit for it. It would have started 
if  I'd been here or not, but I happened to see the potential in it and put in 
all the buildings, we needed the hoist, and loading docks... So, I put them 
all in.
Given the competitive strategies of the business group entrepreneurs, Storm was soon
flooded with dealers interested in working from the pier:
It turned very quickly. Each year we just added on another, another, and 
another. It was the first time I've ever been wined and dined. People 
would call you up from different companies and say, Can we have a 
meeting.
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Storm was not aware o f the competitive processes going on with the business group 
entrepreneurs, and the demand for spots on the pier surprised him. However, knowing 
these strategies it is not surprising that demand for a position on the pier increased so 
quickly. Perhaps it also is not surprising that the close competition between buyers 
became very heated. The early years at this mid-coast Fish Pier are popularly known as 
“The Urchin Wars”. Buyers competed fiercely for harvester’s daily catch first through 
price, and occasionally through violence and sabotage/3 The competition benefited 
harvesters, increasing the price paid for their catch.
With the concentration of buyers at the pier, and the rise in price due to the 
competition, the number of harvesters coming to the pier increased also. For this reason, 
the pier became the natural starting point for a new buyer wanting to break into the 
industry. When the transient entrepreneurs, employing the competitive strategy of 
traveling to coastal areas and offering cash for the product, began moving into the 
industry, the fish piers were an obvious place to start. The initial concentration o f buyers 
increased the concentration of harvesters and the potential for buying sea urchins on any 
given day. The transients were attracted to the public fish piers, and their presence 
further increased the density of competition.
The independent growth of the sea urchin industry, and the public investment in 
building fish piers coincided. This resulted in the spot markets in the sea urchin industry, 
and increased the ability of harvesters to obtain multiple bids on their product However, 
it might not be so easy to explain the frequent switching with the concentration of 
competition at the public piers, ha areas without public piers harvesters will go to
43 Many industry participants can share stories o f slashed tires and fist fights between rival buyers during 
this time.
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extreme lengths in order to solicit multiple bids on their catch. Harvesters will land their
catch and drive as far as an hour in search of what they consider a fair price. In
Washington County, harvesters will drive between Jonesport, Milbridge, and Winter
Harbor in order to get bids and compare dealer offers. Between driving to different
dealers, waiting for a bid, and then evaluating the multiple bids a  harvester can add three
to four hours to their day in the transaction process alone. These are exactly the
conditions that Wilson believed would limit competition between dealers in the
groundfish industry and the transaction specific investments Williamson discusses.
However, in the sea urchin industry many harvesters go to extreme lengths to receive
multiple bids on their product
The harvesters appear to take these extreme measures based on a general distrust
o f the dealers in the sea urchin industry. One harvester states this very strongly:
Whoever the man with the best price was the one who got the product.
They’re all thieves.. .The only thing slipperier than a fish is its dealer.
Yeah, they’re thieves. They’d figure in a wet weight versus a dry weight.
When they’d cull them out, they would knock off a lot o f  the ones that 
were healthy. When they’d measure up the roe count, they’d give you a 
lower percentage than what you should have. It’s just a scam. It’s a scam.
In contrast to the harvesters involved in long-term exclusive ties, there is little potential
for trusting a dealer among these harvesters. Looking for multiple bids is a way for these
harvesters to counter the exploitative strategies of the dealers:
I tried different places. If  I didn’t like the way they operated or I didn’t 
like them for whatever reason, I’d just go elsewhere. That’s always been 
the main thing, even to this day. You can try to get someone who’s 
somewhat legit and work with them until they prove you otherwise.
This harvester is being deliberately calculative in his exchange relations with dealers in 
contrast to the trust-based relations discussed previously. We can further see this distrust 
between harvesters and dealers when we look at opportunism in the exchange process.
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Sea Urchin Indnstrv Opportunism
Although the actual value of a harvester’s catch is uncertain, the exchange on the
fish pier is immediate and so the estimates o f value have immediate consequences for
both harvester and dealer. When harvester and dealer do not have a long-term trust based
relation the estimate o f  value becomes a struggle o f  interests, each trying to alter the
estimate in their favor. Harvesters want to get the highest price they can for their catch
while dealers want to pay as low a price as they can for the catch. One dealer, who
previously worked as a harvester, is open about this struggle:
When I was selling my urchins to other buyers, I’d crack them open and 
always pick out the best one, look how good these are. You know what I 
mean. You throw the bad ones. Now that I ’m a buyer, I’m cracking them 
open and covering up the real good ones.
At each exchange the harvester can maximizes his utility by attempting to increase the 
estimate o f quality, and the dealer can maximize utility by attempting to decrease the 
estimate o f quality. Harvesters use a number o f techniques to trick the dealers into 
overestimating the quality of their catch. The most common strategy is “salting”, 
“sugaring”, or “floating” fish trays. During a typical fishing day, a harvester collects sea 
urchins of varying quality. Harvesters will do a crack test themselves on the boat before 
coming into the pier and estimate the quality o f the sea urchins themselves. After 
reaching some conclusions about the quality, many harvesters will sort their catch in 
order to trick the dealers. Salting involves lining the bottom of a fish tray with lower 
quality urchins and putting a higher quality on top. I f  the dealer samples only the top of 
the trays, the harvester will get a much higher estimate for the catch.
Clearly, a dealer only needs to be tricked once in order to know that harvesters 
may attempt to pass salted trays. Consequently, many dealers will flip a full fish tray into
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an empty and check the quality o f urchins on the bottom layer. Perhaps predictable but 
surprising in its guile, harvesters will try to pass “peanut butter sandwiches” also. 
Knowing the dealer may check the bottom layer of the tray, harvesters will use three 
layers: good product on the top and bottom, and low quality product in the middle. 
Although the latter method is extreme, doctoring of trays by harvesters in order to 
increase the quality estimate is prevalent. The time invested in this process cannot be 
underestimated either. Doctoring trays can take considerable time for the harvester while 
headed into the pier. Once at the pier, the testing process itself takes time. Having to 
look for doctored trays of any kind adds effort for the dealer and time waiting for the 
harvester. Harvesters collect from ten to twenty trays a day each weighing from 60 to 75 
pounds. Having to scrutinize some or all o f these trays can add considerable time to the 
testing process:
You have to wait a half hour to get in there, cause they got 5 more boats 
they got to unload before you. Takes an hour to get everybody to look at 
your eggs. Then it will take at least another hour to get out.
Even at the public fish pier, where dealers cluster, getting multiple bids can add over two
hours to the day devoted to the transaction process.
For the buyers, overestimating can mean a considerable loss. In order to decrease
the chances of paying more than the value o f the catch, buyers often set base prices below
their estimates of market value. A lower base price acts to balance the likely
overestimate o f catch quality. These dealers had a day where they consistently
overestimated the quality of harvesters’ catches:
We’ve been buying what was supposed to go 14% and over 70 % grade A 
color, and it’s not. So, we’ve just made a big loss because we paid the 
highest price for that, and then it’s n o t So, we can’t send it to the 
processor. And we have a low market return for it. Basically, we lose 
money.
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After talking with their Japanese customer, this dealer decided to set a base price below 
the estimated market value in order to compensate for the loss and other overestimates. 
They spent time evaluating their estimating methods to try to avoid the problem in the 
future, and the low base price helps further create a cushion of safety for the dealer.
Looking back at the relations between harvesters and dealers in the lobster and 
groundfish industries, these relations in the sea urchin industry are unusual. The buyers 
and sellers have similar interests as those in other fisheries: harvesters are looking for a 
fair price for their catch buyers are looking for a steady supply of quality product.
Without the institutionalization of long-term exclusive exchange relationships exchange 
in the sea urchin industry is open to opportunistic behaviors. Each party to the exchange 
tries to take advantage of the other in order to maximize their utility. The opportunistic 
behavior on both parts leads to large time expenditures for both, and frequently one of the 
parties loses out to the guile of the other.
Calculated Non-Cooperation
Why don’t these harvesters and dealers cooperate? Curiously, the calculative 
motives not found in the long-term relations guide these exchange relationships. The 
exchange is still fraught with indeterminacy as discussed earlier. Simon (1982,1976) 
proposes that actors attempt to make rational decisions, although indeterminacy limits 
their ability.44 It is just this point at which non-market institutions form, according to 
TCE. However, in these non-exclusive relations the calculating motivations persist This 
makes it possible to consider the bargaining process using the game theoretic models 
associated with the evolution of cooperation argument discussed above. Figure 43
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
175
models the exchange process described above. In this model I attempt to map the 
recurrent exchange relationship, so one option is to regularly cooperate without using 
guile and the other to regular non-cooperation with guile. The payoff matrix is the same 
as we saw in Figure 4.1. Here regular cooperation can occur in the ‘T it for Tat” form. 
However, if one party’s regular cooperation can be assured, the other party’s best interest 






Figure 43  Prisoner’s Dilemma Model of Bargaining Process under Repeated 
____________ Exchange____________________________________________________
It appears that many o f the harvesters and dealers in the sea urchin industry are 
unable to develop the trust required for cooperation. Instead, they find themselves 
constantly calculating, unable to be assured of the other’s fair play. In effect, their 
motives follow a Prisoner’s Dilemma game and they choose a strategy that does not 
result in the highest utility, but is the best strategy given the circumstances. It is 
important to recall that there is still a considerable indeterminacy in this exchange. The 
actual value of the catch is not within the reach o f either harvester or dealer. Just as the 
formation of long-term ties can be seen as an adjustment to the problem of
44 Simon calls this satisficing or bounded-rationality. See Elster (1989a:35-6) for a discussion of this 
mechanism.
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indeterminacy, the calculated non-cooperation involved here is also an adjustment to the 
indeterminacy.
There is a problem with the interpretation above, however. Figure 4.3 does not 
take into consideration the transaction costs or benefits o f reciprocity that form an 
important part o f our analysis so far. Figure 4.4 attempts to include transaction costs and 
the benefits of reciprocity in the model o f the bargaining process. Here there are “extra” 
benefits to being part o f  a long-term trust based relationship. We have seen these in the 
discussion of the lobster, groundfish, and some relations in the sea urchin industry. In 
addition, there are costs, or transaction specific investments, to guarding against non­
cooperation- The model in Figure 4.4 follows what game theorists call an Assurance 
game. Unlike the Prisoner’s Dilemma cooperation should not be difficult to achieve 
given that there are no increased benefits from non-cooperation. If  each player is sure of 





Figure 4.4 The Bargaining Process with Transaction Costs under Repeated 
____________ Exchange____________________________________________________
The outcomes o f  exchange in the sea urchin industry are fraught with 
indeterminacy. One outcome of the indeterminacy may be the formation o f non-market 
institutions in order to facilitate exchange. In these non-exclusive exchange relations, it
H arvester
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appears that, under indeterminate conditions, harvesters and dealers have attempted to 
make rational decisions in the bargaining process.45 Fignre 4 3  provides one possible 
model for that bargaining process and this model can explain the pervasive distrust and 
guile found in these exchange relations. However, if  Fignre 4.4 accurately models the 
exchange, by including the benefits o f  reciprocity and the costs o f transaction specific 
investments, the pervasive distrust and guile no longer can be explained as a result of the 
bargaining  process. Even when it would benefit both parties, the distrust between 
harvesters and dealers keeps them from following a mutually preferred strategy. Below I 
consider the social origins of this distrust.
The Dissolution of Trust
Following TCE, we would expect some non-market institutions, like those in 
other fisheries, to form in the sea urchin industry. Many actors in the sea urchin industry 
appear to approach their exchange in a constantly calculating manner instead. Even 
under this calculative bargaining it seems likely that some form o f calculated cooperation 
would develop. However, the spot markets and frequent switching o f transaction partners 
in the sea urchin industry persist. The existence and persistence o f this form o f exchange 
rife with deceit and guile seems particularly unusual given the important role of trust in 
production on the working waterfront. Below I examine the dissolution of trust in the sea 
urchin industry and the impediments to producing trust based exchange relations. This 
analysis takes a step away from the economic approach considered above and toward 
sociological approaches to studying trust. The sociological approach considers social 
factors paramount to the establishment and maintenance o f trust.
45 Elster (1989b:36) suggests that one reaction to indeterminate situations may be to deny indeterminacy
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Zucker described two informal forms of trust in her study o f the US economic 
structure from 1840 to 1920 - process based trust, and characteristic based trust (1986:60- 
1). Process based trust is tied to a record of prior exchange or future expectations. 
Typically, it is tied to specific persons, such as a reputation. Characteristic based trust is 
based on social similarity assumed to accompany social characteristics, such as ethnicity. 
Here persons assume that those with similar characteristics share similar background 
expectations that smooth negotiations. Similar to the period 1840-1920 in the US, 
process based trust on the working waterfront was disrupted by the introduction of the sea 
urchin industry and was not reestablished in this industry. Trust was disrupted by the 
introduction of cultural heterogeneity, early violations o f trust that have become part of 
the industry lore, and the instability of dealers and processing firms.
The Disruption o f Trust
In previous chapters we have seen how the trust found on the working waterfront 
provided the flexible adaptation o f labor to the new fishery, and enabled entrepreneurs to 
mobilize labor when initiating their ties with Japanese customers. The trust found on the 
working waterfront has both process and characteristic based qualities. It is hard to 
distinguish the economic and community relationships on the waterfront. Exchanges take 
place between kin, between families that have worked together for years, and between 
friends and neighbors. These relations are based on process, as well as shared beliefs and 
expectations from fellow community members. The traditional entrepreneurs and 
harvesters on the working waterfront held these trust-based relations and used them to 
start the sea urchin fishery easily. The development o f  the sea urchin industry attracted
and attempt to act purely rational based on insufficient information.
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the business group entrepreneurs, transient entrepreneurs, young fishermen, and non- 
traditional fishermen to the industry. The increased participation from outside the 
waterfront led to a culturally heterogeneous industry. The entry of new participants to 
the industry disrupted the process-based relations that already existed on the waterfront.
A characteristic based trust might help to reestablish trust by signaling shared background 
expectations among economic actors, but the cultural heterogeneity of the sea urchin 
industry did not signal those shared expectations.
The industry grew rapidly, new entrepreneurs and harvesters moved into the 
industry and many established harvesters and entrepreneurs dropped out. The trust that 
initially allowed cooperative relations to develop easily was disrupted, and three factors 
acted to impede the reestablishment of trust in the sea urchin industry: the lore o f  
distrustful dealers, the ethnic difference o f the transient entrepreneurs, and the regular 
turnover in the dealer sector.
The Lore o f Distrustful Dealers
Rather than a reputation for operating with the trust characteristic of many
waterfront relationships, the new entrepreneurs quickly developed a reputation for talcing
advantage o f harvesters. Most harvesters can relate a story from their own experience, or
the experience o f a harvester they know well, about an early dealer cheating them. In the
stories, dealers took advantage of harvesters by withholding market information, or took
advantage o f the consignment exchange prevalent at the time. Take this example o f  an
out o f state entrepreneur coming to a port to buy sea urchins:
He come to town shortly thereafter and moved over to this wharf next 
door here, when there was nothing really going on. They come into the 
wharf, and they was offering 15,20 cents a pound. He’d fill 2 tractor 
trailer loads right to the back doors for 15,20, 25 cents a pound and go
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with them. He’d take them down to Portland or straight down to New 
York, they’d crack them, and they was making a gold mine.
This is a common story about the low prices that dealers offered in the early years. There
was never a market for sea urchins before this, so harvesters were satisfied to get fifteen
cents a pound. As the industry developed prices rose to SI.00/pound and higher.
Looking back, the harvesters believe they were taken for a ride. Similarly, in these early
days harvesters would often exchange their catch on consignment. In a consignment
exchange harvesters give their catch over to the dealer before receiving an offer. The
dealer evaluates the value o f the catch at a later time and pays the harvester accordingly.
Wilson (1980) has pointed out that the consignment relationship provides and advantage
to the dealer since the harvester has to give up possession of the catch, and is not present
at the time of evaluation. According to harvesters, the dealers took advantage of these
consignment relations:
It was easier for processors to, if they made a mistake this week and lost 
some money it seemed like it was kind o f easy for them to make it up next 
week on you or someone else. It was pretty much, when you put them on 
the truck and they left your sight, you had no idea if  you were gonna get 
paid for them, if you weren’t gonna get paid for them. All you would get 
was a verbal response from who you sold them too saying, well, those 
were no good and they were rejected.
For the first 2 years you had no idea whether you were gonna make money 
until you actually got the check in your hand. No, not even, the check in 
hand. Until you actually cashed that check at his bank, so they wouldn’t 
take it out of your checking account i f  it bounced. For the first 2 years I’d 
say, I was never sure of my money until it was cash in my hand. And the 
other times, knowing checks were gonna bounce and trying to beat the call 
to his bank to get whatever money was in there. That happened to a lot of 
people.
Although a few o f the early dealers garnered this reputation, many o f the stories involve 
Nicholas Cummings, “The Urchin King.” Cummings, and his reputation for getting rich 
by cheating harvesters is an important part o f  the lore of the industry:
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A friend of mine took our urchins to someone called the “Urchin King” 
and we got it in just ahead o f  a blizzard. We got a call that night, while 
the blizzard was going on. “They were junk and you can come and get 
them if  you want” You know right there in the blizzard was going on. So, 
we didn’t get anything for them. He said, “Well I’ll just throw them 
back.” But, we didn’t know, and he knew we were pretty new. So, he got 
over 1000 pounds for nothing.
Nicholas was Darth Vader they called him. They hated him. My son 
worked for him. He has on his wall, to this day, all the bad checks that 
Nicholas stuck on him. But he controlled the Portland waterfront, 
basically, for urchins, so he had to deal with him.
These stories involve the early dealers taking advantage of harvesters who either had no 
choice in the matter, or did not know better at the time. It is not necessarily important 
whether these stories involving Cum m ings and the early dealers are true. What is 
important is that they are part of every harvester’s memory o f the early days of the 
industry. The memory of these experiences, either lived or lore, persist and contribute to 
the belief that trusting dealers is akin to being cheated.
Ethnic Differences o f Transient Dealers
Further contributing to the difficulty of reestablishing trust in the industry is the
ethnicity o f many of the new transient entrepreneurs. Rather than signal a similarity
associated with shared background expectations, these Cambodian and Vietnamese
entrepreneurs make trust difficult. Although there are a number o f small Cambodian and
Vietnamese dealers that travel to waterfront ports along the coast, harvesters appear to
consider them as a single group; often referred to as the Cambodians:
Mostly now, it’s just the Cambodians. I don’t like the Cambodians.
They’re on the pier, it’s mostly Cambodians.
Like with the Cambodians, you come in one day with good urchins, he’ll 
be right down aboard your boat the next day. The Cambodians offered a 
buck-fifteen.
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The Cambodian and Vietnamese dealers are clearly different in look and speech. It
appears that harvesters assume a similarity among these transient buyers, and a difference
between the Cambodians and themselves:
We got to watch them down at the pier the other day. They were sitting 
there fishing, catching these little harbor balls. They was right in heaven.
They was filling up a bucket, “oh very good, oh yeah, yeah.” They eat 
anything.
This cultural distance, and the heterogeneity of the industry leads to in many cases a 
wariness, and in some cases hatred. As one harvester said, “They are Gooks, and I can 
call them that because I was in Vietnam.” When the transient dealers came to the piers to 
buy sea urchins they were initially turned away. No harvester was willing to take a  check 
from them. They soon adapted a strategy of paying in cash, and paying high prices for 
the urchins in order to break into the business.46 hi many cases, the aggressive strategy o f 
the transient buyers led to the auction like exchange at the public fish piers.
Turnover in the Dealer Sector
Further impeding the reestablishment of process based trust in the sea urchin 
industry is the instability o f firms in the processing sector. Looking back at Table 1.1 
shows the amount of turnover in the industry from year to year in this sector. In Chapter 
2, we saw that much o f this turnover resulted from the increased density of competition in 
the processing sector. With regular turnover in this sector, it is difficult for trust based on 
past and future exchanges to develop.
46 Paying in cash is like retreating to an institutional form of trust, as described by Zucker (1986). Cash 
currency does not rely on process or characteristic. Instead, the trust in cash is tied to the state’s 
enforcement
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Using Floral Forms o f Exchange
The two forms o f exchange described so far, relations based on trust and relations 
coordinated by price and self-interest with guile, might seem mutually exclusive 
exchange options. However, many harvesters and dealers manage to use both forms of 
exchange strategically in their economic relationships. Let’s look back at the logbook 
data, to examine this possibility further. In Table 4.1, Row 2 under Nonexclusive 
Harvesters shows that at least 25% o f these nonexclusive harvesters sold 81% or more of 
their catch to primarily one dealer. Fignre 4.4 graphically looks at the proportion sold to 
primary dealer variable for nonexclusive harvesters. This variable appears to have a 
bimodal distribution. There is a strong peak at around 50% of catch sold to a primary 
dealer, and a weaker peak around the third quartile. The first peak represents those 
harvesters described above who switch often. Around the second peak are harvesters 
who switch less frequently. These harvesters appear to use long-term ties and the market, 
both trust and price, to coordinate their exchanges in the sea urchin industry. Rather than 
either trust or distrust, these harvesters use a plural form to coordinate their exchange.
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Plural forms are exchange strategies employed by economic actors that combine 
two or more organizational forms simultaneously (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Bradach, 
1998). Rather than choose one form of organizing exchange (long-term ties and trust or 
the market and price) often times actors will combine both forms in unique ways given 
particular circumstances. Examining plural forms requires a step back from micro-level 
examination of transactions to examine the larger structure o f transactions. Along with 
the social context o f a single transaction, examining plural forms also considers the 
transactional context—how sets of transactions can influence the individual transaction 
(Bradach and Eccles, 1989:116); how the forms o f coordinating exchange can overlap or 
become intertwined.
Perhaps a dealer who develops long-term relations with harvesters demonstrates 
the clearest example o f using plural forms in the sea urchin industry. Thompson, who
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works in the whole-live market, holds a number of long-term exclusive relations with 
harvesters like the ones we saw above. However, around Japanese holidays when the 
demand for sea urchins grows Thompson will supplement the catch from his regular 
harvesters by buying urchins on the market at the public pier. This simple strategy points 
to the importance of considering the plural form. There are clear advantages in the long­
term ties for assuring steady supply and high quality. However, when the demand 
exceeds the capability of the long-term harvesters, the spot markets are an obvious 
solution to the problem. Not all plural forms are this straightforward, however, 
particularly when competitive strategies are introduced.
Some plural forms include a more subtle combination of long-term ties and 
markets in transactions. For instance, many harvesters utilizes a plural form in which 
they form long-term ties with a dealer for the advantages gained as describe in previous 
sections. However, these harvesters will maintain sporadic relations with one to three 
other dealers throughout the season:
Well, we stay pretty much with one guy, and we always have another, you 
know, every once in a while we take them over to someone else, just so 
we don’t bum all the bridges. Cause you never know.
One reason for using this form is to adapt to the volatility of the dealing sector. If a 
harvester’s primary dealer drops from the industry, the harvester has other dealers he has 
worked with in the past, even if sporadically. This form also allows a harvester to check 
on the prices offered by other dealers; to be sure his primary dealer is not taking 
advantage of his loyalty. Some of these harvesters, during high demand times, might 
attempt to have their product bid upon at the piers.
The relation with the primary dealer in these cases resembles that o f the long-term 
ties discussed in an earlier section. Harvesters often are paid once a week rather than on
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the spot, and they do not try to trick their primary dealer in the evaluation o f  quality, hi 
return, they receive a steady buyer for their product, even in slow times, and in some 
cases, they get other reciprocitive benefits for their long-term com m itment. However, the 
trust is laced with distrust as well. One o f  the advantages of the long-term relationship 
for the dealer is not having a regular supply from the harvester and not having to compete 
for that supply. When the harvester sporadically uses other dealers, they are doing this 
behind the back of their primary dealer who would rather they stay committed. This 
combination of trust and distrust is clear when the harvester uses the secondary dealers to 
check on the price of his primary dealer. However, this monitoring does not lead to the 
deterioration of the relationship. Instead, the harvesters typically m aintain the long-term 
tie and indirectly let the dealer know that his prices are not competitive. If the dealer 
moves to raise his price, harvesters see this as a sign of the trust, rather than proof of 
previous opportunism.
Plural forms are evident again when harvesters and dealers work within the 
different sea urchin markets, the whole/live or the processed market. As was discussed in 
Chapter 2, each market occupies a different fundamental niche. The whole/live market 
serves and elite customer and requires a higher quality sea urchin that typically receives a 
higher price per pound for the harvester. The processed market serves a mass retail 
market that does not require the high quality product and typically receives a lower per 
pound price for the harvester. The entrepreneurs in these different niches are not 
competing for the same demand, but there is niche overlap in securing supply. Many 
harvesters will work in both markets using a plural form strategy.
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Harvesters working in the whole/live market maintain long-term trust based
relations with a dealer. However, at times many will harvest a lower quality product
headed for the processed market Rather than coordinating these exchanges with trust,
they exchange product at the market coordinated by price. This plural form is closely
linked with fishing strategies. Harvesters in the whole/live market fish for high quality
sea urchins on a regular basis, which requires looking for particular fishing grounds and
using particular harvesting techniques. Harvesters often make the decision to fish for
quality before leaving the harbor, when they choses fishing grounds. At times, the
weather may limit access to some fishing grounds, or the harvester may stumble on a
large bed o f urchins not quite high enough in quality for the whole/live market. In these
cases, the harvester decides to fish for the processed market, such as this diver who
normally works in the whole/live market:
We sold a couple o f back loads to the Urchin King, Nicholas Cummings.
He was notorious for buying anything. We gave him some garbage. It was 
more like, we’re gonna sell to Cummings today. I know there’s a bunch 
of them over here. Let’s just go get a lot o f them.
The fishermen harvest a slightly lower quality sea urchin, and may emphasize quantity in 
order to make up for the lower price paid for the product Sometimes the harvester 
decides to fish for the processed market because o f  the higher prices being paid on the 
pier, taking the chance that selling a high quantity o f lower quality at the pier will have a 
bigger payoff than the steady whole/live dealer.
While the whole/live dealer would rather have the harvester fishing for his market 
everyday, the harvester typically does not have to go behind the back of the dealer to sell 
to the processed market. The processor is not directly competing with the whole/live 
dealer in the Japanese market, and the whole/live dealer is not interested in the lower
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quality product The dealer does not mind the occasional switching as long as he can 
normally count on the steady supply from the harvester.
Troubles with Trust
A social scientist considering potential exchange relationships in the sea urchin industry 
might predict long-term exclusive relations would dominate the industry, and that trust 
and reciprocity would characterize those relations. Other inshore fisheries employ these 
long-term relations in their dealings and inshore harvesters and dealers move into new 
fisheries often. Institutional theory would expect these participants to carry 
organizational strategies with them into the new industry. The shared problems o f 
exchange—indeterminacy and recurrent exchange leading to transaction specific costs— 
predict a similarity o f organizational form also.
Although some harvesters and dealers have developed exclusive exchange 
relationships that are long-term and reciprocitive, a set o f exchange relations quite 
different dominate the industry. Many harvesters and dealers coordinate exchange solely 
through the market and price mechanism attempting to maximize their utility at each 
transaction without concern for future transactions. The spot markets in the sea urchin 
industry, unique among inshore fisheries, evolved from the particular institutional 
development of this new fishery. The introduction of new actors from outside the 
working waterfront disrupted the process-based trust that characterized traditional forms 
of exchange. Rather than reestablish that trust, even under economic conditions that 
might favor that reestablishment, a distrust and opportunism came to motivate exchange 
relations.
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The importance o f the dissolution of process-based trust and the obstacles to 
reestablishing it should not be underestimated. For the dealer, having a set of exclusive 
long-term harvesters reduces and perhaps eliminates the possibility for competition. In 
addition, some harvesters show no interest in taking part o f the auction-like atmosphere 
that occurs at the public piers. However, the piers rely on a group o f dissatisfied 
harvesters unwilling to commit to one dealer. Similarly, the harvesters and dealers that 
balance strategies o f long-term and market exchange rely on the existence of those 
markets. Without the persistence of those markets, the plural form strategies would not 
be possible.
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Ch a p t e r  5  
S o c ia l  D ile m m a s
In  1982, P r o fesso r  Law rence  H a r r is  a t  t h e  Un iv er sity  o f  N ew  H a m psh ire  
encouraged local fishermen in New Hampshire and Maine to consider harvesting sea 
urchins. Sea urchin populations were growing in size and density, and threatened coastal 
ecosystems. Ten years later industry participants were calling for the state to impose 
harvesting restrictions. The sea urchin fishery had become one o f the most valuable in 
the region, and many believed it was already harvested to the point o f  collapse. The 
decline of natural resources, ocean resources in particular, has become one of the late 
twentieth century’s most pressing problems.
Figure 5.1 shows a dramatic increase in US East Coast sea urchin landings 
followed by a decline after 1993. Perhaps the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry is 
another case o f the boom and bust syndrome of natural resource dependent 
communities.47 This syndrome follows a set o f steps where first a few pioneers 
demonstrate the economic viability o f the resource, followed by an influx o f capital and 
labor that increase extraction exponentially. At some point the resource reaches a limit at 
which it yields less and less to the extraction pressures. At this point, the costs of 
harvesting begin to exceed the value o f the resource and extraction begins to fall off 
quickly. Freudenberg (1992) calls this the cost/price squeeze. Fisheries are renewable
47 See McEvoy (1986:6) and McGoodwin (1990:65-88) for discussions of this syndrome, and the steps that 
production follows under these circumstances. See also Acheson and McCay (1988).
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resources and receive somewhat more dire prediction from some analysts. Renewable 
resources are able to sustain some extraction and replenish resources naturally through 
reproduction. With renewable resources, extraction can increase to a point known as the 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY from here). Passing the MSY can dramatically 








Figure 5.1 Changes in Northwest Atlantic Sea Urchin r-anrfingc (MT).
1995
The most well known explanation for the boom and bust syndrome described 
above is popularly called the Tragedy o f the Commons. This explanation considers the 
boom and eventual bust the result o f the social dilemmas surrounding a common property 
resource. The explanation begins with the assumption that without limitations on access 
exploiters find it in their best interest to extract a resource quickly and completely before
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someone else reaps the economic benefits from extraction.4* The irony of these actions 
lies in the collective consequence of these individually rational actions. When individual 
actors act rationally, the collective consequence is worse for all involved.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the tragedy o f the commons thesis has been 
challenged based on the empirical research o f social scientists examining fisheries from 
an institutional perspective. This research has found that the absence of private property 
and open access are not synonymous. The openness o f a public resource is variable from 
case to case, and more often than not some participants are excluded or limited from 
production through formal and informal means. Social institutions can solve the social 
dilemma of a common resource through limitation and control of extraction.
If problems with the tragedy of the commons explanation exist, what alternative 
explanation is there for the dramatic rise and development of the Northwest Atlantic sea 
urchin industry? The social researcher must explain why this outcome developed rather 
than some alternative outcome. I believe my analysis of the sea urchin industry and those 
processes found between supply and demand provides some insights to these questions.
In this chapter, I discuss the influence of the particular entrepreneurial, labor and 
exchange processes on the extraction of resources, and the reaction to resource 
depletions. First, I look again to the coastal ecology the sea urchin is a part of, and 
address the resource declines, which scientists, state managers, and industry participants 
predominately acknowledged. Following this, I discuss how the processes examined in 
previous chapters provide some insight into how the industry came to resemble the boom
48 See Hardin (1965). For a discussion of this explanation and problems with it from an anthropological 
perspective see McCay and Aches on (1988) and McGoodwin (1990:89-96). I have already discussed this 
issue in Chapter 3.
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and bust scenario described above. Finally, I consider the likelihood o f participants being 
able to overcome the obstacles to solving this social dilemma.
Sea Urchin Resource Declines
The coastal ecological zone is not a static community, and it seems that extreme high or 
low densities o f sea urchin populations can have a significant affect on the ecosystem.49 
Sea urchins are found in shallow inter-tidal pools or in depths as great as 80 to 90 feet. 
They are most common in the shallow sub tidal zone under 30’ on rocky, gravely or shelly 
bottoms. As urchin populations grow, they tend to wipe out regions quickly. The speed 
and efficiency of this process has even been termed an “outbreak” o f sea urchins.50 The 
urchins form feeding fronts, or feeding lines, that can decimate an area by cleaning the 
ocean bottom. After clearing an area, large populations of urchins cover the ocean floor 
assuring no other coastal life returns. Harvesters and scientists alike call these areas “the 
urchin barrens”.
Decreases in sea urchin populations can change the coastal ecology dramatically 
as well. Sea urchins are the largest and deepest grazing herbivores in this coastal region. 
Consequently, they have the largest affect on macroalgea (kelp) growth. Decreases in 
urchins allow kelp beds to grow more freely. An urchin die off in the Caribbean has led 
to increased kelp growth that is responsible for the destruction of coral reefs in the region. 
Along the Maine coast the increases in kelp beds has created more shelter for lobsters, 
and possibly more protection for lobsters from predators.
49 See Steneck (1996) for an interesting review of die interdependent web of marine ecosystems and the 
effects of changes in that web.
50 In Harris (1994).
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Sea urchin populations change based primarily on the presence o f predators,
natural and human. Marine biologists working in the G ulf o f  Maine have long been
aware o f this. For many years, sea urchin populations in the Gulf o f Maine were able to
grow without check. Steneck (1996) finds that the decline o f  natural predators for the sea
urchin, and the lack o f  a commercial fishery led to the growth in size and density of sea
urchin populations in the Gulf o f Maine.51
The introduction o f a commercial fishery reversed this process, leading to the
decline in sea urchin populations. Biologists have found evidence for these declines
through the long-term study of coastal research areas (Steneck, 1996). The tremendous
growth o f kelp beds along the coast, without the impact o f  large urchin populations, is
further evidence o f this decline.
Evidence for the decline of sea urchin populations comes from declining catch
size and increased fishing effort in the industry, also. The DMR collects data from
harvesters on effort and catch size on a regular basis. They have found regular increases
in the effort expended for a smaller catch size.52 The harvesters that have been working
in the industry since its early days have seen the resource declines and experienced
increased effort first hand:
What happened was, back in the 80’s, like ’85 I was getting myself 45,50 
trays a day. Then the next year it dropped down to 40 trays, then 35, then 
25, then 20,15, now we’re down to 10 on a good day. An average day 
now is about 7 trays.
51 Diseases have also checked sea urch in  populations. Large die offs have occured in Nova Scotia and in 
the Caribbean.
52 Margaret Hunter and Ted Creaser, personal communication.
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When the industry first started harvesters could bring in a large catch with little effort In
some cases, harvesters literally shoveled sea urchins into their boats. Today those areas
have fewer or no sea urchins left.
We used to get, Christ, 60,100 boxes. Sometimes we’d go out twice, go 
out and load up, come in and unload it, go back out again. When we first 
started, the places that had the most urchins still have urchins now. But 
there were places when we first started that you could clean out in one 
day. Those places don’t have any urchins now.
Where once there were few predators, sea urchin populations began to feel the brunt of 
commercial fishing. Perhaps it is unsurprising that the introduction of harvesting would 
cause sea urchin populations to decline some. However, biologists, state managers, and 
harvesters alike express doubts about the sustainability o f the current level of extraction. 
Below I look at how the economic processes discussed in previous chapters contributed 
to the increased level o f harvesting.
Economic Processes and Resource Declines
At first, it might seem that the flexible production strategies discussed in Chapter 3 might 
have led to the over-harvesting of the sea urchin resource. This may be a hasty 
conclusion. The institutional arrangements of the working waterfront undoubtedly 
contributed to the ease in initiating this new fishery. However, institutional arrangements 
such as these are more likely to control access and production, and solve commons 
dilemmas. Instead, two other elements of the industry’s development appear to create a 
dilemma similar to Hardin’s tragedy. First, the social construction of open access left the 
sea urchin resources open to all interested. Second, the way in which outsiders came to 
the waterfront context and took advantage of the waterfront institutions. Below, I look 
first at the social construction o f open access. Following this, I summarize the flexible
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
196
production arrangements o f the waterfront, and how outsiders to the industry took 
advantage o f these institutions to move into the new industry.
The Social Copstniction o f Open Access
The lack of formal and informal barriers to access of the sea urchin resource 
allowed extraction to proceed unchecked. Neither the State, nor the local communal 
arrangements surrounding the waterfront limited access to this new resource. The State 
of Maine and the DMR were primarily responsible for the formal management of the 
resource. They did not impose any restrictions on access for two reasons. First, there 
was no precedent for this kind of limitation, and no leadership was prepared to set a 
precedent with this fishery. Second, at that time the State, from the Governor to DMR 
was primarily concerned with developing ocean resources, particularly underutilized 
species.
Although local inshore fisheries, particularly the lobster fishery, have a reputation 
for being territorial, informal barriers to access did not develop either. There are 
primarily two reasons for the lack of informal limitations on access. First, the territorial 
actions of harvesters are species-specific. Not being harvested previously, no harvesters 
laid claim to this species. Second, the new fishery had a number of unusual qualities that 
discouraged already established harvesters from taking an interest. Most notably, many 
established harvesters considered the sea urchin a trash fish, and it required a new 
technology, SCUBA diving, for harvesting.
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Flexibility and Resource Extraction
Open access alone is not enough to explain the initiation and growth of the 
industry. The flexible production arrangements o f the working waterfront form an 
important part o f the explanation. Particularly, these arrangements allowed new entrants 
to inshore fishing to work in this fishery quickly and easily. Two aspects of the working 
waterfront contributed to the quick growth of the sea urchin industry: the already existing 
technical and social infrastructure. Below I look more closely at each.
Technical Flexibility
The sea urchin industry was able to develop quickly because o f  the already 
existing technical infrastructure o f the working waterfront. This includes a fleet of 
fishing boats outfitted with fishing gear, and the many wharves, building and roads on the 
coast devoted to commercial fishing industries. An important quality o f  that 
infrastructure is its flexibility. This is particularly important concerning inshore fishing 
boats and gear. The inshore fishing boat is uniquely suited to adapt to the uncertain 
movements of marine populations, and suited for harvesting a variety o f  different marine 
species. In the early years of the industry, harvesters using boats in a variety of other 
fisheries switched to the sea urchin fishery.
Similarly, harvesters easily adapt fishing gear for different purposes. This may 
include changes that improve fishing in a particular fishery, or changes that allow 
harvesting of a different marine species. In the early years o f the sea urchin industry, 
harvesters adapted their dragging gear from use in the scallop or oyster fishery to work in 
the sea urchin fishery. The Northwest Atlantic sea urchin fishery is the only sea urchin 
fishery to use the dragging technology.
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Social Flexibility
The already existing social infrastructure of the waterfront allowed the quick 
movement o f dealers and harvesters into the sea urchin fishery. Inshore harvesters make 
and break collaborative relations easily, hi establishing the sea urchin fishery, the 
collaborations between inshore boat owners and SCUBA divers were particularly 
important Individually, neither would be able to work in the sea urchin fishery. 
However, cooperation brought the two technologies together and allowed for work in the 
new industry. This type o f cooperation is common on the waterfront, and the ease with 
which it is accomplished led to the speedy increase of resource extraction.
An important aspect of these relations is their open quality. Harvesters already 
embedded in the waterfront context did not limit their collaborations to other established 
harvesters. Instead, these collaborations allowed new entrants to enter the productive 
context o f the working waterfront to begin harvesting sea urchins quickly. This was 
particularly important in the sea urchin fishery that utilizes the SCUBA technology. 
SCUBA was not already a part o f  the inshore fisheries, but it was able to become a part 
of the waterfront through collaborations between established harvesters, and new 
harvesters. This open quality is an important part of the industry adaptation and growth.
This process of flexibility and openness is also clear when we look at the 
entrepreneurial process, comparing the traditional entrepreneurs with new entrepreneurs. 
New entrepreneurs found it difficult to mobilize labor to harvest sea urchins, while 
traditional entrepreneurs mobilized harvesters quickly and easily. The difference lies in 
the long-term collaborative relations that exist between traditional entrepreneurs and 
harvesters. Moving into a new industry includes taking some risks, and long-term
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relations based on reciprocity and trust have advantages when taking such risks. 
Traditional entrepreneurs were able to mobilize harvesters quickly and easily in the new 
industry. As the industry developed, the new entrepreneurs turned to these local dealers 
in order to get started in the new industry.
Processing and Expansion Orientations
The new harvesters and entrepreneurs were not committed to other pursuits on the 
waterfront, and they developed their own economic strategies in the industry. For 
instance, many harvesters attempted to work year round, without balancing the sea urchin 
with other fisheries. Perhaps more important, the new entrepreneurs adopted an 
orientation towards expansion that lead them to integrate the processing activities o f the 
industry. Processing required an increase in size and scope o f harvesting networks, and 
led to increased pressure on the sea urchin resource. A fierce competition developed 
among processors as they grew, also resulting in increased pressure on the resource.
Solving Social Dilemmas
Looking back at Figure 5.1 shows that sea urchin landings on the East Cost of the US 
have declined after 1993. Certainly, part of this decline is due to the over-harvesting that 
occurred in the industry. Other factors have contributed to this decline in landing as well. 
First, the State of Maine and the DMR began to limit harvesting in the fishery beginning 
in 1994. Second, a type of cost/price squeeze as described by Freudenburg (1992) has 
occurred in the industry. Adapting to these changes, and controlling over-harvesting are 
social dilemmas, and only the future will tell if the sea urchin industry will solve these 
dilemmas. Below I look first at the State limitations on harvesting and the cost/price
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squeeze in the industry more closely. To conclude, I consider the ability o f the industry 
to adapt to these changes and solve the problem of over-harvesting given the analysis of 
previous chapters.
State Management Actions
Before 1993, DMR did not pay particular attention to the sea urchin fishery. 
Anyone could obtain a commercial fishing license and harvest sea urchins. In the early 
90s, as the industry became a larger part o f the Maine economy, the state and DMR 
began to pay more attention to this fishery. In 1993, the Legislature passed “An Act 
Concerning the Talcing o f Sea Urchins” to go into affect in January 1994. The act limited 
access to the resource in two ways. First, it restricted urchin harvesting from June 15 to 
September 15. During this time, no urchins could be harvested. Harvesters were also 
required to purchase from the DMR a license to harvest urch in s. In order to harvest 
urchins a fisherman must hold a license, and must be a Maine resident to obtain a license.
In 1994, the legislature again passed legislation concerning the resource, “An Act 
to Conserve the Sea Urchin Resource.” Most significantly, this measure created a limited 
access fishery. Commercial sea urchin harvesting licenses were opened up one last time 
before restricting new entrants to the fishery. In the years 1994 to 1998, the DMR sold 
harvesting licenses only to those fishermen already holding a license. Harvesters can not 
sell or give away a license. The diving and dragging gear types require separate licenses.
In addition, the 1994 legislation enacted a surcharge o f $160 with the purchase of 
a license in order to create the Sea Urchin Research Fund. This research fund rem ains one 
o f the primary sources of funding for scientific research. These funds are designated for 
research needed for better understanding of urchin resources. When the legislature
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formulated this research fund, they were not clear about who would conduct the research 
on sea urchins. The Department o f  Marine Resources does not have the personnel to 
conduct this research, so they distribute the funds to academics.
Following legislation passed in 1995 urchin harvesters must choose between two 
zones in which they will work. Zone 1 runs West from Penobscot Bay to Kittery. Zone 2 
runs East o f  the Penobscot Bay line to Canada. Harvesters choose a zone when they 
purchase their license and are restricted to that zone for the entire season. Within the 
boundaries o f the fishery season, each zone receives a set number of days in which the 
fishery is open. In 1996-1997, Zone 1 was open for 150 days and Zone 2 for 170.
DMR has created the Sea Urchin Zone Advisory Council (SUZAC) in order to 
allocate the days at sea in each zone. This committee includes DMR officials, divers and 
draggers from Zones 1 and 2, buyers and processors, and some scientists involved in 
fisheries management The initial purpose of the Council was to establish exactly which 
150 days for Zone 1 and 170 days for Zone 2 would be open within the season. This 
involves a complicated task of considering Japanese holidays, US holidays, and 
predictions about the market. As the council has evolved it is now taking on more 
responsibility with managing the fishery. This includes becoming a liaison with the 
industry, managing the research fund, and advising on future management plans for the 
fishery.
Most recently, the SUZAC reopened the fishery to new entrants. The limited 
access established in 1994 ended in 1998, necessitating this move. The plan opens the 
fishery to restricted number of new entrants based on the number of current harvesters 
who do not renew their licenses. This method will decrease the size of the overall fleet
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The new plan includes a requirement that new entrants have some experience in 
commercial fisheries by only considering those with a  license in some other commercial 
fishery eligible for entrance.
Cost/Price Squeeze
In the Introduction to this analysis, we saw that favorable exchange conditions 
provided a door to the sea urchin industry that did not exist previously. In 1971, President 
Nixon instituted a floating exchange rate to replace the fixed exchange rates. For the Yen 
to Dollar exchange, these changes resulted in a decline in value of the Dollar vs. the Yen 
resulting in favorable export conditions from the US to Japan, hi 1970,360 Yen could 
buy one Dollar worth o f US goods. In 1993,360 Yen could buy over three Dollars worth 
of US goods. The dropping value of the Dollar compared to the Yen has continued with 
the Japanese Yen able to purchase more US goods for the same price as the value o f the 
Dollar drops.
When competition in the industry increased these favorable exchange conditions 
allowed entrepreneurs to increase the prices paid for sea urchins and still maintain a 
profit. Over the last few years, this has become more difficult The strength o f the Yen 
has declined versus the Dollar, decreasing the profit margin that previously existed. This, 
along with the troubled Japanese economy, has decreased demand for the Northwest 
Atlantic sea urchin.
Solving Social Dilemmas
Perhaps the existence of the flexible productive arrangements on the waterfront 
and the possibility of open access to the ocean resources make the fishing industries
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prone to problems of over-harvesting. However, limiting the flexibility o f the working 
waterfront, including access to the ocean resources, does not seem like a valuable 
solution. That flexibility may be the region’s greatest strength, particularly when 
confronted with the volatility o f international markets in specialty products. One 
potential solution to the problem o f over-harvesting lies in the state management o f the 
resource. As we have seen, the State has taken actions that likely have decreased 
pressure on the resource. However, these measures themselves add to the uncertainty of 
the industry and require flexible adaptations by participants. Perhaps another solution to 
over-harvesting lies in the responsible management of the resource by those actors 
participating in the industry through informal controls on harvesting. Social 
anthropologists have documented these kinds of institutional arrangements in a number 
of common property like circumstances (see McKay and Acheson, 1987).
Trust, Social Dilemmas and Sea Urchins
Key to the success of these types of informal arrangements is the level o f trust 
that exists among participants in these fisheries. Coleman (1988; Messick et al., 1983) 
finds that trust in interpersonal relations, including economic exchange relations, can 
translate into action for solving collective problems. We have already seen the 
importance of trust in economic relations contributing to the flexible adaptations on the 
working waterfront. In order to adapt to future changes in the market and state 
management, and to attempt informal solutions to commons problems the level o f trust in 
the sea urchin industry will have to be high.
The outlook for trust solving the dilemmas imposed on the sea urchin industry is 
not optimistic given the analysis in Chapter 4. Currently, there are substantial obstacles
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to establishing trust in the sea urchin industry. If  the problems o f declining markets, 
increased State management, and over-harvesting continue it does not seem likely that 
many participants will remain in the industry. These problems are not restricted to the 
harvesting sector, but include the coast-side dealers and processors who, without the 
establishment o f trust based relations, may find themselves unable to solve the problems 
of market, state and resource decline.
This may be too dire a prediction for the industry. There do appear to be some 
potential solutions to the problems described above. For instance, consider the long-term 
trust based relations that have developed in the industry. These trust based exchange 
relations may be able to adapt to the changes in market and state management without 
having to exit the industry. As the changes persist, these relations may come to dominate 
the industry as the other participants exit. There is also the possibility that harvesters and 
dealers currently not utilizing trust in their exchanges may develop trust based relations 
in reaction to the changes in market and state management. However, it rem ains to be 
seen if these trusting relations will translate into institutions that control resource 
extraction and solve the problem of over-harvesting.
Future Research Directions
Economic sociology does not address questions o f natural resource extraction directly. 
However, I believe the analysis in previous chapters provides some insight into these 
processes. In particular, the analysis of the organizational dynamics between supply and 
demand provides insights into the boom like growth of the industry, and provides 
evidence for speculation on the ability of the industry to overcome the social dilemmas 
confronting i t  It is not only a set o f harvesters extracting a fishery resource, but an
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organizational field perched on the edge of a common property. Understanding the 
particular dynamics o f that organizational field provides insight into the extraction o f 
natural resources.
Examination o f these natural resource questions in the Northwest Atlantic sea 
urchin industry is one future research direction that might develop from this analysis. 
Related to these questions, future research might examine the political processes 
associated with the management o f the resource. This research direction could explore a 
number o f interesting questions, including 1) Examination o f the state bureaucracies that 
came to promote some controls on production. The state underwent a transition from 
trying to promote production o f the sea urchin resources to trying to control production of 
those same resources. 2) Examination of the mobilization o f industry participants to 
promote or discourage management Some of the first calls to control production came 
from the industry participants themselves, and after the state began to implement controls 
many participants called for the reductions on controls. 3) Future research might also 
attempt to discover the controls on production that best suited the industry and promoted 
a sustainable commercial fishery. Rather than one best universal solution to these 
problems, this research might attempt to uncover the management measures best suited to 
this particular industry.
Another research direction might take a macro look at the natural resource 
questions involving the international sea urchin industry. The Introduction shows that the 
Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry is only one area o f the world that has experienced 
the growth in sea urchin harvests since the 1970s. Other sea urchin fisheries have 
developed in the Pacific along the coasts of North and South America, and along the
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coasts of South Korea and the East Coast o f  Russia. The existence o f these fisheries also 
raises a number o f interesting questions: 1) Examination of the similarities between these 
fisheries. These fisheries have all developed in the last 25 years, and once started have 
developed quickly. 2) Examination o f resource dependence and resource stability in 
these areas. The development of these fisheries may rely on an existing infrastructure of 
commercial fishery extraction, and the instability o f resources may contribute to the 
development of the sea urchin fisheries. 3) Examination o f the dynamics o f global 
fisheries industries. Japanese companies are known for there global reach and have 
played a role in the development of sea urchin fisheries in the Northwest Atlantic and 
around the world.
A final line of research might compare the sea urchin industry with other “new” 
fisheries that have developed in recent years. These are fisheries for unusual species that 
have seen little harvesting pressures until the last 25 years. Since then, growing markets 
in Japan and other Asian countries have increased demand for these species. Comparing 
the economic processes in these fisheries with those found in the Northwest Atlantic sea 
urchin industry could further develop some ideas from the analysis presented here: 1) 
Examination of similarities between economic processes in these fisheries. Some general 
processes that are associated with these new fisheries might develop through comparison. 
2) Examination of some new fisheries that were not successfully developed. These 
comparisons might uncover characteristics that are essential to the success of new 
fisheries like the sea urchin.
Each o f these research directions use the analysis o f the organizational dynamics 
of the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry as a springboard to new and interesting
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directions o f research. In the Conclusion that follows, I return to this analysis and the 
questions posed at the beginning of this dissertation.
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C o n c l u sio n
R ev o lu tio n a ry  changes a re  a fo o t  a lo n g  ou r  n a tio n ’s c o a st s . Th is  resea rch  
has examined the organizational dynamics of the Northwest Atlanitc sea urchin industry 
within changing environments. I have characterized the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin 
fishery as one o f  a set of new fisheries that rely on a unique set o f political, economic and 
social resources. These new fisheries rely on new global demands. The Northwest 
Atlantic sea urchin fishery is one o f  many new fisheries supplying the unique tastes o f 
Asian consumers, in this case the Japanese. This demand relies on contemporary changes 
of international monetary arrangements. International monetary arrangements have 
changed from fixed to floating exchange rates, and the value o f  the US Dollar has 
declined versus the Japanese Yen. This change makes US products cheaper for Japanese 
customers, and makes export o f sea urchins to Japan economical. To accompany these 
changes in monetary policy the US government attempted to increase US exports. Trade 
barriers with Japan were renegotiated, and barriers diminished in seafood exports in 
particular. Responding to these changes many local governments encouraged 
development o f  these new markets o f seafood products.
These fisheries have unique supply characteristics as well. They rely on common 
property resource with State bureaucracies holding ultimate rights over the resources. As 
with other extractive resources, there is a finite supply of these fishery resources even 
with the potential of reproduction. These are characteristics o f  all fishery resources, but
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the new fisheries are further unique for being unusual, underutilized species, hi the 
Northwest Atlantic, no significant fishery for the sea urchin existed before 1985; no one 
had an interest in the species. There was no substantial market to speak of and State 
agencies did not regulate or monitor harvesting. These coasts have a long tradition o f 
industries working in traditional fisheries such as groundfish and lobsters, but these 
industries have been contracting due to over harvesting o f the resources and increased 
state regulations. As traditional fishing industries contract, these new fisheries, serving 
Asian customers, have begun to transform the coasts.
This research follows the evolutionary path of organizational development 
resulting from these changes in ecological circumstances. The analysis here focuses on 
the economic and organizational processes between supply and demand asking two 
primary questions: What kind o f economic organization has come to fill this new 
resource niche? Why did this form of economic organization develop?
Fcnnomic Organization o f  the Northwest Atlantic Sea Urchin Industry
This analysis began with a goal o f uncovering the form or forms of economic 
organization that have come to fill the resource niche between supply and demand in the 
Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry. This assumes that a variety of forms can solve 
the problem o f organizing production, rather than assuming one uniquely possible 
solution exists. Below I review the conceptual schema for examining variation in 
economic organization. I follow with a discussion of the forms o f organization that my 
analysis has uncovered in the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
210
Forms of Eennnmic Organization
This research agenda in economics originally worked with a dichotomous 
conception o f the ways economic activities could be organized: markets or hierarchies 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). Markets include one-time exchanges o f a large 
number of self-interested anonymous actors. The pursuit o f self-interest and the price 
mechanism allow for short term relations of mutual satisfaction. In the market ideal, no 
lasting or integrated relationships exist Hierarchies integrate the division o f labor 
through formal bureaucratic organization. Exchange flows through long-term relations 
governed by an authoritative power structure. Large firms create hierarchies by 
maintaining control o f the production flow from manufacturing to distribution - called 
vertical integration. A  productive enterprise may purchase resources from other 
productive enterprises through market exchange. Distribution of the product could flow 
through market transactions also. However, a hierarchical, vertically integrated firm 
organizes these transactions under a system o f authority and centralized control rather 
than market exchange.
This analysis falls within an exciting vein of research by economists and 
sociologists on economic organization that has come to challenge the market-hierarchy 
dichotomy. These social researchers have found that actual forms of economic 
organization, found through empirical observation, often vary from the market and 
hierarchy possibilities. Institutional economists have considered these variations hybrids 
o f market and hierarchy including aspects of both forms o f  organization- Sociologists 
consider these variations a form of economic organization wholly different from market
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and hierarchy. Rather than market or hierarchy, they consider these economic activities 
organized through networks.
In a production network resource allocation and transactions flow through small- 
firms linked by reciprocal mutually supportive actions (Powell, 1990b:317). In contrast 
to formal organizations, networks are non-hierarchical; in contrast to markets, networks 
include long-term exchange between actors.
Thorelli (1986) describes networks consisting o f a set of positions, or nodes, and a 
system of links between nodes. An actor occupies a position and the network relations 
reflect established long-term links. Long-term ties create stronger boundaries around 
relations than market exchange, but the links also allow for access and exit depending on 
circumstance. Networks can easily change and adapt, but also include more substantial 
relations than anonymous exchange. Powell (1990a) describes networks as “lighter on 
their feet” than hierarchies, and more easily adapting to uncertain supply and demand 
environments. Although relations are less formal than within vertically integrated firms, 
there are more established, long-term relations than in market forms o f organization.
For Powell (1990a) the quality of relationships, particularly their reciprocity, 
differentiates a network from markets and hierarchy. Rather than anonymous exchange, 
relationships include actors that share resources. Similar to markets, but through the 
process of sharing, each individual participating gains advantage. However, the actors 
are not in a short term, self-interested pursuit, but act with concern for the interest of 
other members o f the network. A single transaction between two network participants 
may not include mutual satisfaction. One member may end up slightly better off than the 
other. However, over the course of many exchanges a balance o f satisfaction and
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detriment develops. In this form o f  organization the relationships themselves become 
valuable to both parties (see Coleman, 1988), and participants work to maintain them 
through obligation and cooperation (Macneil, 1978,1985). According to Powell (1990a), 
the emphasis on relationships in networks creates advantages in production environments 
with uncertain resource supplies or demand. Producing in these environments requires 
regular innovation and adaptation to changing circumstances. Information is essential to 
this process. Strong reciprocal ties provide flows of reliable information better than 
markets or hierarchies.
The Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry includes aspects o f both the network 
and market forms o f economic organization, which I discuss below. Two unique 
organizational strategies resemble the network forms- The first form is most common in 
the whole/live market for sea urchins. Here production is organized with a quasi-firm 
strategy. The second form is found primarily among those firms working in the 
processed market. Here large processing firms organize production with a business 
group strategy. Along with these network relations, there exist unique market-like 
relations between harvesters and dealers in the processing sector o f the industry. In 
addition, the institutionalization of these forms of exchange in the sea urchin industry 
allows for plural forms o f organization to operate in the industry.
Network Organizational Strategies
Quasi-Firms in the Whole/Live M arket
In his research on the construction industry, Eccles (1981) found that general 
contractors and their subcontractors develop stable and continuous relationships that last
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over long periods of time. Although there are possibilities for opportunism, no 
hierarchical form of organization develops. Instead, general contractors and 
subcontractors tend to develop long-term and exclusive relationships. A sim ilar form o f 
organization has developed in the whole/live market for sea urchins in the Northwest 
Atlantic sea urchin industry.
Rather than integrating activities in the industry, those firms working in the 
whole/live market tend to establish long-term relations between individual firms 
performing the essential tasks o f production. Dealers along the US East Coast have 
established exclusive ties with Japanese processing companies that last for a number of 
years. The US dealers are responsible for securing a supply o f sea urchins. The Japanese 
firm is responsible for processing o f the product, which takes place in Japan. The dealer 
and processor cooperate on transporting the product with the US dealer responsible for 
transporting the product to an international airport where the Japanese company takes 
over.
Similar to the general contractors in Eccles research, these dealers establish long­
term exclusive ties with harvesters. The whole/live market serves an elite customer in 
Japan; the demand is smaller than that for the processed market, but consistent. The 
whole/live entrepreneurs need a  high quality product, but consistently pay higher prices. 
Under these conditions, long-term exclusive relations based on reciprocity have 
developed between buyers and sellers. The high quality market makes the dealers careful 
with quality estimates, usually requiring a day of evaluation before determining the value 
o f a harvesters catch. Harvesters get some advantages in these relationships, most 
notably higher prices. Dealers will make other arrangements for the harvesters such as
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filling air tanks and arranging to pick up a harvester’s catch if necessary. A close 
coordination of activities develops in these relationships, with harvesters and dealers 
talking daily about their working arrangements. The coordination is reciprocitive 
coordination, however. Dealers do not rely on the catch of a particular harvester alone, 
and the harvester could find another dealer to sell his catch. The two work together out 
o f a mutual satisfaction that develops over regular exchange.
The quasi-firm relations in the whole/live industry look very much like the 
network form of organizing production described by Powell (1990a) and others. 
Exchanges do not flow through bureaucratic lines; neither are they onetime anonymous 
transactions. Instead, exchange appears to be somewhere between these extremes, 
flowing through long-term, coordinated exchange relations based on trust and reciprocity.
Business Groups in the Processing M arket
A second form of organization follows what I call a business group strategy. At 
the center of the business groups in the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry are the 
larger processing firms of the industry. Rather than ship whole/live sea urchins to 
Japanese processors, these dealers integrated the processing activities, and complete them 
in North America. The processed product is then shipped to Japanese partners who act as 
brokers for the product on the Japanese m arket The market for sea urchin processed in 
the US is larger than the whole/live market, but it is a lower quality market also.
The unique organizational quality o f these business groups lies in the way they 
organize their supply networks. The business group entrepreneurs buy a larger quantity 
o f sea urchins, and they do not restrict themselves with regional divisions along the coast. 
Instead, these entrepreneurs set up a series o f  buying stations along the coast in order to
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have a presence in as many regions as possible. The buying stations act as coast-side 
dealers, securing harvesters catch and transporting the product to the large processor. 
Each of these buying stations is a formally recognized dealer independent o f the 
processor, but sells their product exclusively to this processor. The members of a  group 
do not compete among each other, and in the region where a buying station operates, 
industry participants know what business group the dealer works w ithin.
Business groups attempt to gamer a large supply of sea urchins, and to compete 
with other business groups with the same goals. The region o f a buying station is 
carefully chosen in order to assure buying stations within the same group do not compete 
with each other, and in order to assure competition in a region where another business 
group operates. Business groups monitor each other’s behavior and follow each other 
into new regions establishing buying stations in order to assure competition with each 
other.
A business group is a network o f  firms that regularly collaborate over a long 
period of time; they are neither completely integrated, nor loosely integrated 
(Granovetter, 1994; Powell and Smith-Doer, 1994). The relationship between the large 
processor and the regional buying stations resembles the business group form. The firms 
are a set of cooperating firms that are not completely integrated. The relationships are 
more integrated than those of the quasi-firm, however. They do not develop over a 
period of regular exchange. Instead, participants agree upon the terms o f the relationship 
before the first exchange occurs, and there is more dependence between partners to the 
exchange. If the relationship between processor and buying station were to end abruptly, 
a buying station would find it difficult to find another processor to work with. Similarly,
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the processor would find it necessary, but difficult to establish another buying station. 
Finally, the relationship is more hierarchical than vertical, with the processor holding  
more authority in the relationship.
M arket-like Exchange Strategies
Rather than the long-term exchange relations between harvesters and dealers in 
the whole/live market, these exchanges in the processing sector have market like 
characteristics. These coast-side dealers and harvesters tend to have non-exclusive, 
market like exchange relations governed by price. When business groups establish 
buying stations in a region competition between dealers can become fierce as they 
attempt to undercut prices. Some harvesters are drawn to these regions, where 
competition raises prices. Harvesters do not sell to one buyer exclusively, but to the 
highest bidder instead. This market like exchange governed by price culminates in a 
series o f spot markets that have developed along the coast at public piers. Rather than 
trust and reciprocity, these exchanges are often rife with opportunism and guile.
The competition in the processing sector is not solely between rival business 
groups. A set of transient dealers has come to form an important part o f this competition. 
Similar to the business group processors, this group exports processed sea urchin to 
Japanese businessmen who act as brokers. However, this group processes a smaller 
amount o f sea urchins, and operate smaller processing plants. This group does not have 
the financial ability to establish buying stations following the business group strategy. 
Instead, these processors travel to ports where markets already exist to compete with the 
business group processors and other transients. Transients may visit the same port 
regularly, but it is not unusual for them to visit a number o f ports and compete in
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different markets. The presence of transient dealers further increases the intensity o f 
competition at the markets.
The competition at these markets is not strictly anonymous, nor one time, hi the 
case of the established buying stations o f the business groups, harvesters and dealers 
often are quite familiar with each other. Exchanges with transient dealers are closer to, if  
not completely anonymous. Despite the amount o f anonymity, the exchanges closely 
resemble market exchange in that participants make exchange governed by price without 
concern for future exchanges.
A  Note on Plural Forms
As the organizational strategies described above became institutions in the 
Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry, the opportunity for participants to use plural 
forms of organization arose. Plural forms are exchange strategies employed by economic 
actors that combine two or more organizational forms simultaneously (Bradach and 
Eccles, 1989; Bradach, 1998). Rather than choose one form of organizing  exchange 
(long-term ties and trust or the market and price) often times actors will combine both 
forms in unique ways given particular circumstances- This is most notable among 
harvesters. For instance, harvesters who work primarily in the whole/live sector may use 
a spot market when the whole/live demand is low. Similarly, a dealer in the whole/live 
sector may turn to the spot market when his demand is higher than his regular harvesters 
can supply. In this way, the existence of the market allows for additional organizational 
strategies that use more than one form o f organizing exchange.
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Economic Sociology and the Social Construction of Indnstries
One o f the driving motivations of this research has been the assumption that the 
Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry might not have been followed this path of 
development Rather than one rational way to organize production, a variety of strategies 
exist. Above I document the forms o f organization that exist in the Northwest Atlantic 
sea urchin industry. Below I examine the social construction o f those organizational 
forms, to uncover how these forms of organization became established in the industry 
rather than some other. For this, I turn to the concepts of economic sociology. At its 
core, the New Economic Sociology has developed a set of sociological concepts for 
understanding economic action that counter the neo-classical economist’s atomized 
rational actor (see Granovetter, 1985). Block (1992) finds three sociological concepts 
central to a sociological understanding o f  economic processes: 1) economic action is 
embedded within existing social and cultural networks, 2) the role o f imitation in 
structuring economic action, and 3) the importance o f blocked exchanges. Each o f these 
concepts plays a key role in my analysis o f the construction of economic institutions in 
the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry. A fourth concept, the shared set of 
expectations by those involved in economic exchange has also played an important role 
in my analysis. Below I look at each of these concepts and their role in the development 
and the organizational dynamics o f the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry.
Embedded Economic Action
The concept o f embeddedness maintains that the individual economic actor is not 
able to disregard existing and ongoing social ties in their economic actions (Block, 1992; 
Granovetter, 1985; Polyani, 1957). Instead, an actors wide ranging social and cultural
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ties influence how they respond to economic signals. Social ties both allow actors to take 
certain economic actions (in the form o f social capital), as well as restrain the actions o f 
economic actors (in the form of inertial pressures).
Social Capital and Inertial Pressures
In many cases, existing social relations provide essential resources for the 
economic actions of individuals—starting a business or finding a job for instance. In 
these instances the actual social ties provide the actors with a resource known as social 
capital (Coleman, 1988). Capital most commonly refers to some form o f physical or 
financial capital. Economists use the concept human capital to refer to an individual's skills 
and education that provide an economic resource (Becker, 1964). This extends the concept 
of physical capital embodied in tools, machines, and other productive equipment to 
individual persons. Similarly, social capital extends the idea o f capital to find economic 
resources in the existing and ongoing social relations individuals hold.
In contrast to the ability for action provided by social capital resources, existing 
social relations can limit the ability o f economic actors to take advantage of 
opportunities. Hannon and Freeman (1984,1989) call this lack o f movement inertia.
They find expectations and reputations associated with existing social ties, and actors 
sometimes move slowly in order to fulfill those expectations and to m aintain their 
reputations. Institutional sociologists call these normative pressures, or guiding 
conceptions of control (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1996). Economic actors 
do not write off their existing ties lightly, and they do not write off their reputation and 
the legitimacy associated with it. Instead, they act to maintain these ties in ways that 
limit their autonomous actions. Following this, actors not embedded within existing  ties
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do not share the social capital advantages, but they do not share the limits on their 
autonomy either.
Embedded Action and the N orthwest A tlantic Sea Urchin Industry
Entrepreneurial Processes. Social capital and inertia were key to the 
development o f the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry. The advantage traditional 
entrepreneurs held in mobilizing labor for the new sea urchin fishery clearly 
demonstrated the social capital advantages they held. Over time, these entrepreneurs had 
developed relationships with harvesters based on reciprocity and trust. These relations 
made it easy for the traditional entrepreneur to ask harvesters to take the risks associated 
with working in the new fishery. In fact, looking for these types o f opportunities was part 
of their working relationship. As a result of their being embedded in this set of ongoing 
relations on the waterfront, these entrepreneurs considered the process matter of fact.
The contrast with the business group entrepreneurs made the advantage held by these 
entrepreneurs particularly clear. These entrepreneurs were getting involved in the new 
industry at the same time, but did not have the existing, ongoing relations on the 
waterfront. Rather than matter o f fact, getting started in the new industry was difficult 
for these new entrepreneurs. Eventually these entrepreneurs from outside of the 
waterfront had to turn to dealers already embedded on the waterfront in order to get 
established. These relationships with dealers were the first buying stations as these 
entrepreneurs began to organize along the business group lines.
The existing and ongoing relations of the traditional entrepreneur provided them 
with an advantage in establishing themselves in the new fishery, but these embedded 
relations also inhibited the extent to which these entrepreneurs pursued this opportunity.
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The business group entrepreneurs, structurally more autonomous, were not inhibited by 
the inertial pressures o f the ongoing relations. This allowed them more avenues to pursue 
when organizing the new industry. They sought sea urchins on a year round basis, 
moved into the processing sector, adopted an expansion orientation, and competed 
directly with other entrepreneurs along the coast. Each of these directions contradicted 
the organizational strategies o f the traditional entrepreneurs. The traditional entrepreneur 
follows an organizational strategy that includes switching among fisheries based on 
season, long-term reciprocal relations with harvesters, and an association with a 
particular port or region o f the coast The sea urchin industry changed as a result o f the 
new entrepreneurs’ organizing strategies, and inertial pressures on traditional 
entrepreneurs kept them from changing with i t
The development o f the transient organizational strategy provides an interesting 
combination of social capital advantage and autonomy from inertial pressures. This 
group came predominantly, though not exclusively, from the Cambodian and Vietnamese 
refugee communities in New England. Similar to the advantages traditional 
entrepreneurs have in mobilizing harvesting labor, these entrepreneurs had an advantage 
in mobilizing a labor force to process sea urchins. Embedded in the local refugee 
communities, these entrepreneurs could easily mobilize a processing labor force.
However, this group o f entrepreneurs was not embedded within the waterfront at all.
This autonomy allowed them to develop the transient strategy for securing a supply of sea 
urchins.
Labor Processes. Inertial pressures played a key role in the labor process also. 
Established harvesters moved into the new fishery as local dealers approached them.
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These harvesters were already embedded in the waterfront both internally with 
investments in physical capital and externally with ongoing relationships with other 
actors within the organizational field. Being embedded allowed their easy movement 
into the new fishery, but these same ties inhibited their interest in the new fishery. As the 
industry changed in the entrepreneurial sector these harvesters chose to maintain their 
existing relations rather than adapt to the requirements o f the new industry.
Other harvesters who moved into the new fishery were not already established on 
the waterfront, and consequently held more autonomy from the inertial pressures. One 
group of young harvesters came from waterfront communities, but had not established 
their careers as inshore fishermen. A second group o f harvesters came from outside the 
waterfront context, and moved to commercial fishing to take advantage o f the 
employment opportunity. Neither of these groups were limited by existing social and 
cultural relations, and therefore adapted easily with the changes in the new fishery.
Imitation and Economic Action
Economists assume that economic actors will calculate preferences independently 
of other actors. Sociologists assume actors make economic decisions and develop 
strategies with direct reference to other actors. In particular, actors imitate the decisions 
and strategies o f other actors in similar circumstances whom they deem to be successful. 
Imitation is a way of dealing with the problems o f uncertainty. In uncertain situations, 
economic actors often follow the actions o f friends, neighbors, business associates, and 
competitors. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call these mimetic pressures, when firms 
model themselves on other firms that they consider legitimate or successful.
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Expansion and Integration
Imitation was key to one o f the defining developments o f the sea urchin industry, 
the decision by many entrepreneurs to move from exporting whole/live sea urchins to 
begin exporting processed sea urchins. The decision to process was a decision to 
integrate activities previously carried out by other firms in the productive system. This 
included taking on substantial costs in-equipment, facilities, and labor. Perhaps most 
important, the decision to process was a  decision to enter a different market, a larger but a 
lower quality market supplying a more modest customer.
Entrepreneurs made the decision to integrate and move into a new market because 
of a belief that survival in the industry depended on the ability to expand production. 
These entrepreneurs saw expansion as a necessary step for survival in the industry. 
Operating without normative or experiential guides to organizing their business, the new 
entrepreneurs innovated and imitated each other as they developed larger, more 
integrated firms. First, this involved establishing relations with the large trading 
companies in Japan who had the money and networks to handle the increased shipment of 
supply. These trading companies held the financial capability to support the integration 
of productive activities. These trading companies were key to making the move to the 
processing sector, but the willingness these larger companies found among new 
entrepreneurs is equally important. The new entrepreneurs were looking for the 
expansion opportunities. Monitoring the behaviors o f other firms, they believed reaching 
a larger market was the key to their survival. Without that access, their business would 
fail. Moving into processing was the way to reach that market. The influence of these
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mimetic pressures stands out in the contrast of traditional entrepreneurs and new 
entrepreneurs who resisted these pressures and chose to stay in the whole/live m arket
Career Strategies
Imitation was again apparent in the labor process as young harvesters from the 
waterfront context moved into the sea urchin fishery. Although not yet established in a 
commercial inshore fishing industry, these fishermen intended to become established. To 
accomplish this, these harvesters followed a strategy adopted by many harvesters along 
the waterfront. This includes choosing a primary fishery in which to operate, and 
supplementing this fishery with work in other fisheries seasonally. Becoming established 
means investing in the fishery internally through investment in a boat and key gear. It 
also means investing externally in the establishment of key relationships and a reputation 
in that fishery. The harvester develops a level of commitment to their primary fishery, 
which they do not hold for other supplemental work. As opportunities in the sea urchin 
fishery arose, many young harvesters took advantage o f the new opportunity by choosing 
the new fishery as their primary fishery. These harvesters developed their career 
strategies by imitating other successful harvesters. Through monitoring other successful 
harvesters, or harvesters who hold an amount of legitimacy in the local communities  
these harvesters developed strategies for their own careers. In many cases, these models 
were family members, or close friends and neighbors.
Blocked Exchanges
Sociologists recognize that certain types of economic actions are restricted, or 
blocked (Block, 1992:526). This dissertation has considered this concept in terms o f both
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open and closed relationships. If  we can not assume unrestricted access to all economic 
activities, then it becomes as important to explain open as well as closed relationships. 
Productive relations are open to outsiders to the extent that participation is not denied, 
and closed to outsiders when participation is occluded, limited or subject to conditions 
(Weber, 1968:43). Drawing on Weber, the institutional approach to labor processes 
emphasizes two mechanisms that work to keep productive systems closed: access to 
property (Parkin, 1979) and the filtering of personnel (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The 
importance of property is clear; control over property includes control of the material 
resources essential to the productive process. Filtering o f personnel is an attempt by 
members of an occupation to “control the production o f  the producers (Larson,
1977:49).” This is done through admitting only those with certain characteristics (i.e. 
professional training, required credentials, membership in trade associations) to 
participate.
When the first entrepreneurs began to consider shipping sea urchins to Japan, and 
when they approached the first harvesters to invest time in the industry, there were two 
potential restrictions on access to the resource that might have stalled the development of 
the new industry. There may have been state limitations, and there may have been 
informal limitations on access to the resource.
Access Limitations
The first seven years o f the industry took place primarily along the coasts of 
Maine where the state legislature holds the ultimate rights over resources within the 
three-mile limit. Important decisions on the management o f this resource follow the 
channels o f all law making in the state. The Department o f Marine Resources is the
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administrative body that controls the resource on a day-to-day basis through the edict o f 
the State. The DMR could have limited entry to the sea urchin fishery when the first sea 
urchins began selling in Japan, but they did not Two factors contributed to DMR’s not 
restricting access, however. First, the department had no precedent for restricting access, 
and there was no movement from within the department to establish a precedent with this 
new fishery. This lack o f  precedent combined with a push from the Governor through the 
DMR to develop the state’s commercial fisheries industries. These forces targeted 
unusual, underutilized fisheries such as the sea urchin as an area for growth.
If the state did not establish formal restrictions to resource access, there may have 
been informal restrictions from local producers. These types o f informal restrictions on 
access to common property resources are common in many settings, one o f the most well 
known cases being the lobster gangs of Maine. Two factors contributed to this lack of 
territorial enforcement. One factor discouraging informal restrictions on access to the sea 
urchin fishery lies in the species-specific character o f lobster gang’s territoriality. While 
the gangs act as a strong filter on access to the lobster fishery, they do not exert much 
control on access to other fisheries. A second reason for the lobster gangs not exerting 
control on access to the sea urchin fishery lies in the unusual qualities o f the species. The 
sea urchin fit the lobster fisherman’s definition of a trash fish. Not only did lobster gangs 
not restrict access to the sea urchin fishery, they were happy to see them go.
Open Labor Practices
Along with open access to resources, the labor markets along the waterfront 
include cooperative social relationships that are subject to little restriction- One set of 
cooperative relationships exists between harvesters and local dealers. Harvesters and
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dealers often cooperate in order to explore the possibilities o f  new fishery related 
products. These social relations are not exclusive partnerships between pairs, but are a 
part of the economic life of the waterfront Dealers cooperate with many different 
harvesters, and harvesters cooperate with different dealers when exploring these new 
ventures. Similarly, harvesters using different technologies often cooperate in order to 
work in new fisheries. Individually neither harvester would be able to work in a fishery, 
but through cooperation, they can. These relationships are not restrictive either. They 
may last a few days, a season, or multiple years. Initiating, ending, and in some cases re­
establishing these relationships is common.
As we have seen, these open labor practices allowed easy movement of traditional 
entrepreneurs into the new sea urchin fishery. Established harvesters collaborated with 
established dealers to explore the new fishery. They also allowed harvesters to move into 
the fishery easily. Boat owners collaborated with SCUBA divers to work in the new 
fishery; experienced harvesters combined their knowledge with new harvesters to move 
into the new fishery. Open labor practices—the ability to establish, end and re-establish 
cooperative relations easily—allowed the easy movement o f the traditional entrepreneurs 
and harvesters to the new fishery.
Expectations and Exchange
Institutional sociologists emphasize the influence o f cultural expectations, the 
taken for granted understandings o f every day life, on economic action. Actors extend 
these background expectations to those that they assume hold a world in common. 
Expectations may constitute the defining  the rules of a specific context or situation, also. 
Actors may develop shared expectations through regular interaction, or they may assume
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it given shared characteristics. Background and constitutive expectations have played a 
role in the inertial pressures and in the expectations o f cooperation in the open labor 
market processes discussed above. Expectations o f opportunism played a role in  the 
formation o f  non-exclusive, market like exchange between harvesters and dealers, also.
Zucker (1986) points out that these expectations may provide trust in exchange 
relations; trust being the mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit the 
other’s vulnerability. In the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry expectations of 
distrust developed, and contributed to the non-exclusive, market like exchange relations 
between harvesters and coast-side dealers. The exchanges have indeterminate outcomes, 
and opportunistic behavior is rife—conditions that might lead to cooperative, trust-based 
exchange relations. However, these inefficient exchanges persist because the participants 
to the exchange expect opportunistic actions by participants to the exchange, and are 
unable to overcome these expectations.
The persistence of these relationships follows a two step path of development 
First, the industry required the establishment of new exchange relations, rather than being 
based on existing exchange relations. As the industry developed the demography o f the 
industry changed. Participants with established relations left the industry, and 
participants without established relations came to dominate the industry. Without the 
regular interactions, these actors could not rely on existing expectations of exchange. 
These new participants came from a variety of social backgrounds, also. Some from 
coastal communities, some not; some with commercial fishing experience, some not; 
some from European descent, some not. Without the shared characteristics, participants 
could not assume shared expectations.
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At this point, the new participants to the industry might have developed 
expectations of trust based on regular exchange in the industry. Three social factors 
inhibited this development, however. First, the new entrepreneurs in the industry 
developed a reputation for taking advantage of harvesters by withholding market 
information. Whether true or not, these reputations have became a part o f the harvester 
culture, and they contribute to a continued expectation o f opportunistic behavior.
Second, one group of new entrepreneurs came from the Cambodian and Vietnamese 
refugee community of New England, and use the transient strategy of securing a supply 
of sea urchins. The heterogeneous background discouraged expectations of trust, and the 
transient strategy did not lend itself to regular exchange that might develop expectations 
of trust. Finally, the regular turnover in the industry, particularly in the processing sector, 
made the establishment o f expectations of trust based on regular exchange difficult. 
Without the development o f trust expectations, participants approached exchange 
relations with an assumption o f opportunism on the part o f exchange partners and the 
persistence of non-exclusive market like relations.
Summary of Findings and Contributions of the Research
I would like to finish by reviewing some of the important findings o f this research and by 
considering some further implications of this analysis to the field of economic sociology. 
To this point, the conclusion addresses the primary significance of the research. It takes 
an important step by bringing together an important empirical literature on unique forms
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of economic organization with a more theoretically formal literature in economic 
sociology53.
The empirical literature primarily includes case studies o f network forms o f 
production, hi some cases they focus on networks in particular industries, some on 
small-firm networks that concentrate in certain regions (Silicon Valley in California, the 
Emilia-Romagna Region o f Northern Italy, and Southwestern Germany), and some on 
large networks that span the globe (Japanese and Korean business groups). These cases 
are interesting because they combine cooperation and competition, and provide a  contrast 
to markets and hierarchies. The formal economic sociology literature comes primarily 
from the network literature, but also includes contributions from organizational research 
and new institutional economics.
The research describes the unique set of organizational arrangements that came to 
dominate the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry, and it uses concepts from economic 
sociology to examine how these forms came to dominate the industry, and not some 
others. While this research is a case study itself, I believe it has some implications for the 
more formal literature in economic sociology that I would like to suggest here.
Economics and Economic Sociology
In Chapter 1 ,1 outline the differences between the economic and sociological 
approach to economic life. This research contributes to research on economic institutions 
by demonstrating the salience o f  sociological variables in explaining the formation and 
persistence o f economic institutions.
53 The complements of these two research directions has been discussed at length by Powell (1990a; Powell 
and Smith-Doer, 1994)
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First, the analysis demonstrates the social capital advantages of embedded 
economic activity. Actors with existing and trusting relations embedded in ongoing 
economic contexts hold advantages o f access to opportunities that other actors do not 
hold. Equally important, existing and ongoing relations can place create inertial 
pressures, limiting the movement o f actors. These inherently social variables help 
explain how opportunities arise and who takes advantage o f the opportunities. Imitation 
in economic action is similarly a social process. Economic actors make decisions, not 
individually, but in reference to other actors. In uncertain circumstances, actors turn to 
the practices o f others they deem successful and mimic those practices in their own 
activities. With new industries, imitation of new innovative activities leads to isomorphic 
activities and to the establishment o f new institutions. Finally, demographic changes and 
reputations contribute to the inability to overcome expectations of opportunism, which in 
turn lead to the persistence o f market-like relations.
These concepts from economic sociology have contributed to the understanding 
o f the economic processes o f the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry. In turn, these 
findings contribute to the field o f economic sociology by providing further evidence for 
the salience of these concepts. In addition to this contribution, I believe this research has 
some larger implications for the economic sociology literature. Particularly the 
theoretical work on economic institutions and small-firm networks.
The Limits o f  Social Networks
Much has been made about the economic advantages o f small-firm networks.
Best (1990) heralded them as the “New Competition” and organizational sociologists 
have admired the small-firm networks’ ability to adapt to changing economic
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circumstances: light on their feet, flexible boundaries. This research did find the 
network-like relations o f die working waterfront to resemble these descriptions o f  the 
network form o f organizing production. Here production was “light on its feet” and able 
to open its boundaries and adapt to the new sea urchin fishery. Those existing social 
relations gave actors an advantage in the changing economic environment. There was a 
unique competition here, found in the flexible adaptation of the existing social relations 
on the waterfront.
There were clearly limits, however, to the adaptability of these particular 
relations. The inertial pressures of ongoing economic relations inhibited both dealers and 
harvesters from taking advantage of the new opportunities fully. The limits of the 
network form of relations lie partly in the structural aspects of the relations. The strong 
network ties, and the sunk costs of the existing economic relations discouraged the actors 
from moving fully into the new industry. In addition, the limits of these ties lie in the 
institutional aspects of these relationships. The dealers chose to uphold expectations and 
their reputation in the ongoing economic relations. Harvesters chose to honor 
expectations and to follow certain career strategies that have become part o f inshore 
fisheries along the working waterfront These pressures are not strictly structural, but 
follow from cultural expectations and understandings about production on the working 
waterfront.
The network-like relations on the waterfront were finally limited through 
competition with other organizational forms that inhabited the sea urchin industry. The 
inertia described above stands in contrast to the actions o f actors com ing from outside the 
context of the working waterfront. These actors operated without the inertial pressures
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o f existing relations and were able to expand and create new forms o f  organization and 
competition in the industry. Those holding the existing network-like relations were 
pushed out of the industry through competition with the non-network organizational 
forms.
Institutions and Innovations
If the network relations on the working waterfront limited some actors in the 
industry, the open character of these relations allowed the entrance o f  new actors to the 
industry. Rather than starting from scratch, these new actors used the already existing 
organizational form to create new innovative forms of organization. In this way, the 
existing institutions of production lead to the emergence of new innovative forms of 
organization.
One place we can see this evolutionary process is the organizational strategies o f 
the business group entrepreneurs. Here entrepreneurs met with organizational obstacles 
to production. In overcoming these obstacles, this group of entrepreneurs developed the 
business group organizational strategy described above. This organizational strategy 
“piggybacks” on the existing organization o f production on the waterfront, however. The 
business group entrepreneurs tapped into the existing inshore institutions to develop their 
business groups. There are two important aspects of this piggyback relationship. First, 
the existing institutions are essential for overcoming obstacles to production. Without 
that existing organizational form, these entrepreneurs would have had difficulty 
becoming established in the sea urchin industry. Second, the piggyback process resulted 
in a new, and fundamentally different, organizational form than the initial institutions it 
relied upon.
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We can again see the importance of existing institutions in the creation o f  
organizational innovations with the spot markets in the sea urchin industry. First, 
consider the transient entrepreneurs’ strategies for securing a supply o f sea urchins- The 
strategy o f transient entrepreneurs describe above relied on the existence of markets for 
sea urchins that began to develop through business group competition. Without a  group 
o f harvesters prepared to sell their catch to the highest bidder these entrepreneurs would 
have found it difficult to get started in the sea urchin industry. The transient strategy 
transformed these markets, and created an organizational form unique to the business 
group and traditional organizational strategies. Similarly, the plural forms of organizing 
exchange discussed in Chapter 4 use the spot markets to create unique organizational 
strategies that combine organizational forms.
Learning Trust
Finally, this research provides some insight to persistent questions about creating 
trust based economic relations. Trust can be found and lost, but not created according to 
many observers (Sabel, 1993:104). The sea urchin industry provides examples o f  finding 
and losing trust, as well as demonstrating the difficulty o f  overcoming distrust. Trust was 
lost through the demographic shift in the industry. As the traditional entrepreneurs and 
established harvesters who held long-term reciprocal ties left the industry, the overall 
amount o f trust in the industry declined. Participants in the whole/live sector appear to 
have found trust. Here a group o f harvesters and dealers not established on the waterfront 
have developed long-term reciprocal relations similar to those utilized by established 
actors.
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The research provides a stark example o f the difficulties in overcoming obstacles 
to trust as well. The exchange relations that make up the spot markets at public piers 
along the coast have developed an institutionalized distrust among participants. Under 
economic conditions that clearly would lend themselves to trust based long-term 
exchange relations, deceit and guile persist. While trust based economic relations were 
able to develop in the whole/live sector, the distrust at the spot markets demonstrate the 
obstacles to trust that can develop within organizational fields.
Summary o f Findings
This discussion returns to questions first raised in the introduction to this dissertation.* 
How do social forces influence the initiation and development of these unique 
organizational forms? Do the cooperation and trust found in these relations result from 
rational pursuit of self-interest? Do they rely on the influence of existing social relations 
in economic life? Much is made of the advantages o f  networks. Do limits to the 
adaptability of these organizational forms exist? How might social forces constrain the 
adaptability of production networks?
The analysis of the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry contained within these pages 
examines this unique commercial fishery from the perspective of economic sociology. In 
turn, the analysis provides some insight to questions at the core of the new economic 
sociology:
■ Social relations, particularly existing institutions, provide a stepping stone for new 
innovative institutions that develop.
■ Rational self-interest alone does not guarantee the development o f  trust based 
exchange.
541 first develop these questions in pages 1-6, and restate them on pages 19-20.
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■ Existing social relations can contribute to the persistence o f distrust in exchange.
■ Existing social relations and the expectations that accompany those relations can lim it 
the adaptability o f actors in these networks.
The evolutionary development o f the Northwest Atlantic sea urchin industry, and the 
organizational dynamics o f small-firms in that industry, does not provide the final word 
on these questions. However, by bringing together an important case study literature on 
unique forms o f economic organization with a more theoretically formal literature in 
economic sociology to examine this unique industry, this research takes a first step.
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A p p e n d ix  
S e m i-S t r u c t u r e d  I n t e r v ie w  G u id e s
This appen d ix  includes t h r e e  in terv iew  guides I used  w h il e  con ducting  sem i-  
structured in-depth interviews o f  sea urchin industry participants. I used the guides 
during interviews with harvesters, dealers, and processors in the industry. I did not 
follow these guides rigidly during the interviews. Instead, they were to remind me of 
subjects I meant to cover at some point during the interview, and to help me prepare for 
interviews. Any one interview might follow a number o f directions, covering these 
issues in different sequences, and covering issues not set out in the interview guide.
The guide primarily includes a set o f subjects I planned to cover in the interview 
with sub-sections included with each subject At the end o f the interview guide I include 
a set of actual questions I m ight ask during the interview in order to obtain the 
information included in the guide. These questions were meant to establish a 
conversation, and most information was obtained through probing follow-up questions.
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Urchin Harvester Interview Guide.
When did you first realize there was a market for sea urchins?
□ Year started.
□ Who introduced to industry?
a  How obtained equipment to get started?
□ How learned techniques o f fishing?
What did you do before you were harvesting / in urchin fishery?
□ Tending another sea urchin diver.
□ Worked in other fisheries.
□ Other non-commercial fishery types o f work?
□ Still does this work?
□ If so, does this other work in this area?
What do you currently do when not urchin diving?
□ Works in other fisheries.
□ Does other types o f work.
□ Works in this area.
□ Which do you prefer sea urchin harvesting or other work? 
Relationships with buyers.
□ History o f relations with buyers.
□ Do you use long term relations?
□ Do you use more than one? How many buyers?
□ How did you meet your buyer(s)?
□ Do you switch buyers often?
□ Do you establish exchange deals outside o f exchange?
□ How is money exchanged?
□ Do you trust your buyer(s)?
□ Do you ever work with Cambodian buyers?
□ Have you noticed changes over time in selling  your catch?
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Relationships with processors.
□ History of relations with buyers, 
a  Do you use long term relations?
□ Do you use more than one? How many buyers?
□ How did you meet your buyer(s)?
□ Do you switch buyers often?
□ Do you establish exchange deals outside o f exchange?
□ How is money exchanged?
□ Do you trust your buyer(s)?
□ Do you ever work with Cambodian buyers?
□ Have you noticed changes over time in selling your catch?
Relationships with other harvesters.
□ History o f relations with buyers.
□ Do you use long term relations?
□ Do you use more than one? How many buyers?
□ How did you meet your buyer(s)?
□ Do you switch buyers often?
□ Do you establish exchange deals outside o f exchange?
□ How is money exchanged?
□ Do you trust your buyer(s)?
□ Do you ever work with Cambodian buyers?
□ Have you noticed changes over time in selling your catch?
Organization of work.
□ Do you own a boat?
□ Do you work for yourself?
□ Have you ever worked for a processor or buyer?
□ What is your relationship with your tender?
□ Do you work with other harvesters, form cooperatives?
□ Do you trust other harvesters?
□ How is money exchanged?
Role of the State.
□ The regulation process?
□ Like the moratorium? Should it be extended?
□ Research fund?
□ Are regulations good for the fishery?
□ Do you like the zone system?
□ East - South?
a  Is the DMR a good manager o f the resource?
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Organization.
□ Me Urchin Harvesters Association.
□ Downeast urchin harvesters association. DE Draggers.
□ Other fisheries organizations.
□ How did you hear about/get involved with these groups?
□ What do you think o f these groups?
□ Involved with Strike last winter?
□ How found out about strike?
□ Agree with strikers?
□ Attend public hearings?
□ Local or in Augusta?
□ Attend alone or with group?
□ How hear about meetings?
□ Do they get any results?
□ Processors’ organizations?
Organizational Field.
□ Admire others in Maine industry?
□ Admire others in international industry?
□ Who are your competitors?
□ Who do you turn to for advice?
□ Do you socialize with others in industry?
Future of Fishery.
□ Aquaculture? Future/Funding?
□ Is the resource sustainable?
□ Do you see yourself in the fishery?
□ If no, why leave?
□ Any plans already set?
□ Future plans in this area?
Why Fish?
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1. When did you first realize there was a market for sea urchins?
2. Could you describe a typical day for you working in the sea urchin industry?
3. Could you describe for me, to the best o f your knowledge, how an urchin gets form 
the ocean floor to a Japanese customer?
4. When you are making important business decisions who do you consult for advice?
5. Are there particular individuals in the Maine sea urchin industry that you admire?
6. Are the particular individuals in the International sea urchin industry that you admire?
7. Who are your competitors?
8. What is the Japanese market for urchins like?
9. What would be the best way for the state to manage the fishery resource?
10. Thinking o f the next 5 to 10 years, do you see the urchin fishery lasting?
11. What influence have the Cambodians had on the industry?
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Urchin Dealers Interview Guide.
When did you first realize there was a market for sea urchins?
□ Year started.
□ Who introduced?
□ Need to raise money?
□ Need to recruit labor?
□ Other family involved?
□ How did you leam? Did it require training?
□ How did you secure supply? Harvesters? Dealers?
□ Do you work with exporters? The Japanese?
What did you do before you were in the urchin fishery?
□ Worked in other fisheries.
□ Other non-commercial fishery types o f work?
□ Still does this work?
□ If so, does this other work in this area?
What do you currently do when not buying and selling urchins?
□ Worked in other fisheries.
□ Other non-commercial fishery types o f work?
□ Still does this work?
□ If so, does this other work in this area?
Relationships with harvesters.
□ History o f relations with buyers.
□ Do you use long term relations?
□ Do you use more than one? How many buyers?
□ How did you meet your buyer(s)?
□ Do you switch buyers often?
□ Do you establish exchange deals outside o f exchange?
□ How is money exchanged?
□ Do you trust your buyer(s)?
□ Do you ever work with Cambodian buyers?
□ Have you noticed changes over time in selling your catch?
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Relationship with processors and exporters.
□ History o f relations with buyers.
□ Do you use long term relations?
□ Do you use more than one? How many buyers?
□ How did you meet your buyer(s)?
□ Do you switch buyers often?
□ Do you establish exchange deals outside o f exchange?
□ How is money exchanged?
□ Do you trust your buyer(s)?
□ Do you ever work with Cambodian buyers?
□ Have you noticed changes over time in selling your catch?
Relationships with Other buyers.
□ History o f relations with buyers.
□ Do you use long term relations?
□ Do you use more than one? How many buyers?
□ How did you meet your buyer(s)?
□ Do you switch buyers often?
□ Do you establish exchange deals outside o f exchange?
□ How is money exchanged?
□ Do you trust your buyer(s)?
□ Do you ever work with Cambodian buyers?
□ Have you noticed changes over time in selling your catch?
Organizational Field.
□ Admire others in Maine industry?
□ Admire others in international industry?
□ Who are your competitors?
a Who do you turn to for advice?
□ Do you socialize with others in industry?
Industry Organization.
□ What do you think o f harvesters’ organizations
□ Processors’ organizations
□ Do you get involved?
□ What do you think o f the strike?
□ Are they legitimate concerns? 
a  Do you attend public meetings?
□ Local or in Augusta?
□ Do you attend alone or in a group?
□ How hear about meetings?
□ Story/Results?
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Role of the State.
□ The regulation process?
a  Like the moratorium? Should it be extended? 
a  Research fund?
□ Are regulations good for the fishery?
□ Do you like the zone system?
□ East - South?
□ Is the DMR a good manager o f the resource? 
Future of Fishery.
□ Aquaculture? Future/Funding?
□ Is the resource sustainable?
□ Do you see yourself in the fishery?
□ If no, why leave?
□ Any plans already set?
□ Future plans in this area?
Why the Seafood Industry?
12. When did you first realize there was a market for sea urchins?
13. Could you describe a typical day for you working in the sea urchin industry?
14. Could you describe for me, to the best of your knowledge, how an urchin gets form 
the ocean floor to a Japanese customer?
15. When you are making important business decisions who do you consult for advice?
16. Are there particular individuals in the Maine sea urchin industry that you adm ire?
17. Are the particular individuals in the International sea urchin industry that you admire?
18. Who are your competitors?
19. What is the Japanese market for urchins like?
20. What would be the best way for the state to manage the fishery resource?
21. Thinking o f the next 5 to 10 years, do you see the urchin fishery lasting?
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Urchin Processor Interview Guide.
When did you first realize there was a market for sea urchins?
□ Year started.
□ Who introduced?
□ Need to raise money?
□ Need to recruit labor?
□ Other family involved?
□ How did you leam? Did it require training?
□ How did you secure supply? Harvesters? Dealers?
□ Do you work with exporters? The Japanese?
□ Type of market: whole/live or processed.
What did you do before you were in the urchin fishery?
□ Worked in other fisheries.
□ Other non-commercial fishery types o f work?
□ Still does this work?
□ If so, does this other work in this area?
What do you currently do when not processing urchins?
□ Worked in other fisheries.
□ Other non-commercial fishery types o f work?
□ Still does this work?
□ If so, does this other work in this area?
Relationships with buyers.
□ History o f relations with buyers.
□ Do you use long term relations?
□ Do you use more than one? How many buyers?
□ How did you meet your buyer(s)?
□ Do you switch buyers often?
□ Do you establish exchange deals outside o f exchange?
□ How is money exchanged?
□ Do you trust your buyer(s)?
□ Do you ever work with Cambodian buyers?
□ Have you noticed changes over time in selling your catch?
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Relationship with Exporters
□ History of relations with buyers.
□ Do you use long term relations?
□ Do you use more than one? How many buyers?
□ How did you meet your buyer(s)?
□ Do you switch buyers often?
□ Do you establish exchange deals outside o f exchange?
□ How is money exchanged?
□ Do you trust your buyerfs)?
□ Do you ever work with Cambodian buyers?
□ Have you noticed changes over time in selling your catch?
Relations with Harvesters.
□ History of relations with buyers.
□ Do you use long term relations?
□ Do you use more than one? How many buyers? 
q How did you meet your buyer(s)?
□ Do you switch buyers often?
a  Do you establish exchange deals outside o f exchange?
□ How is money exchanged?
□ Do you trust your buyer(s)?
□ Do you ever work with Cambodian buyers?
□ Have you noticed changes over time in selling your catch?
Organizational Field.
□ Admire others in Maine industry?
□ Admire others in international industry?
□ Who are your competitors?
□ Who do you turn to for advice?
□ Do you socialize with others in industry?
Industry Organization.
□ What do you think o f harvesters’ organizations
□ Processors’ organizations
□ Do you get involved?
□ What do you think o f the strike?
□ Are they legitimate concerns?
□ Do you attend public meetings?
□ Local or in Augusta?
□ Do you attend alone or in a group?
□ How hear about meetings?
□ Story/Results?
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Role o f the State.
a  The regulation process?
□ Like the moratorium? Should it be extended?
□ Research fund?
□ Are regulations good for the fishery?
□ Do you like the zone system?
□ East - South?
□ Is the DMR a good manager o f the resource? 
Future o f Fishery.
□ Aquaculture? Future/Funding?
□ Is the resource sustainable?
□ Do you see yourself in the fishery?
□ If no, why leave?
□ Any plans already set?
□ Future plans in this area?
Why the Seafood Industry?
22. When did you first realize there was a market for sea urchins?
23. Could you describe a typical day for you working in the sea urchin industry?
24. Could you describe for me, to the best of your knowledge, how an urchin gets form 
the ocean floor to a Japanese customer?
25. When you are making important business decisions who do you consult for advice?
26. Are there particular individuals in the Maine sea urchin industry that you admire?
27. Are the particular individuals in the International sea urchin industry that you admire?
28. What is the Japanese market for urchins like?
29. What would be the best way for the state to manage the fishery resource?
30. Thinking o f the next 5 to 10 years, do you see the urchin fishery lasting?
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